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FOREWORD
There is a need for the United States to move the debate
over the challenge China presents us beyond the
dispositions of the attention grabbing advocates: the
rationalizers who explain Chinese actions in benign terms
with their own political or academic motives, or the
denigrators, who are “The Chinese Are Coming” school—to
wit: China is belligerent, a threat, in short, a monster. It is
increasingly important for Americans to think carefully
about the vast complexities of the U.S.-China relationship,
and the calculations that go into forming courses of action.
The Chinese have to consider some of the same realities we
do when planning military actions and strategy. The key
question is: will China’s so-called first priority of economic
development and its resulting influence on domestic social
stability curtail China’s continuing reliance on military
force as a means of exerting its influence? In addition, will
economic development enhance China’s comprehensive
national power and thus contribute to some of China’s more
unhealthy goals, such as dominating the South China Seas,
seizing Taiwan by force, or grabbing the Senkaku Islands
from Japan? Is the China-Taiwan economic dynamic strong
enough to offset military adventurism? The rationalizers
often say security and sovereignty will always trump
economic determinism, others insist economic factors will
change China—and thus decrease the chances of war,
especially with China winning the 2008 Olympics. How this
dilemma is managed by the United States, China, and
Taiwan will affect the future of Asia, and perhaps the world.
We have tried to present in this book factual and analytical
essays which stress the need for squarely addressing these
questions.
So, this volume should make a valuable contribution by
addressing the issue of what would be at stake for China if
Beijing were to pursue military solutions. The chapters that
follow were originally presented at a conference at the U.S.
Army War College (USAWC) held in December 2000. It is
v

the tenth annual conference on the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) that I have organized under the auspices of the
American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage
Foundation. This is the third PLA conference volume to be
published by the USAWC Strategic Studies Institute. I
commend it to you.

Ambassador James R. Lilley
Senior Fellow
American Enterprise Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Andrew Scobell
Larry M. Wortzel
A widely held belief is that China will not use force
against Taiwan. Frequently, one of two major assumptions
is made to justify this assertion: first, Chinese leaders
realize that the economic cost of such an operation would be
unacceptable; second, China’s leaders recognize that, for at
least the next decade or so, any attempt to seize Taiwan
would be doomed to failure. Both these assumptions are
questionable and indeed downright dangerous.
The basis for the former proposition is the assumption
that China has too much to lose economically to risk a
conflict over Taiwan. Certainly, China’s leaders have placed
the highest priority on economic growth over the past 2
decades. China’s economy has gradually been growing out of
the centrally planned model, and more and more production
and pricing are being determined by the market.1 And
China has become increasingly intertwined with the global
economic system through trade and investment.2 Moreover,
economic ties increasingly bind the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) together with the larger Chinese diaspora,
particularly with the territories of Hong Kong and Macao
and with the island of Taiwan—what has become known as
“Greater China” or the “China Circle.”3 These burgeoning
cross-strait economic links have continued to grow during
the 1990s. This growing economic interdependence is
examined in detail in the chapters by Ralph Clough and
John Tkacik in this volume.
The latter assumption, that China must wait a decade
before it is able to act against Taiwan, has recently been
made by several military analysts, especially those who
have focused on amphibious invasion scenarios. After
1

studying the array of forces available on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait, these researchers conclude such an
operation would not succeed in the foreseeable future.4
Unfortunately, by focusing on this extreme and, in our view,
least likely scenario and remaining at the operational level,
these analysts miss the strategic considerations that guide
China’s actions vis-à-vis Taiwan. As many researchers
recognize, China, like most countries, tends to play to its
strengths. And in Beijing’s view, the chances of an
amphibious assault succeeding are slight. Rather than
concentrate on launching a seaborne invasion of Taiwan, it
is far more likely to employ its extensive arsenal of ballistic
missiles to bombard the island and/or its submarine fleet to
enforce a blockade.5 Moreover, Beijing does not just have
conventional military options. In addition to weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) alternatives, China also can
employ other elements of national power: informational,
political, and even economic.6
The above discussion begs three questions. First, “Can
China afford to attack Taiwan?” According to a Chinese
economic analyst in Beijing, speaking to New York Times
columnist Thomas Friedman in 1996, the clear answer is:
“No—it would stop investment in China, stop growth, stop
our last chance to catch up with the rest of the world.”7 But
inquiring minds will not be satisfied with a single round of
question and answer. Indeed, the follow up question is:
“Would China under certain circumstances use military
force against Taiwan no matter what the economic
consequences?” The answer, according to Friedman, is
“absolutely.”8 Many analysts, including the contributors to
this volume, would concur with this judgment. The third
key question, posed by David Finkelstein in his contribution
to this volume, is: “What price is acceptable [to China]?”
This is the hardest question to answer, although as Ellis
Joffe concludes in his contribution it is likely that China’s
leaders are prepared to pay a high price for a war that in
their minds would have a good chance of success (i.e.,
capture Taiwan). Thus, it would be extremely unwise to
2

dismiss China’s insistence that unification with Taiwan is a
key national security objective to be achieved by force, if
necessary, as merely hot air. As Joffe observes, the depth of
Chinese feeling toward the Taiwan issue should not be
underestimated, particularly among military leaders.
Taiwan is vital for the legitimacy of the regime in Beijing as
well as an important strategic asset.
There are important factors that mitigate against the
use of force. There is considerable internal unrest in China
due to economic conditions. This unrest would increase if
foreign investment dropped; if unrest increases, the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would be busy protecting
the Communist Party; and China would have a difficult
time reconstituting its combat capabilities. Nevertheless, in
the face of even more daunting problems, such as in Korea in
1950, China has resorted to military force.
Other possible locations for the use of force by China in
East Asia are where Beijing has territorial disputes with
other states. China claims the Senkaku or Diaoyutai
Islands in the East China Sea that are currently controlled
by Japan. Beijing also believes it has sovereignty over vast
swaths of maritime territory surrounding numerous reefs
and atolls in the South China Seas that are claimed by
various other countries in the region. China has only used
indirect threats of force to make good on its claims on the
East China Sea Islands, but it has employed military power
to acquire the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974, in the
Spratly Islands against Vietnam in 1988, and in Mischief
Reef against the Philippines in 1995. While China insists it
wishes to solve the disputes in the South China Sea
peacefully and is willing to cooperate and share the natural
resources in this area, it has refused to renounce claims or
abjure the use of force. Still, given the remoteness of the
claims in the South China Sea and the limited force
projection capabilities of China and its rival claimants, any
warfare is likely to be sporadic and limited in nature.
Analysts have commented on China’s “creeping assertive-
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ness” in the region and dubbed its strategy as constituting
“slow intensity conflict.”9
The obvious flashpoint of greatest concern is the Taiwan
Strait, and it is a discussion of a Taiwan scenario that
absorbs much of this volume. Finkelstein examines China’s
strategic thinking about a possible conflict in the Taiwan
Strait. He contends that Chinese strategists now assume
that a war with Taiwan automatically means a conflict with
the United States. Since, in their view, U.S. power is
growing and China’s will remain limited for the foreseeable
future, Beijing cannot be sanguine about its prospects in
such a military confrontation. The prime concerns of
Chinese analysts tend to be how to keep a conflict from
escalating into an all-out war between China and the
United States, and how to prevent a conflict from triggering
a cold war between China and the United States. Neither a
major hot war nor a prolonged cold war with Washington is
in Beijing’s interests. Finkelstein concludes that Chinese
strategic thinkers are engaged in a careful cost-benefit
analysis regarding a war in the Taiwan Strait.
Ralph Clough and John Tkacik both focus on the
economic dimension of cross-strait relations. Clough
emphasizes what he calls “conflicting tendencies”: economic
integration on the one hand and political impasse on the
other. The extent of the integration is indicated by the fact
that Taiwan currently has an estimated U.S.$25 billion
invested in China and a similar amount in contracted
investments. Moreover, on any given day some 200,000
Taiwanese are living, working, or traveling on the
mainland. Most of these individuals are engaged in
industry, in managing factories producing such diverse
products as shoes, motorcycles, and information technology
(IT) hardware. Clough points out the growing
interdependence between Taiwan (one of the top producers
of computers and computer software), China, and the
United States. This is because much of the actual
manufacturing and assembly of Taiwanese companies’ IT
products are now done on the mainland and then shipped to
4

buyers in the United States. A conflict in the strait would
disrupt this IT triangle and likely result in shortages of IT
hardware in the United States.
In his chapter, Tkacik highlights Taiwan’s growing
dependence on the mainland and argues that the multitude
of economic strings that ties the island to China will deter
Taipei from pursuing independence. Taiwan is now
estimated to do more than U.S.$30 billion in two-way trade
with China annually. Tkacik is concerned that Beijing is
unconvinced of Taipei’s desire to safeguard its economic
well-being.
The impact of a China conflict on countries in the region
is assessed in chapters by Taeho Kim and Carlyle Thayer.
Kim examines the impact of a conflict on China’s relations
with Japan and South Korea and concludes that the costs
would be high. A war would negatively affect trade with
these two countries. Japan is China’s second largest trading
partner with an estimated U.S.$85 billion bilateral trade in
2000. South Korea, meanwhile, is China’s third largest
trading partner with approximately U.S.$33 billion in
two-way trade last year. Moreover, in the security sphere, a
war would likely push Japan to further upgrade its defense
relationship with the United States and lead South Korea to
draw closer to the United States militarily.
Thayer examines China’s ties with Southeast Asia and
Australia. Beijing has good relations with virtually all the
countries in the region although there are some tensions,
notably with Manila, particularly over conflicting maritime
claims in the South China Sea. China’s trade with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries
grew steadily during the 1990s to more than U.S.$30 billion
by 2000. ASEAN foreign direct investment in China had
reached an estimated U.S.$3.6 billion by the late 1990s.
Thayer concludes that if China becomes embroiled in a war,
these economic ties will likely be damaged and the countries
of the region will very possibly engage in closer defense
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cooperation. Australia also has growing economic ties with
China but does not tend to see Beijing as much of a threat.
Joffe analyzes the attitudes of the PLA toward Taiwan.
He notes that the PLA has become more professional over
the past 2 decades, but this has had the effect of pushing
soldiers into more prominent and significant policy roles.
This is especially true on the issue of Taiwan. While the PLA
is highly nationalistic, Chinese soldiers are not itching for
war because most recognize that the cost of a conflict over
Taiwan is likely to be quite high. Joffe concludes that,
although Beijing is not confident of China’s ability to deter
U.S. intervention or decisively defeat the American military
on the battlefield, Chinese military leaders seem quite
confident of their country’s ability to withstand sustained
American attacks against China and outlast any initial U.S.
enthusiasm for prosecuting a war in Asia.
Alexander Huang reviews the defense policy of the
administration of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian. Chen
has long been interested in defense matters dating back to
his days in the Legislative Yuan prior to becoming mayor of
Taipei in the early 1990s. As part of his preparation for his
successful 2000 presidential election campaign, he
formulated a new defense concept dubbed “decisive
campaign beyond boundaries.” This strategy entails taking
the fight to the enemy beyond the coastline of Taiwan. If
China uses force against Taiwan or if there is a clear
indication that China is preparing to do so imminently, then
Taiwan will strike. The new security concept is
controversial in Taiwan because of fears that it is
unnecessarily provocative and will antagonize China.
James Mulvenon outlines the process of divestiture of
the commercial ventures of the PLA and assesses its results.
He argues that the initiative was less rapid and
conflict-ridden than is often assumed. Mulvenon contends
that the process of divestiture was underway well before
Jiang Zemin’s much publicized announcement of the
initiative in mid-1998. He also asserts that there was a high
6

degree of civil-military consensus that the step was needed.
The divestiture process has resulted in the majority of PLA
for-profit enterprises being taken out of military hands,
although a small but significant portion remains. He
suggests that it would be foolish to assume that continued
PLA involvement in economic activities would hinder the
military response in a conflict situation.
Wendy Frieman examines China’s ballistic missile
capabilities and intentions in light of U.S. missile defense
initiatives. She argues that China’s possession of ballistic
missiles lowers the costs to Beijing of resorting to military
conflict. Beijing’s response to American moves toward the
development and deployment of theater missile defenses in
the Asia-Pacific to protect its forces and allies and national
missile defense to protect the U.S. homeland will be to
increase its missile arsenals, suggests Frieman. The costs to
China of building more short range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
will be strictly monetary, Frieman asserts. The actual
production costs she estimates at approximately the
equivalent of U.S.$ 100,000 for each of the former and
approximately U.S.$12.5 million for each of the latter. Such
costs can easily be absorbed by Beijing. Of course, if, in the
event of conflict, the missiles are actually used, then China
will need to bear the costs of replacing them.
In sum, the authors in this volume tend to believe that
China will incur a significant cost if it resorts to military
conflict anywhere in the Asia-Pacific. The cost of conflict
will not only be measured in PLA casualties and the loss of
military hardware. It will also be measured in terms of the
damage to China’s economy, its relations with countries in
the region, and Beijing’s global reputation. One can only
hope that the substantial costs that would be incurred will
deter China from waging war or at the very least think twice
before doing so.
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CHAPTER 2
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE COSTS
OF A CONFLICT
David M. Finkelstein
Introduction.
This year, the conference organizers have established an
extremely ambitious agenda. The conference theme, “The
Costs of a Conflict,” should be approached with a high
degree of caution because we are departing somewhat from
our usual roles. Usually, as specialists and researchers, this
group relies on databased empiricism to draw likely
conclusions about our research topics. On this occasion, and
clearly for good reason, given the importance of the subject,
we have been asked to enter the murky world of speculation.
As least I have been asked to dive into murky waters,
because I have been asked to speak to an elusive topic:
“Chinese Perceptions of the Costs of a Conflict.”
To claim to have a clear understanding of this question
would require a level of arrogance that even I have yet to
achieve. So let me be up front. I have no bottom-line truths
on this topic. No one can speak with authority on how the
Chinese who matter perceive the potential costs of a conflict.
Therefore, I have no unassailable insights to offer this
group. Most of what I have to offer is highly subjective. It is
speculative. It is based on a meager handful of articles
published in the mainland press, informed by a limited
number of conversations with interlocutors, and bounded by
my own interpretation of Chinese history. With those
caveats placed upon the table, let us proceed with the topic
at hand.
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Defining the Question.
It seems to me that there are two questions that need to
be addressed. First, “Do the Chinese even think about the
potential costs they may have to pay should Beijing feel it
has to use military force to attempt to achieve unification
with Taiwan?" Second, “If so, what do we know about what
they think about the potential costs of a conflict?” Phrasing
the questions in this manner requires some further
refinement for the sake of bounding the discussion.
First, what we are talking about is the use of military
force to actually achieve unification—not the use of the
military element of national power to merely coerce Taiwan.
What we are talking about is an actual conflict—a war—not
a demonstration of force to deter Taipei from one course of
action or another, or to “send signals” such as in 1995-96.
Second, for the purposes of this discussion, we need not
attempt to define the military scenario; i.e., how China
might use military force. Third, neither do we need to
speculate about how the conflict would end or to whose
favor.
A Proposition From The Historical Record.
Let me start with a proposition. Even in the absence of
hard data, I would be surprised if the larger community of
security analysis (xitong) in Beijing and beyond, military
and civilian, is not thinking very carefully about the
potential costs and benefits of military conflict over Taiwan.
Stated in the affirmative, I am prepared to assert that
there is likely a good deal of thinking going on about the
potential risks and costs.
I say this even in the absence of hard evidence because
the historical record suggests it. We are talking about a
civilization and culture that has a legacy of strategic
calculation that is more than two millennia in the running.
This is, after all, the civilization that gave the world the
oldest surviving, written treatise on war and statecraft. I
10

refer of course to Sun Zi Bing Fa. Every once in a while it is
good to review what Master Sun had to say about war. What
one finds is that almost the entire treatise is about the need
for proper cost-benefit analyses at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Indeed, at the
strategic level of warfare, Sun Zi cautions rulers and
generals alike that whether one should engage in a war at
all is the most serious calculation. In fact, the very first
sentence of the very first chapter (Estimates) of Sun Zi Bing
Fa talks to this:
War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of
life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that
it be thoroughly studied.1

In the preface to his own book of commentaries on Sun Zi
Bing Fa published in 1995, Major General Xie Guoliang of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military
Science highlighted the seriousness of contemplating war
when he offered that the first of all the principles one can
learn from Sun Zi is, “. . . have adequate respect for war and
be wary of waging one.”2
Of course, we are talking about a book of uncertain
origins that was purportedly written some 2,000 years ago.
So the question, then, is this: Is it a stretch to postulate that
Sun Zi Bing Fa and all of its emphasis on calculations have
any relevance to current Chinese thinking on the issue at
hand?
There was a time when I would have answered, “Yes, it is
a stretch.” However, having attended the “5th Annual
International Symposium on Sun Zi’s Art of War” held in
Wuxian City in October 2000, I am now of a mind that the
study of Sun Zi Bing Fa is alive and well among Chinese
military strategists.
Without being sidetracked by the details of the
conference, suffice it to say that over 100 PLA officers—from
Majors to Lieutenant Generals, from Beijing and from at
least three Military Regions outside of Beijing, from
11

military academics to officers of the Second Artillery
(strategic rocket forces)—gathered for 3 1/2 days to engage
in serious and very professional discussion about this
ancient treatise. Much of the discussion was about the
application and relevance of Sun Zi to modern strategic
issues.3
Of course, the historical record suggesting a legacy of
careful calculations about war by Chinese need not go back
as far as Sun Zi. Closer to our own times we need look no
further than what the Chinese call Mao Zedong Junshi
Sixiang, or, “Mao Zedong Military Thought.”
This particular group needs no introduction to the very
pragmatic approach to warfare taken by Mao. But I always
like to point out that by the end of 1947, Mao was a rather
conservative military planner, having learned many
painful lessons throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and early
1940s. By “conservative” I do not mean “passive.” My use of
the word “conservative” is meant to convey a sense of Mao’s
use of careful calculations and cost-benefit analyses as part
of the operational planning process.
Of the ten famous “principles of operations” Mao
highlighted for his commanders at the Central Committee
meeting at Yanjiakou in December 1947, the one that seems
to have had the most durability since 1949 is Number 5:
Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of
winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle,
make every effort to insure victory in the given set of conditions
as between the enemy and ourselves.4

The point of this historical digression, then, is to make
the point that, even if we had no data at all indicating that
Chinese leaders and planners are thinking about the
potential costs of a conflict over Taiwan, the historical
record (not to mention just good common sense) would
provide some reason to believe that Beijing will not enter
into such a conflict without some careful analysis.
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Of course, careful analysis is no guarantee of correct
analysis. So the question remains to be asked: “Do we have
any evidence that Chinese analysts and other concerned
individuals are thinking about what is at stake should
military force against Taiwan be required to achieve
unification?” Do they think about the “downside” of such an
endeavor?
Some Speculation from the Contemporary Record.
My own reading of the mainland press and journals as
well as discussions with Chinese interlocutors leads me to
believe that there are at least some Chinese security
analysts that do understand what is at stake and that the
costs to China, even if victorious militarily, could be quite
high.
There are three indicators that lead me to believe this.
The first indicator revolves about three recent and key
analytic judgments by Chinese analysts that now appear to
be accepted as mainstream thinking. The second indicator
is a meager handful of articles published on the mainland.
The third indicator is some informal conversations with
Chinese security analysts.
Indicator #1: Three Recent and Key Chinese
Analytic Judgments.
Chinese Analytic Judgment #1: War with Taiwan means
conflict with the United States.
Although the United States Government continues to
follow what some have termed a “policy of ambiguity”
regarding its military intentions should Taiwan and China
be at war, the Chinese have come to their own conclusion
and working assumption.
Whether reading mainland journals or talking with
interlocutors, it is very apparent that Chinese security
planners and analysts, both military and civilian, now take
as a working assumption that any conflict between the
13

People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan will mean
U.S. military intervention on the side of Taiwan.
This judgment, I would argue, is a relatively recent
development. It is a result of what I like to call “The Great
Peace and Development of 1999" that took place in the wake
of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.5
Prior to what the Chinese refer to as the “U.S.-led”
Kosovo operation, there were many Chinese security
analysts who questioned whether the United States would
intervene with military force in a hypothetical cross-strait
military scenario. Some argued that U.S. vital national
interests did not warrant a conflict with the mainland over
Taiwan. Taiwan, they argued, is not the Persian Gulf—a
reference to vital U.S. oil interests and the Gulf War (a
Chinese view). Others argued that the United States still
suffered from a “Somalia Syndrome” and does not have the
national will to engage in a serious conflict with China over
the island. The implicit assumption being that such a
conflict will not be casualty-free for the United States. Still
others argued that the nature of the U.S. political system,
especially the “contradictions” between the executive and
legislative branches, would make it difficult to mobilize the
popular political will, or achieve a political consensus quick
enough, to enter a cross-strait scenario even if Washington
wanted to.
Kosovo and the ensuing security debate of 1999
overturned all of these arguments. One result of China’s
national security debate in 1999 was a general consensus
that the analytic conclusions above were not valid. There
was a general assessment that the United States—in order
to maintain its “sole superpower status”—was clearly
capable of using the military element of national power to
intervene around the world in seemingly (to Chinese)
irrational ways that did not necessarily have any pragmatic
logic associated with them. When viewed through the lens of
Chinese perceptions of U.S. policies that are perceived as
directed against Beijing directly, or inimical to Beijing’s
14

interests, a new consensus has emerged that China must
assume U.S. intervention in a cross-strait scenario.6 This
analytic judgment was likely reinforced in May 2001 when
President Bush made his comments about the defense of
Taiwan on national television.
Yan Xuetong, former senior analyst at the China
Institute for Contemporary International Relations
(CICIR), summed up this viewpoint in a November 2000 Ta
Kung Pao interview. Asked whether the United States
would intervene in the event of a cross-strait military
conflict, Yan Xuetong pointed out extremely explicitly that:
if a crisis breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, it is certain that the
United States will become militarily involved. There are no
two ways about the United States becoming militarily
involved in the Taiwan strait, and the possibility of them not
getting involved does not exist; the only question is the degree
of involvement.7

Chinese Analytic Judgment #2: The United States is not
in decline. To the contrary, its “comprehensive national
power” is increasing.
This is yet another example of a critically important
Chinese analytic judgment that, apparently, has been
adjusted relatively recently.
Previously, and as recently as the late 1990s, Chinese
analysts were predicting the inevitable decline of the
“comprehensive national power” of the United States. The
idea that U.S. national power was doomed to slow but
inevitable decline in all areas—political, social, economic,
and military affairs—had been a staple of Chinese analysis
since the mid-to-late 1980s. Indeed, in his excellent volume,
China Debates The Future Security Environment, Michael
Pillsbury underscored the near-sanctity of that analytic line
by asserting (likely correctly at the time of writing) that, “No
Chinese author can today openly argue that the United
States will grow relatively stronger than other major
powers . . .”8
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This, apparently, is no longer the case. Chinese analysts
are now inclined to argue that the comprehensive national
power of the United States is not about to decrease any time
soon. Indeed, many argue that U.S. national power has yet
to peak and that it is getting greater. Moreover, the U.S.
position as the dominant and “sole superpower” will be
secure for at least 2 decades, if not longer.
Here are two examples for the sake of illustration. In his
interview in Ta Gong Pao, Yan Xuetong argued that “. . . the
overall U.S. economic situation is good, and the status of the
United States as the sole superpower is on the rise.”9
Certainly in terms of economic potential, Chu Shulong, at
the time a senior analyst at CICIR, agreed with his former
colleague’s assessment, writing in August 1999 that “. . . the
difference between China and the United States in
economic capability may not be shrinking but growing.”
Chu also made the same argument for the gap in military
capabilities.10
This type of analysis is related to, and leads us to, a third
Chinese analytic judgment that bears on the issue of
thinking about the potential costs of a conflict.
Chinese Analytic Judgment #3: China must be realistic
about its potential power, now and in the future.
I have a very high degree of confidence in the currency of
the first “Chinese Analytic Judgment” above. I have a good
degree of confidence in the currency of “Chinese Analytic
Judgment #2. ” I have the least confidence in the assertion
that follows, but enough confidence in it to table it in a
speculative monograph such as this one.
“Chinese Analytic Judgment #3” speaks to a growing
realism on the part of some PRC analysts about the
comprehensive national strength of China today and in the
future. That realism dictates that Beijing should not fool
itself into inflating its importance in the world, its current
levels of development, or its future prospects when crafting
grand strategy or making important security decisions.
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Most of the evidence for this is, admittedly, anecdotal.
However, one can find at least one remarkable journal
article that may represent this school of thought. I refer,
once again, to Chu’s fascinating article in Zhanlue Yu
Guanli published in August 1999, at the height of the great
debate over China’s national security. Some of the key
statements in the analysis from his article, “China’s
National Interest, National Power, and National Strategy,”
are worth listing.11
• “. . . we must have a clearheaded, realistic
understanding of China’s comprehensive national
capability.”
• “Today’s China remains an economically,
technologically, and militarily backward developing
country.”
• “In terms of the overall size of the economy, China is
ranked seventh in the world, following the United States,
Japan, Germany, France, Britain and Italy, and is
absolutely not the number one or number two power in the
world. It is obviously a great exaggeration of China’s
national power to describe China as the second largest or
third largest economic power in the world . . . ”
• “The gap in terms of China’s military power is even
larger. The U.S. or Russian strategic nuclear force is several
hundred times larger than China’s strategic nuclear force.”
• “In terms of conventional armaments, China is not
only immensely behind the United States, but also behind
such middle-level military powers as Japan, India, and
South Korea.”
• “As far as a specific theater of war is concerned, the
United States, Russia, or Japan can send more advanced
aircraft and warships to a specific theater of war than China
can.”
• “. . . any future armed conflict against hegemonism will
basically be in the form of naval and aerial warfare carried
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out in coastal areas. Chinese armed forces will find it
difficult to exploit their numerical advantage, while our
opponent will be able to exploit its quality advantage of
having naval and air forces equipped with large long-range
precision weapons.”
• “. . . China is not yet a world power . . . China has a
certain international status, but its international influence
is mainly felt in Asia . . . China has difficulty exerting any
substantive influence on Latin America, the Middle East,
Europe, or Africa . . . ”
• “Chinese culture has some influence in Asia and is
respected in the world, but will not become a worldwide
culture.”
How much currency these brutally frank assessments
have across the board in Beijing cannot be known. But they
may reflect more than just the personal views of the author.
This analysis may reflect the institutional assessment of
CICIR itself that, according to The Washington Post (by
inference) and other knowledgeable individuals, recently
finished a major project comparing the comprehensive
national power of several countries and projecting into the
future.12 The alleged results of that study is that China’s
“comprehensive national power” will continue to rank 6th or
7th out of a sample group of seven nations for at least the
next 35 years.
If the three Chinese judgments above are in fact part of
mainstream analysis (and this, of course, is open to
question), then they inject some significant factors into any
Chinese thinking that may be going on about the potential
costs of a conflict over Taiwan. By way of review, these three
judgments hold that:
1. Military conflict to achieve unification with Taiwan
will certainly mean military confrontation with the United
States.

18

2. The United States is not in decline but, to the contrary,
holding its own and possibly enhancing its position as sole
superpower.
3. China’s own current national power is not as great as
some Chinese officials believe, and China will likely not
become a world-class international power for some time to
come.
Indicator #2: Recent Articles of Specific Interest to
the Question At Hand.
Articles from the mainland press that address the
specific issues of potential costs of a Taiwan war are hard to
come by. But there are a couple that are germane and may
provide us some grist for speculation. The first is the article
by Chu Shulong referenced above. The second is by Dr. Shi
Yinhong, who, according to the PRC-affiliated Hong Kong
periodical Ta Kung Pao, is the Director of the Institute of
International Relations of the Nanjing Institute of
International Relations; a university-level school of the
PLA.
The article by Chu Shulong was written at the height of
the great security debate of 1999, and it should be read in
that context: written during a period of great analytic
confusion, policy ferment, and emotionalism in the wake of
the errant bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade. But
the message of the author seems intended to transcend
those particular events and might be equally applicable to
the question of war or peace over Taiwan. And the author’s
messages are as follows:
1. Throughout modern Chinese history, every time the
government has acted rashly on emotion instead of
cool-headed calculation, the results have been disastrous.
2. China must be coldly realistic about its own
capabilities.
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3. Unless China’s survival is at stake, comprehensive
national development is China’s fundamental interest.
4. With development, all other issues, to include security
issues and issues of unification can be solved.
To some extent, this article can be read as a warning to
(unknown) others that Deng Xiaoping’s views, strategies,
and priorities should not be abandoned. This particular
article is a “must read” for students of Chinese politics
searching for an example of the existence of a school of
realpolitik among Beijing’s security analysts.
But the topic at hand is addressed even more directly in
articles written by Shi Yinhong of the PLA’s Nanjing
Institute of International Relations. Let us briefly review
some of his thinking. One article of interest appears in the
April 30, 2000 issue of Zhanlue Yu Guanli.13 In this article,
there are four arguments pertinent to this chapter.
1. The Risk of Escalation. Shi argues that if military
force is the only way to achieve unification, then concrete
political objectives must be formulated and a desired
political end-state understood beforehand. Otherwise, he
warns, “our attack will involuntarily slip onto the track of
‘absolute war’ that is purely governed by military logic, end
eventually the total price we pay will be far greater than the
total benefit.” In other words, Shi is warning that a conflict
with Taiwan could escalate beyond China’s ability to handle
given the assumption of U.S. involvement. 14
2. The Degree of U.S. Intervention Will Be a
Function of the Type of Chinese Attack. U.S. military
intervention is a “given” for Shi. What is unknown is how
deeply the U.S. military will be involved. But he offers “the
largest scale and most violent military operation (by China)
that hopes to achieve unification at one stroke will be the
most likely operation to cause the most serious U.S. military
intervention.”
3. Adverse World Opinion and a Risk of Cold War.
“In reality, what is of the greatest concern is perhaps the
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possible international political consequences of China’s
all-out assault to achieve unification in one stroke (or even
achieve radical military victory).” Under this scenario, Shi
warns that even if the United States cannot prevail
militarily, then Washington will be able to rally the opinion
of the developed Western nations and engage in a “Cold
War” against China.
4. A Cold War with the United States Is Not In
China’s Interests. Shi clearly argues that a long-term
Cold War with the United States (and the West) will be
self-defeating to China’s larger national interests. It will “. . .
force us to devote far too much resources and pay too much
attention to military, political, and ideological and cultural
matters to deal with the United States . . . and it will rob us
of most of the economic and political development
opportunities we otherwise would have . . . ”
In the last section of this article, Shi posits the argument
that “China’s basic autonomy, security, and integrity and
its prospects of becoming a world power are most important;
the Taiwan issue is not the final, overwhelming issue.” To
say the least, this is not the typical analysis of the subject
one is accustomed to reading in the mainland press;
especially by authors affiliated with the PLA.
A third article in the Octopber 1999 issue of Zhanlue Yu
Guanli is also written by an author listed as affiliated with
the PLA’s Nanjing Institute of International Relations, and
also surnamed Shi.15 This Shi is equally concerned about
the costs of a conflict over Taiwan. Briefly, he raises the
following issues:
• Handling the Taiwan issue by military means
incorrectly has the potential to make the situation worse,
not better. The military option requires careful study.
• The geography of the Taiwan Strait favors the defense,
not the offense.
• The PLA has yet to develop “a large-scale
three-dimensional force offensive capability on high-tech
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terms, while the Taiwan armed forces have benefited from
abundant fiscal resources and U.S. arms sales to roughly
have a three-dimensional defensive capability...”
• “. . . since the separatist tendency in Taiwan has
acquired impressive political might, an international
climate highly favorable to reunification has always been
lacking . . .”
• “If a large-scale military conflict breaks out over the
Taiwan matter . . . and becomes particularly intense and
protracted due to the diehard resistance of the Taiwan
authorities and a large-scale U.S. military intervention, we
probably would not have high expectations that most of the
mainland Chinese people would forever actively support a
military struggle that would have a huge cost and an
uncertain outcome.”
• “And in consideration of the fact that we would be
facing mostly other Chinese in such a struggle, that is even
more so the case.”
It is important to underscore that none of the
authors cited directly state that the use of the
military element of national power to achieve
unification should be abandoned.
What they are arguing for is a careful cost-benefit
analysis: (1) be aware of China’s strengths and weaknesses,
(2) be aware of the international forces (on Taiwan and
beyond) that China will face, and (3) be aware of the
potential costs that may accrue.
Shi Guhong brings this all together quite nicely in the
following passage:
While the criteria for weighing the pros and cons are obviously
very complex, including all of the factors mentioned above, we
can say most simply that they hinge on: 1) Their effectiveness in
containing or stopping Taiwan independence, 2) The price that
would have to be paid in lives and economic, political, and
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diplomatic costs, particularly the negative impact on China’s
reform, opening, and modernization.

Indicator #3: Conversations.
Conversations with interlocutors are the most tentative
and subjective type of evidence to cite on the issue of
Chinese perceptions of the potential costs attendant to a
conflict over Taiwan, so I will not belabor them. Suffice it to
say that over the past year (1999 to 2000), one is acutely
aware that there is growing concern on the part of many
Chinese analysts and military planners that in such a
situation the United States might be inclined to escalate a
conflict beyond what Chinese military planners would
prefer to see. And what is it that they prefer to see as they
contemplate the military option? It is a quick campaign
localized around and over Taiwan. There appears to be
growing concern that the United States might be inclined to
launch pre-emptive strikes on Chinese mainland military
and economic facilities early on in a cross-Strait war. We
need not address the validity of these concerns, only register
them. Evidently, these concerns have been heightened of
late with the recent publication of a RAND study entitled,
Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation
and Options for U.S. Policy.16
“1999 is Not 1949”: An Economy at Risk?
One of the common concerns that run through the above
discourses, whether in published articles or discussions, is
that some Chinese now assess that China does have much to
lose if the military option must be exercised. Hence, the
need for careful calculation and the avoidance of “rash
decisions.” And at bottom, it appears the most concern is not
about international opinion per se. It is about the collateral
damage that the Chinese economy (and other reform
programs) could sustain as a result of a conflict. This, in
turn, could defeat China’s long-term national objectives of
becoming a strong, modern, and wealthy nation.17
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Economic damage, as perceived by Chinese, could come
in two forms. First, a military escalation that places China’s
economic engine at physical risk (the exposed eastern
seaboard). Second, as a result of a protracted “hot” or “Cold
War” against Taiwan and the United States. On this count a
protracted encounter might either force China to radically
change its own domestic priorities from economic reform to
defense, as well as drain its extant wealth. Or a protracted
scenario might drag in the developed Western world and
Japan and dramatically and adversely affect the nature of
foreign investment and foreign assistance to long-term
economic and other modernization programs. As one
interlocutor put it, “1999 is not 1949. When you have
nothing, there is nothing much to lose.”
Conclusions.
So where does this leave us in attempting to address the
assigned topic? First, the original caveats bear repeating.
This chapter is purely speculative. I do not pretend to have
any bottom line on this issue. Data points worthy of a high
degree of confidence are nearly impossible to come by. The
fact of the matter may be that what we can produce may not
reflect the thinking of anyone in China who matters or have
any currency beyond the thinking of a few individuals.
The best we can say is that there appear to be some
Chinese analysts, to include some in the military, who are
thinking about the potential costs of a military conflict over
Taiwan. Let’s review once again some key assessments and
potential “costs.”
• A military conflict over Taiwan will mean a conflict with
the United States.
• A conflict over Taiwan could place at dire risk what
some Chinese consider China’s real primary national
interests: reform and modernization.
• It could result in a prolonged “Cold War” with the
United States and some Western nations.
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• A military conflict could strengthen the resolve of
Taiwan separatists, not cow them.
• A prolonged military conflict over Taiwan and the
collateral price in lives and treasure might even cost the
regime in Beijing the support of its own people for the
endeavor.
• A military conflict over Taiwan could escalate into a
major war due either to: (1) a failure on the part of Beijing to
have a firm political end-state in mind and a military plan
tailored to it, or (2) due to the unpredictability of the scale of
U.S. military involvement.
As I mentioned earlier, careful analysis on the part of the
Chinese (or anyone else) is no guarantee of correct analysis.
Moreover, even a correct Chinese analysis of the likely costs of
a cross-strait war is not by itself necessarily a valid indicator
of a decision not to engage in one. The calculus for “what
price is acceptable?” or the factors—known and especially
unknown—that would drive a decision for war are likely
much more important than what we think the Chinese
perceive the costs will be.
In closing, I would just add the following. Difficult as it is
to address the topics assigned this year, it is important that
we do so. My own feelings, fears really, are that not enough
people on either side of the Taiwan Strait or the Pacific are
thinking seriously about the implications and costs of a
conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This conference starts to
address that concern. However, I would say that there is a
paper missing from this conference on the costs of a conflict
to the United States.
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CHAPTER 3
CONFLICTING TENDENCIES:
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION VERSUS
POLITICAL IMPASSE
Ralph N. Clough
The governments on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait
are caught up in a contradiction. Politically, they are at an
impasse, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
pressing for political unification of Taiwan with the
mainland and the government in Taiwan seeking greater
freedom to function independently as a sovereign state in
the world community. Economically, the PRC wants rapid
modernization, in order to catch up with the West. The Chen
Shui-bian administration in Taiwan also wants
modernization, turning Taiwan into a “green, silicon
island.” Economic cooperation across the strait is making an
important contribution to achieving the modernization
goals of both sides, but they have been unable to resolve the
political impasse.
Pressing too hard to achieve conflicting political goals
could lead to a war that would set back for decades the
achievement of economic goals. The achievement of
economic goals requires growing cross-strait economic
cooperation—each side needs the other.
Extensive economic integration does not necessarily
prevent war. The example of England and Germany before
World War I is frequently cited. In that case, conflicting
political aspirations prevailed over economic cooperation.
But economic integration can be an important factor
reducing the risk of war.
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Trends toward Integration.
The complementarity of the two economies provides a
firm basis for integration. The China mainland offers
cheaper labor and land and a huge market. Taiwan
entrepreneurs provide capital, technology, and marketing
and management skills. Affinities of history, culture, and
language give Taiwan investors an advantage over other
outside investors.
Taiwan entrepreneurs began on a small scale, moving to
the mainland labor-intensive manufacturing that could no
longer be profitable in Taiwan because of the rising cost of
land and labor. An early example was umbrella
manufacturing. Within a few years most umbrella factories
had moved to the mainland; so many had settled in an area
of Guangdong province that it became known as “Taiwan
Umbrella City.”
In 1990 I talked to a shoe manufacturer in Taipei who
had set up a factory in Guangdong. He leased a building,
packed up some used machinery and shipped it to his
Guangdong factory. He did not hire local workers, but
brought some down from Guizhou province because they
would accept lower salaries. After operating successfully for
a year, he wanted to expand his operation. He told his
workers he needed more help and within a few days he had
more down from Guizhou than he could use. I asked him
whether he sold any of his shoes on the local market. He
said, “No, they were too expensive. All were shipped to the
United States.”
Over the past 10 years, trends in Taiwan’s investment
have been toward larger companies, larger investments,
and movement up the China coast and inland. Altogether,
45,000 Taiwanese entrepreneurs have contracted
investments of $45 billion, with $25 billion actually
delivered. People from Taiwan make two million visits a
year to mainland China, and at any given time there are
some 200,000 people from Taiwan on the mainland. The
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main motivations for investing in the China mainland have
been to exploit the China market and to use China as a base
for increasing exports to the world market. Some examples:
• The Uni-President Group. This large food
manufacturer had by 1996 invested $300 million in 18
plants in China. Its goal was to become the largest supplier
of food to Chinese throughout the world.
• The Ting Hsin Group is a rival of Uni-President in
seeking to supply the world’s Chinese population.
Operating through a subsidiary registered in the Cayman
Islands, Ting Hsin has been very successful in producing
and distributing on the mainland its popular Master Kang
brand instant noodles. As of 1996, it held nearly a quarter of
the mainland instant noodle market.
• The Giant Manufacturing Company is Taiwan’s
largest bicycle manufacturer. In 1999 one-half of its
worldwide production of 3.2 million bicycles were
manufactured by its plant in Qunshan, Jiangsu province,
the remainder by plants in Taiwan and Holland. Giant has
been pressing the government in Taipei to ease restrictions
on mainland investments so that it can further expand its
China mainland production.
• The Kwang Yang Motor Company (KYMCO) is
Taiwan’s leading motorcycle manufacturer. In 1996 it had
invested in four joint ventures on the mainland. At a
meeting in Guangzhou in late 1996, KYMCO’s president
announced plans to surpass Honda by 2010 as the world’s
largest name-brand motorcycle manufacturer. It was
expanding operations in mainland China as well as building
new plants in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, Vietnam and the
Philippines.
The Information Industry.
The most striking current example of economic
integration between Taiwan and mainland China is in the
information industry. Taiwan firms are the world’s third
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largest producers of information technology hardware, after
the United States and Japan. But in 2000, nearly 40 percent
of these products are being turned out by Taiwan firms’
plants on the mainland. This year, the total value of
information technology hardware turned out on the China
mainland by Taiwan-owned plants and others will, for the
first time, exceed the value of such products manufactured
in Taiwan.
Taiwan’s leading computer company, Acer, has
committed itself to large-scale, long-term operations on the
mainland. It has taken out a 50-year lease on 40 hectares of
land in Guangdong province, where it has a plant producing
motherboards and other computer components. It plans to
build five more factories on this property, making it Acer’s
largest overseas production base, larger than its present
base at Subic Day in the Philippines. Acer also has
subsidiaries in Suzhou and Zhejiang.
Acer’s 10,000 employees on the China mainland
constitute almost one third of its global workforce. Sales of
Acer computers on the mainland rank fifth, after the
leading Chinese computer company, Legend, and several
American companies. Acer aims to become the No. 2
supplier of computers in China’s rapidly growing market.
Most of Taiwan’s producers of information technology
products have now invested in the China mainland, despite
the existence of some restrictions on cross-strait
investment. The government bans investment in single
projects of over $50 million or involving the transfer of
advanced technology. For example, the government
prohibits the manufacture of notebook computers on the
mainland by Taiwan companies. Yet all five of Taiwan’s
leading producers of notebook computers have, or plan to
have, plants on the mainland making components for
notebook computers. The heads of these companies recently
threatened to proceed with the manufacture of the entire
product on the mainland, despite government restrictions.
They say they have no choice, given the shortage of labor in
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Taiwan and the fact that wages on the mainland are only
one-fourth to one-third of those in Taiwan.
The most remarkable recent instance of cross-strait
cooperation in the information industry is the $1.6 billion
computer chip plant being built in Shanghai in a joint
venture involving Winston Wang, the son of Y. C. Wang,
head of the Formosa Plastics Group in Taiwan, and Jiang
Mian-heng, the son of Jiang Zemin. Jiang is the company’s
vice chairman, and Wang is the president and Chief
Executive Officer. This plant is one of four that they plan to
build on the Shanghai site. Wang has declared that no
Taiwan money is going into the plant, and that he has no
personal financial stake in it.
A triangular interdependence is developing rapidly
among Taiwan, mainland China and the United States. Not
only are Taiwan’s information industry companies
increasingly dependent on production on the China
mainland, but increasing amounts of the final products are
being bought by American companies. Compaq alone
projects purchases from Taiwan companies in 2000 at $9
billion. IBM, Dell, and Hewlett-Packard will buy $4-$5
billion each, and Intel over $1 billion.
Other Recent Developments.
The expected entry of the PRC and Taiwan into the
World Trade Organization has unleashed a rapid increase
in investment by Taiwan firms on the China mainland.
According to the Taiwan government’s official figures,
during the first 10 months of 2000, investment on the
mainland has nearly doubled over the same period of 1999,
to $2 billion.
In other ways, Taiwan and mainland China are being
further connected. The principal telecommunication firms
of the PRC and Taiwan recently signed a memo of
understanding for the construction of a third international
undersea fiber-optic cable that will link the two sides of the
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strait. Firms on both sides are preparing in a variety of
innovative ways to create a vast network of cross-strait
connections through the Internet.
Conclusions.
What does all this add up to?
1. The Chen Shui-bian government is deeply divided on
whether to ease restrictions on cross-strait trade and
investment.
2. Businessmen in Taiwan are placing heavy pressure on
Chen to ease restrictions.
3. Entry into the WTO will compel the removal of some
restrictions.
4. Many Taiwan entrepreneurs have been able to evade
restrictions, as in the example of the Shanghai chip plant.
5. Thus, economic pressures will continue to promote
integration, thereby increasing the cost of any disruptive
military action.
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CHAPTER 4
TAIWAN DEPENDENCE:
THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION OF
CROSS-STRAIT TRADE AND INVESTMENT
John Tkacik
Washington policymakers were terrified when Taiwan’s
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian
announced in June 1999 that he was running for the
country’s presidency. The prospect of a DPP politician
actually winning Taiwan’s presidency and moving toward
“Taiwan Independence”—a long-held dream of the
DPP—was a nightmare that both Pentagon planners and
State Department diplomats have often war-gamed in
scenarios that inevitably provoke China into armed conflict.
Well, they needn’t have lost any sleep over it. Since his
March 18, 2000, election, Chen has stepped back from
“independence.” And no wonder—Taiwan, it seems, is too
dependent on China to be independent. Despite their
profound sympathies for a formal “non-Chinese” homeland,
President Chen, most of his major financial backers, and a
majority of his own political party are all too aware of the
central fact of Taiwan’s economic predicament: its entire
export manufacturing sector relies on mainland Chinese
labor and factories for growth. And it’s not just Taiwan’s
“sunset industries” that are being forced offshore, but its
cutting-edge computer and semiconductor industries as
well. Into the 21st century, Taiwan’s drift toward political
“independence” will have halted, and Taiwan’s increasing
economic symbiosis with mainland China will bind the
island ever more tightly to the mainland.
There is not enough room in this short chapter to offer a
comprehensive study of Taiwan’s economic
interdependence with China. I will only attempt to give a
flavor of the political, investment, trade, and labor factors at
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play in the dynamics of cross-Strait relations. Nonetheless,
the obvious conclusion is reassuring. For the foreseeable
future, no one need worry that Taiwan will seek to change
its “status quo.” What China does is another story.
Turning Point.
The atmosphere in Taipei’s Academia Sinica auditorium
was electric the afternoon of March 10, 2000. There were
just 7 days left before Taiwan’s historic presidential
election. Reporters, photojournalists, and TV cameramen
jammed into the small auditorium to witness that was
perhaps the psychological turning point of the presidential
campaign. On the dais, a lanky and owlish scholar stood up
and moved next to former Taipei mayor Chen Shui-bian, the
DPP candidate for Taiwan’s presidency. The two men had
just completed an hour’s meeting in private and were now
ready to face the cameras.
Nervously, Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan-tseh,
Taiwan’s most respected scholar and winner of the 1986
Nobel Prize for Chemistry, cleared his throat and spoke into
the microphones in front of him. Calling candidate Chen a
“proper national leader,” Dr. Lee pledged to join
President-elect Chen’s National Policy Advisory Committee
and work to help Chen govern Taiwan as the island’s first
non-Kuomintang (KMT or “Nationalist”) party leader since
the end of World War II. “I admire Chen for his
determination to carry out all kinds of reforms and to
eradicate the ‘black gold’ politics of corruption,” Lee said. “I
will help Chen to govern our country if he is elected, to
promote Taiwan’s development.” The unprepossessing
academic explained his support for the former Taipei mayor
was spurred by the sight of “too many known members of
organized crime groups stumping for other candidates.”
Flashbulbs snapped, motor-driven cameras whirred. Dr.
Lee’s endorsement had sealed Chen’s victory.1
Although former Taipei mayor Chen Shui-bian had
maintained a persistent if slight edge in the polls over the
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previous 3 months of the 2000 campaign, even this late in
the game there were still lingering anxieties about his
commitment to the pursuit of “Taiwan Independence,” the
defining plank of Chen’s DPP. Although all the opinion polls
leading up to the presidential election showed a small but
increasing sentiment for outright “independence,” they also
showed the vast majority of Taiwanese, nervous about
China’s reaction, favored “maintaining the status quo
indefinitely.” Chen’s own DPP polls told him this latter
group made up the 20-to-25 percent of the undecided voters
who would swing the election.
For over a year, Chen had been backing away gingerly
from his party’s militant stance of full-separation from
China. While China and Taiwan are two separate and
independent countries, Chen would explain to his
constituents and fellow partisans (as well as to uneasy
Americans) this requires no change in Taiwan’s political
status. Taiwan, after all had been sovereign and
independent of mainland China since 1949, and the
“Republic of China” has been a sovereign and independent
nation since 1912. Chen promised to “maintain the status
quo” throughout his term as the Republic of China’s next
president.
While Taiwan’s voters were sympathetic, they still
needed reassurance that electing Chen wouldn’t be
catastrophically provocative to China. Dr. Lee Yuan-tseh’s
words gave them some of that reassurance.
But as soothing as Dr. Lee’s endorsement was, Chen was
about to get a boost from even more convincing
supporters—Taiwan’s wealthiest and most dynamic
ethnic-Taiwanese businessmen and women. As Chen
turned to the audience, still basking in Dr. Lee’s reflected
glory, Chen revealed to reporters that “I have also received
promises from Taiwan High-Speed Railway Corporation
chairwoman Nita Ing, Chi Mei president Hsu Wen-lung,
Evergreen chairman Chang Jung-fa, and current National
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Security Advisor Chen Pi-chao, and in addition, Dr. Lee has
suggested I invite Acer Computer’s CEO, Stan Shih.”
The message to Taiwan’s fence-sitting voters was clear.
If Taiwan’s top tycoons could support Chen, then a vote for
Chen was a vote for economic prosperity. And because all
these business leaders had extensive investments on the
other side of the Taiwan Strait, a vote for Chen was a vote
for stable relations with China as well.
A thousand miles away in Beijing, however, Chen’s
support among Taiwan’s top entrepreneurs was cause for
panic. Chinese leaders from President Jiang Zemin and
Premier Zhu Rongji on down were seized by the sudden
realization that maybe this pro-independence politician
could actually win! On March 15, with Taiwan’s election
just 3 days away, a clearly alarmed Premier Zhu called an
unscheduled news conference with foreign reporters. “Let
me advise all these people in Taiwan,” he warned, his voice
cracking with stress, “do not just act on impulse at this
juncture which will decide the future course that China and
Taiwan will follow. Otherwise, I’m afraid you won’t get
another opportunity to regret.” Premier Zhu vowed that
Chinese were ready to “shed blood” to prevent Taiwan
breaking away.2
If China’s leaders thought Premier Zhu’s hard line
would sway Taiwan’s voters, they were wrong. In the end,
Chen won the March 18, 2000, election with 39.6 percent of
the vote in a hard-fought three-way race. Chen’s campaign
managers said privately that their polls showed Zhu’s
intemperate remarks actually added a percentage point to
Chen’s narrow win. And the following week, Chen invited
his advisors, including Nita Ing, Chang Jung-fa, Stan Shih
and Hsu Wen-lung to help him choose a new cabinet.
Beijing Pressures Pro-Chen Businesses.
The Financial and Economic Times is a small circulation
weekly financial newspaper published in Beijing by the
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China Securities Market Research and Planning Center,
but on Tuesday, April 11, 2000, its circulation shot up as
Taiwanese reporters scurried around town looking for
copies. Under a front-page headline, “A Minority of Taiwan
Businesspeople who Tout Taiwan Independence Stirs the
Anger of the Mainland,” were four large portraits of none
other than Nita Ing, Chang Jung-fa, Stan Shih, and Hsu
Wen-lung. The paper named these four ethnic-Taiwanese
supporters of president-elect Chen Shui-bian (as well as
three others: future Minister of Economic Affairs Lin
Hsin-yi; E. Sun Bank chair Lin Jong-shong; and I-Mei
Foods’ Kao Chih-ming). The article complained that
although these Taiwan businessmen and women had one
thing in common—massive investments in China—they
nevertheless had the temerity to support Chen Shui-bian
and Taiwan independence.3
The first target of the newspaper’s attack was Chi Mei
Enterprises’ Chairman Hsu Wen-lung. The paper pointed
out that Hsu’s operations in Taiwan ship over a million tons
of raw petrochemicals to China each year, and account for
over 40 percent of China’s imports in many major
petrochemical sectors. Chi Mei also has a 300,000 ton/year
polystyrene plant in Zhenhai as well as a 125,000 ton/year
joint venture acrylonitrile-butadine-styrene (ABS) plant
under construction.
Next on the list was Chang Jung-fa, chairman of
Taiwan’s Evergreen Group which operates one of the
world’s largest merchant fleets, scores of container ports,
and several international freight forwarding businesses as
well as EVA Airways. Evergreen has 14 offices in China and
cooperates with all of China’s major shipping lines to run
cargo across the Taiwan Strait via third ports. (And it
should be noted that, at the sufferance of the Chinese
government, EVA Airways now ferries 15,600 passengers
weekly between Taiwan and Macao, where most of them
book onward flights directly into China.)
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The Financial and Economic Times piece then recalled
that Stan Chen-jung Shih’s Acer Computers is already one
of China’s top computer sellers, has plans to invest in over
200 separate internet portals in China over the next 2 years,
and more plans to invest another U.S.$3 billion into the
China market over the next 5 years.
The Financial and Economic Times article was a shot
across the bow. No longer would Beijing “sit idly by” and
“watch Taiwan businesses make money in China to support
Taiwan Independence back home,” it warned. That week,
the planned opening of Evergreen’s Shanghai office was
delayed, and Chi Mei’s shippers and factories along the
China coast were all subject to the incessant inspections of
battalions of Chinese bureaucrats, from tax collectors to
safety inspectors to customs agents and policemen. In May a
platoon of tax inspectors appeared at the doorstep of the Chi
Mei plant near Nanjing, and, while they found no
irregularities, they made it clear to the Taiwanese
managers that the crackdown was tied to Hsu’s support for
Chen. According to a Business Week article,4 Chi Mei says
authorities have threatened its mainland customers with
special tax scrutiny. Although Chi Mei has sunk $200
million into China, the company is now threatening to
freeze future investments, and there are rumors that Hsu
Wen-lung is pondering ways of pulling out of China
altogether.
But Hsu Wen-lung is the exception. Most of Taiwan’s
entrepreneurs hope to remain in Beijing’s good graces.
Acer’s Stan Shih, for example, was so worried about his
appearance in the Financial and Economic Times that he
flew immediately to Beijing where he hoped to meet some
high in the party so he could explain himself, but in the end
he spent just a day and gave a speech at a computer trade
show.5 Shih told reporters that he had “never supported
Taiwan Independence,” while Chi Mei’s representatives in
China insisted that their boss, Hsu Wen-lung, “has nothing
to do with the China offices”—as if that would exculpate Chi
Mei’s mainland operations from Mr. Hsu’s political stance.
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Hsu himself was unapologetic, but he remained quiet
nonetheless.
Evergreen’s Shanghai office eventually opened, but as
late as November 23, 2000, the Chinese were still
temporizing about extending EVA Airways’ landing rights
in Macao, rights that were due to expire at the end of that
month.6 By Friday, November 24, however, Taiwan and
Macao civil air negotiators finally signed an agreement
which increased the number of weekly passenger seats
between Taiwan and Macao by 8,000—half to Air Macao
and the other half split between Taiwan’s EVA Air and
TransAsia Airways. Cargo will also be increased by 400 tons
per week, with 200 tons going to Air Macau, and 100 tons
each to EVA Airways and TransAsia Airways. While the
Chinese clearly wanted the increased air traffic, they were
also willing to hold out to the 11th hour and 59th minute to
make their point that thenceforth EVA Air’s operations in
China would continue on condition of good behavior.
Taiwan Dependence on China.
The Chinese leadership’s new hardline against
ethnic-Taiwanese businesses in following the election of
President Chen Shui-bian has heightened Taiwan’s sense of
vulnerability to Chinese economic pressures. President
Chen’s response has been moderate. In his May 20, 2000,
inauguration address, he acknowledged that “Taiwan’s
industrial development must move toward a
knowledge-based economy, high-tech industries need to be
constantly innovative, while traditional industries need to
undergo transformation and upgrading.” Chen’s fears for
Taiwan’s sunset sectors reflect his private concerns that
most of the island’s light-industrial firms will sooner or later
have to move offshore—to China—in order to remain
competitive, leaving Taiwan’s advanced information
economy to emerge as the engine of Taiwan’s future growth.
Accordingly, Taiwan is becoming the supplier of advanced-
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technology components to the labor-intensive assembly
lines in China.
Taiwan’s economic planners are understandably
concerned by this out-migration that is already
“hollowing-out” Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. This isn’t
to say they haven’t tried to control the problem. President
Chen’s predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, instituted a “don’t hurry,
be patient” policy of discouraging Taiwan businesses from
moving to the Chinese mainland. 7 Earlier, in 1994,
President Lee launched a “Southern Strategy” of
encouraging Taiwan businesses to look at Southeast Asia as
an alternative to China.8 But, with the exception of a
large-scale move into Vietnam (where labor is truly cheap),
new investments in China continued to increase at an
annual rate of 13-30 percent. (See Table 1.)
Paradoxically, Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration seemed to
speed-up Taiwan’s manufacturing exodus to China. Chen
campaigned on a promise unilaterally to open up trading
links with the mainland, and after his election he has
ordered a series of policy initiatives to encourage
cross-Strait trade, provided China doesn’t levy a “one
China” precondition. Although China hasn’t obliged,
Taiwan businesses view the new Chen Shui-bian regime as
much more sympathetic to cross-Strait investments than
his predecessor’s, and Taiwan investment flows into China
ballooned in the first 6 months of Chen’s government.
On September 25, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic
Affairs (MOEA) reported that it had approved U.S.$1.612
billion in new Taiwan investments in China for the
January-August period—representing an annual
expansion of 146 percent.9 By October 25, another U.S.$178
million in Taiwan investment applications were approved,
106 percent over 1999 levels.10
The final tally for the year 2000 confirmed the trend. The
MOEA reported January 30, 2001, that increasing efforts
by the Beijing government had been successful in drawing a
record level of Taiwan investment in China. In 2000, MOEA
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processed a total of U.S.$2.6714 billion worth of PRC
investment projects applications submitted by Taiwan
investors, a 108.1 percent increase over 1999 applications,
and the highest annual level on record. MOEA report said
that the influence of both Taiwan’s and the PRC’s entry into
the World Trade Organization (WTO) likely means Taiwan
investment in China would continue its heated pace
through 2001, as well. Of these projects, electronic and
electrical equipment projects accounted for 54 percent of the
total. But the sector with the biggest increases in
investments wasn’t electronics but services. In 2000,
Taiwan service sector investments totaled U.S.$160
million, a six-fold increase from 1999; electrical/electronics
investments were U.S.$1.4 billion, an increase of 170
percent; plastics sector investments were U.S.$180 million,
up 86 percent, with 80 percent of the new investment
applications for projects in Guangdong and Jiangsu.
Taiwan’s newspapers noted Beijing sources estimate
Taiwan businesses have invested a cumulative U.S.$28
billion in China since 1986, while Taiwan’s own Central
Bank of China (CBC) seemed to think the figure was over
U.S.$50 billion—or maybe U.S.$60 billion.11 As late as
November 11, 2000, one Taiwan Legislative Yuan member
claimed the CBC told him Taiwan investments could be as
high as U.S.$100 billion if one includes all the money that
Taiwan businesses borrow for their mainland operations
without seeking Taiwan government approval. 12 By
comparison, Taiwan’s Commission on Economic Planning
and Development (CEPD) reckons that Taiwanese
businesses have invested a cumulative U.S.$43.7 billion in
Southeast Asia.13 In February 2001, Ms. Tan Ching-yu, a
research fellow at Taiwan’s “National Policy Foundation,” a
think-tank closely linked to the Kuomintang (KMT) party,
asserted that “Taiwan’s mainland investments hit a record
U.S.$2.7 billion in 2000 and grew 108 percent compared
with the previous year.” Tan also said “almost 70 percent of
the investments were made in the second half of last year,”
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that is, made after President Chen Shui-bian took office in
May 2000.
This situation would be truly disturbing even if one
weren’t concerned about the national security implications
of such close economic dependence on a politically hostile
power. In early November, 2000, Taiwan’s cabinet-level
CEPD reviewed the alarmingly high growth of Taiwan
industrial investment in China and recommended that laws
be enacted which will limit investment to 2 percent of
Taiwan’s gross domestic product.14 And Taiwan is likely to
continue its national security ban on making very high-tech
computers, powerful motherboards, or high-speed modems
in China.
Still, when all is said and done, and despite the
increasing vulnerability of Taiwan’s economy to pressures
from China, there is no other choice for Taiwan businesses
that hope to remain competitive. China has the labor, the
land—and now, the market—while Taiwan has the capital,
expertise, and entrepreneurship. Already, thousands of
entire production lines have been closed in Taiwan—and
reopened in China.
With Taiwan as dependent as it is on China, President
Chen is not about to provoke Beijing with an independence
challenge. Indeed, Chen held out the olive branch at his
inauguration address by reassuring his Chinese
counterparts that “we believe that the leaders on both sides
possess enough wisdom and creativity to jointly deal with
the question of a future ‘one China’. ” Chen also made his
so-called “Four No’s” vow that
as long as the Chinese Communist Party’s regime has no
intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that
during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will
not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion
of the so-called ‘state-to-state’ description in the Constitution,
and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo
in regards to the question of independence or unification.15
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How Dependent Is Taiwan?
The year 2000 was a benchmark era for Taiwan
investment in China. Taiwan’s investments in China moved
from low and mid-tech into the high-tech sectors, and for the
first time, investments in services showed that Taiwanese
businesses have finally begun to view mainland China as a
major export market in itself. Taiwan’s bean-counters say
the capital injection from Taiwanese enterprises in China
reached U.S.$14.8 billion by mid-2000. But figures compiled
by Beijing showed that Taiwan investors have signed
agreements to invest U.S.$48 billion capital in the
mainland, with actual capital input amounting to U.S.$28
billion.
Much of the early Taiwan investment in China could be
said to have been “overestimated” in an effort to “puff-up”
their claims to preferential treatment in China. Taiwan’s
toy, textile, electrical appliance, and footwear factories in
Fujian and Guangdong, for example, were often older
production lines with obsolescent equipment that had been
crated up in Taiwan and shipped across the Strait.
But not any more. For the year 2000, an astonishing 72.8
percent the total U.S.$25.535 billion production value of
China’s information technology (IT) hardware sector was
manufactured by Taiwan-owned production lines. A more
ominous fact was that China’s U.S.$25 billion IT industry
was bigger than Taiwan’s home-grown U.S.$23.209 billion
industry (according to a November 6, 2000, report by the
Taipei Market Intelligence Center, or “MIC,” at Taiwan’s
government-run Institute for Information Industry).16
Taiwan-controlled IT production for the year 2000 will
total U.S.$48.076 billion—20.5 percent over 1999—with
only U.S.$23.209 billion worth of the products actually
manufactured in Taiwan. U.S.$18.577 billion worth—or
38.6 percent—of the total will have been assembled in
mainland China, up sharply from 1999’s level of 23 percent,
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and even that number is expected to rise to 51 percent in
2001.
In October 2000, Quanta Computer announced it would
invest U.S.$26 million in a motherboard factory and
computer case production line in Zhongshan, making it the
last of Taiwan’s notebook manufacturers to set up shop in
China. As of late September, Taiwan’s desktop personal
computer (PC) manufacturers had moved 42 percent of their
production lines to China, including:
• Mitac International (U.S.$30 million in Shunde,
Guangdong);
• Hsing Enterprise (Shenzhen, Guangdong);
• Acer Inc. (Zhongshan, Guangdong);
• Tatung (Wujiang, Jiangsu); and,
• First International Computer Inc. (Shenzhen).17
Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs judges that up to
48 percent of desktop computers exported by Taiwan
makers are now manufactured in mainland plants, 18
percent turned out by their plants in Taiwan, and the
remaining 34 percent produced in other parts of the world.
At the high-end of the PC spectrum is the notebook
computer, and Taiwan can already claim a 60 percent share
of the global notebook computer market. In 2000,
Taiwanese-operated plants in mainland China assembled
6.5 percent of Taiwan’s notebook output, double 1999’s
figure.
About 56 percent of Taiwan’s motherboard makers also
had production lines on the mainland, which in the first half
of 2000 produced 45.8 percent of Taiwan’s total
motherboard shipments—a figure that rose to over 50
percent by the end of 2000. Motherboard makers in China
include Hsing Enterprises (Shenzhen); Asustek Computer
(Suzhou, Jiangsu); Gigabyte Technology (Dongguan, and
Huangjiang, Jiangsu); Micro-Star (Shenzhen); and
Elitegroup (Shenzhen). Of Taiwan’s scanner
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manufacturers, 88 percent had moved to the mainland by
the end of 2000, including Silitek (Dongguan); Avision
(Shanghai, Suzhou); Primax Electronics; Mustek
(Dongguan); and Umax Data Systems (Suzhou). Of
Taiwan’s CD-ROM drive makers, 74 percent have moved to
mainland China, including Chien-Hsin Electronics,
Behavior Tech, Arima, Acer Communications and
Multimedia, and Aopen. And 58 percent of Taiwan’s
computer monitor producers, including Lite-On Technology
(Dongguan) and Compal Electronic (Kunshan, Jiangsu),
have major production lines in China.18
Labor costs are a major factor in the migration of
Taiwan’s high-tech sector to China, with engineering and
technical staff salaries running about one-third to one-fifth
of Taiwan’s levels, and assembly labor as cheap as
one-tenth. Acer Display Technology, Taiwan’s largest
domestic notebook display manufacturer, announced
October 20, 2000, that it would set up a new liquid crystal
module (LCM) assembly line at Acer’s 53.3-hectare complex
in Suzhou, Jiangsu. The company said an exhaustive study
showed that moving LCM assembly lines to China would
reduce production costs 20 percent. Although Acer’s move
displaces over 800 assembly-line workers at Acer Display’s
Taiwan factory, many of its major Taiwan customers are
setting up notebook assembly lines on the mainland, and
the company has to service them.19
Taiwan’s Lite-On Electronics announced on October 5,
2000, that it would relocate its entire Taiwan optoelectronic
production line to its factory in Tianjin “due to high
production cost in Taiwan.” Lite-On’s three production lines
in Tianjin cover 750,000 square feet of floor space, have
2,000 workers, and generated about U.S.$62.5 million
income in 2000. The move saves Lite-On about U.S.$1.6
million in production costs and will leave the Taiwan
operation focused on research and development (R&D) and
production of high value-added products.20
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But Taiwan’s high-tech sector doesn’t just see China as a
source of cheap labor. It’s a major market as well. VIA
Technologies, Taiwan’s largest chipset designer, reported in
September that China’s 12 major computer assemblers
(including China’s giant Legend Group) have ordered VIA
chipsets and processors, and that VIA intends to take over
50 percent of the mainland Chinese market for chipsets and
between 10 percent and 30 percent of China’s CPU (central
processing unit) market within the next few years. On
October 30, VIA Tech announced it would invest U.S.$16.08
million to establish its first branch in China, an R&D center
in Beijing. VIA sees itself as becoming China’s main
supplier of chipsets by placing VIA-Cyrix III
microprocessors as original equipment manufacturing
(OEM) on the majority of motherboards sold in the
mainland. VIA’s China foray will, of course, put it into direct
competition with Intel, which currently dominates China’s
CPU market, but VIA’s strategy is to beat Intel in the China
market. Taiwan’s motherboard producers already use VIA
chipsets on their China-bound OEM products marketed by
Compaq and Dell.21
Stan Chen-jung Shih’s “Acer Sertek” said September 25,
2000, that its PC sales in China will exceed Taiwan for the
first time in 2000 making it China’s number three PC brand
after Legend and Founder Group. With China demand
pegged at between seven and eight million units in 2001 and
annual growth rate of between 20 percent and 30 percent,
Acer Sertek sees the mainland as replacing Germany as the
third largest PC market in 2001 and Japan as the world’s
second largest PC market by 2002. To meet the demand,
Acer Group is planning PC manufacturing centers in
Guangzhou and Suzhou and doubling its PC distribution
and service beyond its existing 500 sales centers by first
quarter 2001.22
The February 9, 2001, edition of Hong Kong’s AsiaWeek
magazine profiled the controversial semiconductor joint
venture in Shanghai run by Formosa Plastics Group (FPG)
Chairman Wang Yung-ching’s estranged son, Winston
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Wen-yen Wong (Wang), noting that “for Beijing, it’s a dream
venture. But for Taipei, it could be a nightmare.” The article
said Wong’s U.S.$1.63 billion, 240,000-square-meter
computer-chip plant in Shanghai’s Pudong Zhangjiang
High-Tech Park—"Shanghai Grace Semiconductor
Manufacturing"—is part of China’s strategy to become a
major player in the world of high tech. Taipei worries the
“investment, and other projects that are already following,
will accelerate Taiwan’s economic dependence on the
mainland—and sap its political ability to resist
reunification.” According to AsiaWeek, China has only two
major semiconductor makers: a Motorola plant that
produces chips for its own mobile phones, and a small NEC
joint venture in Shanghai. AsiaWeek explained that “Wong
these days seems primarily driven by his desire to get even
with his father,” but is now “coy about the financial
structure of the project, not least because he is under
pressure from Taipei authorities not to go ahead with the
venture.” The holding company, “Grace THW Group,”
already has eight low-tech factories in China which claimed
U.S.$260 million in sales in 2000. Construction on Grace’s
new eight-inch waferfab in Shanghai, the most advanced of
its kind in China, should be in full production by 2002. And
if the venture expands according to its high-tech contract,
the Chinese government will provide an extra U.S.$2.5
billion, with the total likely investment to hit U.S.$6.4
billion.23
AsiaWeek also reported that another giant Taiwan
computer-chip factory, Semiconductor Manufacturing
International (SMIC) owned by a consortium led by Richard
Chang, is expected to begin pilot production this September.
Together, AsiaWeek said, Wong and Chang are likely to
have up to 12 production lines turning out eight-inch silicon
wafers by the end of 2002, giving China one-fifth of Taiwan’s
50-plus production lines, making it a major computer-chip
manufacturer. Moreover, SMIC plans experimental
production of 12-inch wafers by mid-2002. AsiaWeek
reported that “the Taiwan business community expects the
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government to relax some investment restrictions later this
month. Taipei may authorize six-inch and possibly
eight-inch wafer operations on the mainland.”
2000 was a key year for Taiwan’s copper-wire
investments in China. Nine of Taiwan’s top electric wire and
cable producers expanded the output of their Chinese
factories to meet the ever-rising demand for cable and wire
in mainland China. Walsin Lihwa has invested U.S.$120
million in 14 factories throughout China to make copper
wire, power cable, fiber-optics, and steel wire. Pacific
Electric Wire and Cable invested U.S.$31 million in
Shenzhen to make bare copper wire. Tai-I Electric Wire and
Cable spent U.S.$17 million in a copper wire line in
Guangzhou, making that factory the largest factory of its
kind in China. Ta Ya Electric invested U.S.$11.8 million to
set up a copper wire factory in Dongguan, Jung Shing Wire
Co., Ltd. invested U.S.$5.21 million to build two copper-wire
factories in Dongguan supply the computer monitor
industry.24
The petrochemical sector has also been drawn to
mainland China in 2000. Nan Ya Plastics, a subsidiary of
Formosa Plastics Group (FPG), decided on August 27, 2000,
to invest U.S.$49 million to build a refinery in Huizhou,
Guangdong. The FPG parent company is also seeking
Taiwan government approval for a U.S.$100 million
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) refinery in Ningbo, Zhejiang, with
a 300,000 metric ton annual output capacity, and plans
additional ones in Nantong, Zhejiang, and in Xiamen,
Fujian.25 Taiwan media reports on September 3, however
indicate FPG is planning to invest over U.S.$13 billion in a
vast 4,000-hectare petrochemical complex at the Ningbo
site. While FPG has long been a pioneer in mainland
investments, Taiwan’s Petrochemical Industry Association
(PIA) which represents the island’s non-FPG-owned
petrochemical manufacturers, have decided to move ahead
with a U.S.$700 million joint venture ethylene cracker with
an annual capacity of 600,000 tons.
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Despite the enthusiasm that FPG and the PIA
petrochemical producers show for expansion into China,
Taiwan’s now-blackballed Chi Mei Petrochemical seems to
have other ideas. After 6 months of harassment by Chinese
watchdogs, and an unofficial boycott of Chi Mei’s products,
which in late October prompted Chi Mei to announce a
downward adjustment in its November domestic sales
prices of ABS and polystyrene. The company is said to be
looking for ways out of China—perhaps for Vietnam or the
Philippines.26
These are just a few examples of the major Taiwan
investment initiatives in China during the two
mid-quarters of 2000. And they are, of course, just a
snapshot of the migration of Taiwan’s mid- and high-tech
manufacturing to the mainland. But they also underscore
the growing importance of China’s market for high-tech
products.
The rest of Taiwan’s U.S.$25 billion to U.S.$60 billion
investment in China’s low- to mid-tech industries has been
there for at least 5 years, in some cases (as with shoes and
light industrial goods) between 10 and 13 years. Taiwan’s
largest light industrial sector players—foodstuffs giant
Uni-President, for example—are now familiar features in
the Chinese landscape. Taiwan is now getting comfortable
with them as well. On October 22, 2000, Taiwan’s Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC) and Ministry of Economic Affairs
approved the first exception to the island’s U.S.$50 million
ceiling on investment projects in China. But it was an
exception that proved the rule. Taiwan’s Uni-President
Group actually applied to consolidate 18 of the Uni Group’s
re-invested firms in China into a large holding company
based in Shanghai and capitalized at U.S.$100 million
which will handle materials management, fund
management, and personnel training for the group’s 20
other re-invested manufacturing firms in mainland
China.27
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Patterns of Trade.
Taiwan’s investments in China are the engine behind
Taiwan’s massive trade across the Strait. And China is the
engine for Taiwan’s export sector.
Taiwan’s November 2000 trade with the People’s
Republic of China totaled U.S.$2.25 billion in exports to the
PRC (6.6 percent above November 1999) and U.S.$560
million in imports from the PRC, according to the figures
published in January by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic
Affairs (MOEA). November’s U.S.$1.7 billion trade surplus
with China brought last year’s January-November total
trade surplus to U.S.$18.27 billion in Taiwan’s favor, 20
percent above 1999’s levels and a new high. Taiwan’s total
cross-Strait trade has tripled in less than 10 years, the
MOEA report said, and Taiwan’s trade surplus with China
broke the U.S.$10 billion mark in 1993, and was U.S.$16.7
billion in 1999. MOEA statistics showed cumulative
January-November 2000 trade with the PRC at
U.S.$29.776 billion, 27.2 percent above 1999 levels,
accounting for 11.2 percent of all Taiwan’s foreign trade.
Taiwan exports during the period totaled U.S.$24.027
billion (24.3 percent above 1999), and accounting for 17.6
percent of all Taiwan’s exports. Imports from the PRC were
U.S.$5.749 billion, 40.5 percent above 1999 and 4.4 percent
of all Taiwan’s imports.
Taiwan’s trade with China hit record levels in July 2000
for the 10th consecutive month of double-digit year-on-year
growth. Exports to China surged a year-on-year 42 percent
in July to U.S.$2.5 billion while imports were U.S.$566
million, up 55.4 percent from the same month in 1999.
Taiwan’s trade with China grew to U.S.$18.38 billion in the
first 7 months of the year, up 30.9 percent from the same
1999 period and accounted for 11.1 percent of Taiwan’s total
external trade.28
Interestingly, although Taiwan’s trade with China has
doubled since 1994, the level of Taiwan’s export dependence
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on China has gone from 14.9 percent (of Taiwan’s total
exports) in 1993 to 17.8 percent in 2000. This statistic,
however, masks the level of exports orders (and hence
profits) received by Taiwan-owned factories in China
directly to customers abroad without transiting Taiwan or
relying on components imported from Taiwan. (See Table
2.)
What does the trade consist of? Mostly components
shipped to Chinese factories for assembly into products for
export beyond China. A report released by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs on March 26, 2000, showed that over 26
percent of all Taiwan export orders received by Taiwan
companies are shipped from Taiwan-run factories in China.
The MOEA report indicated that this 26 percent figure
includes export orders for items made in whole or in part in
China. This means that, while a good chunk of these goods
are re-assembled, sent back to Taiwan, and then exported
from Taiwan as finished products, more than half appear to
be shipped directly from China without showing up on
Taiwan’s export statistics. Still, the implications are
dramatic—over one-fourth of all Taiwan exports, direct or
indirect, in whole or in part, rely on China.29
That’s a huge figure. But it puts into perspective why
China doesn’t view Taiwan’s foreign direct investment as a
“golden goose.” Instead, the Chinese leadership likely sees
foreign investments in the export-processing sector as a
job-creator. A report prepared by the U.S. Consulate
General in Guangzhou in 1992 included a study of the
footwear industry which cited the example of a pair of Nike
tennis shoes said to cost about U.S.$12.00 ex-factory. Of
that figure, U.S.$1.00 was for labor, about $0.50 was for
rent, electricity, taxes, U.S.$6.00 was for imported
components, and U.S.$2.00 for Chinese sourced
components. At the time, the consulate extrapolated that
for every dollar of exported goods from a foreign venture,
only about 30 percent stayed in China, while the rest went to
other foreign countries which supplied the components and
entrepreneurship.30
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Taiwan’s reliance on China to fuel its export economy,
therefore, seems far more important to Taiwan than to
China, a fact that seems only recently to have dawned on
Beijing. Beijing’s policy heretofore has generally been to
insulate the Taiwan economic and political spheres.
As the Beijing Financial and Economic Times‘ attack on
Taiwan businessmen shows, the careful separation of trade
and politics broke down after Taiwan president Chen
Shui-bian’s election. A few days before the FET story was
published on April 9, Chinese officials were already
reported in the Taiwan press to be “increasing pressure on
the investment activities of Taiwanese companies which are
thought to be backing the pro-independence policy of
President-elect Chen Shui-bian of the DPP.” These
unnamed Beijing officials warned that they may consider
excluding companies that back Taiwan independence from
cross-strait economic activities. Taiwan’s businessmen and
women, small, big and world-class alike have too much
invested—literally and figuratively—in mainland China to
risk it by actively supporting Taiwan independence.
They—not just the four whose photos appeared on the
front page of a Chinese newspaper—but hundreds of
President Chen’s supporters—certainly wield enough
influence over Chen to restrain any precipitate and overt
move to Taiwan independence—presuming he would want
to in the first place. In short, although Chen’s presidential
term thus far has not been the most predictable, it’s
probably safe to say he would not want to precipitate the
economic collapse that would result if China forced Taiwan
companies to shut down their mainland operations.
Beware of Radical Labor.
If Taiwan’s “new economy” firms see the mainland as an
opportunity for growth and increased competitiveness, its
“old economy” manufacturing businesses see it as the only
way to survive. Taiwan traditionally has had a
characteristically Asian labor market, with unemployment
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hovering in the high two percentages, and yet the island’s
working wages are far higher than most Asian countries,
due to a combination of a thriving economy and one of Asia’s
narrowest income gaps.
If there is a threat to the political status quo in the
Taiwan Strait, however, it is that the income gap is
widening. Chen’s DPP has traditionally put its
ethnic-Taiwanese platform before its populism, but now
that independence is on the back-burner, the party has been
focusing more on its social and environmental
agenda—hence the Chen administration’s controversial
decision to abandon plans to build a nuclear power plant.
DPP party literature calls Taiwan’s income gap “alarming,”
noting that the richest 20 percent of the population earns
5.5 times as much as the poorest 20 percent.
Ironically, that disparity is probably narrower than its
“communist” neighbor next door—but with thousands of
jobs moving off the island and onto the mainland every
month, it’s not going to get any narrower. Unemployment
was as high as 2.7 percent in May and was creeping up at 0.1
percentage point a month to 3.1 percent in October. On
November 14, 2000, a coalition of Taiwan labor groups
planned to fly to Hong Kong where they would demonstrate
outside the Xinhua news service building to protest the
exodus of Taiwan jobs across the Strait. The prospect of the
independence platform resurfacing under a protectionist,
pro-labor guise is certainly plausible.
Conclusion.
While there is a large Taiwan constituency for labor
relief and efforts to halt the outflow of manufacturing jobs,
there is nevertheless very little political sentiment on the
island for a challenge to the status quo that calls Taiwan the
“Republic of China.” If present trends continue—and there’s
every indication they will—the outlook for the early part of
the 21st century is for ever-increasing Taiwan dependence
on China for its economic expansion. This, of course, means
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Taiwan’s political leadership will be very circumspect in
dealing with the touchy topic of “independence.”
Of course, there’s no need to bring up the “independence”
issue at all. Taiwan’s formal position is that it’s already
independent and sovereign, and that’s the status quo that
has existed since 1949. Taiwan, therefore, has neither need
nor desire to change this status quo. China, on the other
hand, has declared that “if the Taiwan authorities refuse,
sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits
reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese
government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures
possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill the great
cause of reunification.”31 Strong words. They serve as a
warning that if anyone’s likely to risk changing the status
quo in the Taiwan Strait, it’s the People’s Republic of China,
not Taiwan.
Unfortunately, there’s little evidence one way or the
other to indicate that the Chinese leadership is reassured by
Taiwan’s growing “dependence.” One would think they’d be
ecstatic; that they’d see the trend as pulling Taiwan ever
closer into China’s orbit. And one would think the
reasonable strategy would be to let nature take its course.
But if the February 2000 “White Paper” is to be taken
seriously, the Chinese leadership doesn’t seem to see it this
way. Instead, they focus on the largely hallucinated specter
of “Taiwan Independence.”
Beijing already has proved itself capable of
strong-arming Taiwanese businesses in China into
supporting one China. Indeed, the timid protestations from
Taiwan firms that they are “neutral” or “don’t support
Taiwan Independence,” or better still, “adhere to one
China,” reflects that Taiwan firms see political fealty to
Beijing as a cost of doing business. But there’s a limit to how
much influence even these Taiwan firms have on Taiwan’s
political leadership, and, if further commercial migration to
China means ballooning ranks of unemployed in Taiwan,
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their leverage would evaporate. So, clearly, Beijing’s
leverage is limited to “keeping Taiwan from declaring
independence”—but the leverage does not extend to being
able to “force Taiwan into unification.”
Without this leverage, Beijing may look elsewhere for
influence over Taiwan. Surely, easing up on a military
buildup that explicitly threatens Taiwan would be infinitely
effective at speeding up Taiwan’s “dependency” trend. But
instead, Beijing seems to be pursuing a diametrically
opposite tactic. Beijing is spending vast new sums on
Russian-made Sovremmenny destroyers, SS-N-22
“Sunburn” supersonic missiles, Sukhoi-30 jet fighters, and
the full fearsome panoply of advanced weaponry that is now
being deployed with the People’s Liberation Army, Navy,
and Air Force.
Needless to say, this is a policy direction that seems
designed not so much to woo Taiwan into the gently
enfolding arms of the motherland, as to placate China’s
military. Others in this volume will assess whether the
Chinese leadership truly intends to use its new armaments
against Taiwan—or anyone else. But one can’t help but feel
that, with all this new equipment, the Chinese PLA will find
some way to use it.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. The event was covered in all the Taipei newspapers on Saturday,
but the Taipei Times has the best best English language description. See
“Chen to visit Lee Yuan-tseh today,” Taipei Times internet edition,
March 10, 2000, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/ news/2000/03/10;
“Chen’s the man, says Lee,” Taipei Times, March 11, 2000, at
http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2000/03/11; and “Lien, Soong
scrambling on damage control over Lee Yuan-tseh,” Taipei Times,
March 12, 2000, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/news.
2. “China’s Zhu Warns Taiwan to Vote with Cool Head,” by Paul
Eckert, Reuters, from Beijing, March 15, 2000.
3. The full story is in “Beijing Baozhi Dian Ming Yan Bian Qi
Taishang” (“Beijing Newspaper Names Seven Taiwan Businessmen

59

who supported Chen Shui-bian”), filed by journalist Xu Donghai in the
Shijie Ribao (World Journal), New York, April 12, 2000, p. 1.
4. “Uneasy Collaborators: To China, Taiwan Investors are both
Welcome and Suspect,” Business Week, August 14, 2000, p 28.
5. “Hongqi Xiang Zhonggong Baozheng Zhichi Tongyi” (“Acer
Assures PRC that It Supports Unification”), China Times, April 12,
2000; “Shih Zhenrong Yuedi Fang Dalu” (“Stan Shih to Visit Mainland
at End of Month”), China Times, April 19, 2000; “Shangye Zhoukan:
Hongqi Dalu Xinchang Fazhan Kong You Kunjing” (“Business Week
Says Progress on Acer’s New Mainland Factory May Face Trouble”),
China Times, April 19, 2000; “Shih Zhenrong Qiangdiao Ziji Zhengzhi
Lichang Zhongli” (“Stan Shih Insists His Own Political Stance Is
Neutral”), Commercial Times (CommT), April 27, 2000.
6. “Zhang Rongfa wei Liewei Jinru Dalu Hei Mingdan” (“Chang
Jung-fa Hasn’t Been Entered in Any Mainland Black List”), Taipei’s
Commercial Times, April 12, 2000; “Changrong: Cong Wei Zhichi Taidu,
ye bu Zhuzhang Taidu” (“Evergreen: Never Supported Taiwan
independence, Never Advocated Taiwan Independenece”), Commercial
Times, April 10, 2000; “Zhonggong Jinggao Zhichi Taidu Taishang”
(“PRC Warns Taiwan Businessmen Who Support Taiwan
Independence”), China Times, April 9, 2000; “Zhonggong Shiya
Taishang bu Zhichi Taidu” (“PRC Pressures Taiwan Businessmen not
to Support Taiwan Independence”), China Times, April 11, 2000.
Regarding EVA Air’s Macao routes, see “Tai Gang Ao Hangxian Xiayue
Jiang Jixu Yue” (“Taiwan-Hongkong-Macao Air Agreement Will
Continue Next Month”), China Times Express, Taipei, October 17, 2000;
and “Tai-Ao Hangyue Xiayue Di Jieman Houtian Tanpan”
(“Taiwan-Macao Air Agreement Will End at the end of Next Month,
Negotiations in Two Days”), Commercial Times, Taipei, October 23,
2000. Economic Daily News (EDN) reported the Macao-Taiwan civil air
agreement on Monday, November 27, 2000; Reuters reported Saturday,
November 25, that Macao-Taiwan routes presently have a load of 28,200
a week, and some 403,200 Taiwan visitors arrived at Macao
International Airport in the first 7 months of 2000, 86 percent of all
arrivals at the airport.
7. See “Li Teng-hui Defends ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ Policy’,” Taipei,
China Times, December 4, 1997, translated by Foreign Broadcast
Information Service as FBIS-CHI-97-343 OW0912143797.
8. Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui launched his so-called “Southern
Strategy” during his February 9-17, 1994, tour of the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand.

60

9. “Approved Taiwan Investment in Mainland China Up 146
Percent in 8 Months,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, September
25, 2000.
10. “Dui Dalu Touzi Qian San Ji Chuang Xin Gao Chengzhang 106
percent” (“Investment in the Mainland At New High, Grows 106 Percent
in First Three Quarters”), Commercial Times, October 25, 2000.
11. “Taishang Touzi Dalu Qunian Chuang Xin Gao” (“Taiwan
Commercial Investments in the Mainland Hit New High Last Year”),
Taipei China Times, January 31, 2001. Also “Taizi Deng Lu Wei Yu
Sanbai Yi Meiyuan” (“Taiwan Investment Not Over U.S.$30 Billion”),
Central Daily News, November 11, 2000.
12. “Yang Hang: Taishang Touzi Dalu Yu Qian Yi Meiyuan”
(“Central Bank: Taiwan Business Investments in Mainland Over
U.S.$100 Billion), China Times, November 10, 2000.
13. “Taiwan’s Mainland-Bound Investments Estimated at U.S.$60
Billion,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, October 8, 2000. “China
investment hits high,” Taipei Times, Taipei, Taiwan, February 12,
2001.
14. “CEPD Plans Mainland Investment Ceiling At 2 Percent of
Taiwan’s GDP,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, November 2,
2000.
15. “President Chen Shui-bian’s Inauguration Speech” Source:
Office of the President, Republic of China, at the Taiwan Government
Information Office website, http://www.gio.gov.tw.
16. “Mainland China to Replace Taiwan As World’s 3rd Largest IT
Supplier,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, November 6, 2000.
17. “Half of Taiwanese Desktop PCs Sold From Mainland China”
China Economic News Service, Taipei, August 10, 2000.
18. “Mainland China to replace Taiwan as world’s 3rd largest IT
supplier.”
19. “Acer Display to Set Up LCM Lines in Mainland China,” China
Economic News Service, Taipei, October 19, 2000.
20. “Lite-On Electronics to Move Optoelectronic Lines to Mainland
China,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, October 5, 2000.

61

21. “VIA Technologies Aims For Top Spot in Mainland’s PC Chip
Market,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, September 21, 2000.
22. “Acer Sertek to Rank As Mainland China’s Third Largest PC
Seller in 2001,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, September 25,
2000.
23. Allan T. Cheng and David Hartung, “Wong’s Dispute with His
Father Has Fuelled His Mainland Ambition,” Asiaweek, February 9,
2001 Vol. 27 No.5
24. “9 Local Electric Wire & Cable Makers Expanding in Mainland
China,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, September 13, 2000.
25. “Nan Ya Plastics Enjoyed Growth in Half-Year Revenue &
Profit,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, August 27, 2000.
26. “Chi Mei Lowers Domestic Prices of ABS, PS for November,”
China Economic News Service, Taipei, October 24, 2000.
27. “Gov’t to Okay U.S.$100M. Mainland Investment by
Uni-President,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, October 22,
2000; “Qunian Taiwan dui Dalu Maoyi Xuncha Chuang Xin Gao”
(“Taiwan’s Trade Surplus With the Mainland Hit New High Last Year”),
Taipei, Commercial Times, January 30, 2001. Also see Ministry of
Economic Affairs website at http://www.moeaboft.gov.tw for a
comprehensive look at cross-Strait trade. Note, most of Taiwan’s
cross-Strait trade estimates are based on a figure equal to 70 percent of
trade with Hong Kong.
28. “Taiwan’s Exports to Mainland China Surged 42 Percent in July:
BOFT,” China Economic News Service, Taipei, September 26, 2000.
29. “Taiwan Jiedan, Dalu Chu Huo Bilu Tupuo 26 percent” (“Ratio
of Taiwan Export Orders to Mainland Shipment of Goods Breaks 26
Percent Mark”), Commercial Times, March 6, 2000. But also see
“Waixiao Jiedan Jin 87 percent Zai Guonei Chansheng,” (“Only 87
percent of Export Orders Produced Domestically”), China Times,
Taipei, June 26, 2000.
30. Unpublished report written by the author. You’ll have to take
my word for it.
31. “White Paper on the Principle Of One China And The Taiwan
Question” Xinhua, Beijing, February 21, 2000.

62

CHAPTER 5
THE COSTS OF CHINA’S MILITARY
CONFLICT:
THE KOREAN AND JAPANESE DIMENSIONS
Taeho Kim*
Would China’s nationalist ambitions and economic drive
increase a chance for future conflicts in the Taiwan Strait as
well as in the supposedly resource-rich disputed areas such
as the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands?
Or would Chinese leaders shelve such disputes—at least
temporarily—as China’s economic imperative requires a
relatively long period of internal and external stability?
This crucial question, which has long puzzled China
scholars and strategists worldwide, has taken on new
relevance in light of profound and sustained regional
uncertainty, China’s overall strained relationships with the
United States and with Japan throughout the 1990s, and
the growing polarization of the broader “rise of China”
debate in the media, policy, and academic circles. It thus
stands to reason that East Asia’s future security and
economic trajectories are increasingly tied up with China’s
current and likely future external behavior.
The answer to the question, however, depends on a host
of diverse yet uncertain factors, including domestic
developments inside China, its interactions with Taiwan
and other claimants, and its relations with other major
powers, the so-called “daguo guanxi.” The ongoing yet
inconclusive debate about China’s war-proneness,1 though
critical in discerning East Asia’s future, is beyond the scope

* The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not
represent the positions of the KIDA, the Mershon Center, or any other
organizations with which the author is affiliated.
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of this chapter. Rather, it focuses on a subsidiary issue:
What would be the costs of China-initiated conflicts in its
relations with the Korean peninsula and with Japan?
More specifically, this chapter attempts to better
understand the little-discussed consequences and
implications of an armed conflict in the three disputed
cases—i.e., the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—on China’s relations with the
Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and with Japan. It
not only takes stock of the current and likely future
evolution of China’s relations with those important
Northeast Asian neighbors, but also addresses the latter’s
possible calculus and options.
A long list of caveats, disclaimers, and explicit
assumptions should precede an intellectual endeavor of this
sort. Most prominent ones include: First, like any objective
discussions on disputed territorial and other claims, this
one does not support or take sides with the positions of any
actual or potential claimants. Nor is it intended to offer
possible solutions to the age-old disputes. Second, the
timeframe for this chapter is 2001-2010—that is, the
current status and likely trend-lines that are discernible as
of this writing do not change significantly 10 years down the
road. Third, as David Finkelstein’s pace-setting chapter in
this volume illuminates, this chapter only highlights broad
diplomatic and security implications of a major armed
conflict—if it ever happens—and does not exhaust its
complex and interactive processes, including its military
scenarios, its duration, and its degree of intensity. Fourth,
in light of severe limitations on the publicly-available
literature or data on the topic—both inside and outside
China, the analysis that follows should be regarded as
tentative and speculative.
Cross-Strait Conflict.
Any major flare-up in the Taiwan Strait is bound to be
extremely costly, disastrous, and tragic in terms of not only
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the “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli) of the
parties directly involved but also overall stability and
prosperity in the region and beyond. In such an eventuality,
in particular, the Chinese cost to its relations with Japan
and the ROK would be exceedingly high.
Foremost among the negative consequences would be
economic. Not only has China’s reform and open-door policy
since the late 1970s required a cultivation of amicable
relations with its Asian neighbors, but the dynamic Asian
economy has held growing importance to China’s domestic
agenda of economic development. As is well known, Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan are not only economic
powerhouses but also important sources of capital,
technology, and management skills necessary for China’s
economic development.
Japan remains China’s number-one trade partner ($66.2
billion in 1999 and $85.8 billion in 2000, respectively) as
well as the largest provider of foreign direct investment
(FDI), official development aid (ODA) and technological
know-how.2 These benefits that are necessary for China’s
longer-term economic development can be withheld or even
cancelled outright, as Japan’s linkage between the
scheduled ODA and China’s nuclear test in 1995 amply
illustrates.
The economic cost to Sino-ROK relations would be very
high as well, as South Korea is now China’s third largest
trade partner with $25 billion in 1999 and $33 billion in
2000, respectively.3 If China’s trade volume with South
Korea is added up with those with Japan, the United States,
and Taiwan (which are China’s number one, two, and four
trade partners), the economic cost is insurmountable and
would irrevocably disrupt its economic development. In
such an eventuality, moreover, there are significant
noneconomic costs China would have to bear in its relations
with South Korea and Japan.
Like most other middle powers around the world, South
Korea harbors regional ambitions, especially for a day when
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it is unified with the North. Its security mind-set, however,
is still predominantly peninsular. Notwithstanding the
historic June 2000 inter-Korean summit meeting and a
flurry of ensuing diplomatic activities, the ROK’s primary
security goal remains the same—i.e., to deter a North
Korean military threat in an overwhelmingly land-based
war and, if deterrence fails, to win a war in a swift and
effective manner. 4 South Korea’s peninsular-based,
parochial security mind-set, I would argue, has far-reaching
implications for its perceptions of, and its possible responses
to, the three conflicts under review.
South Korea maintains a certain degree of policy
ambiguity on such sensitive issues as a potential armed
conflict in the Taiwan Strait, to which it is not a direct party
but which cuts across major dimensions of its foreign and
security policy. They include the ROK-U.S. alliance,
Sino-ROK relations, peninsular stability, and in the longer
term the regional posture of a unified Korea. What triggers
ROK responses or what are the sufficient conditions for
South Korea to take definitive actions is an intriguing yet
largely unanswerable question.
In a major armed conflict over the Taiwan Strait the
foremost concern for South Korea would be the possible
involvement of United States Forces Korea (USFK) in
particular and its implications for East Asia’s overall
security environment. The possibility of close security ties
between Beijing and Pyongyang cannot be ruled out, even if
the former clearly understands the risks of a two-front war.
The accompanying regional instability could in turn
necessitate an adjustment in U.S. forward deployment in
Asia, higher-level regional militarization, and a
strengthened strategic configuration among the United
States, Japan, and the ROK against an assertive China.
The South Korean elite, on the other hand, seems to be
well aware that it alone carries little weight and few means
to influence any contingency in the Taiwan Strait, except
joining a diplomatic chorus for a peaceful resolution of the
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conflict through dialogue. South Korea’s official response to
the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis is a case in point, which
was passive, restrained, and neutral.5 In a major armed
conflict involving active U.S. participation, however, it also
understands full well that a similar low-profile response
could carry a great risk in alliance maintenance.
While South Korea will weigh carefully the grave yet
uncertain consequences of its role between the United
States and China over a major cross-Strait conflict, it is
worthy of note that how best to balance alliance ties with the
United States and security cooperation with China would
highly likely become its primary security challenge in the
foreseeable future. Viewed in this light, a China-provoked
armed conflict in the Strait could become an impetus for
further consolidating South Korea’s “strategic
prioritization” with the United States, akin to Japan’s
decision in the mid-1990s.
Parenthetically, unlike the majority of the American
and Japanese public, South Koreans throughout the 1990s
and beyond maintained a favorable view of China in general
and of its role in Korean peninsular issues in particular,
reflecting across-the-board improvement in Sino-ROK
relations in the last decade. A major Strait conflict could
lead South Korean public perception of China to become
closer to that of its elite, which can be summed up as
“somewhat negative” toward China and “fairly friendly”
toward the United States.6
Of longer-term consequence is a sustained confrontation
between the regional superpower and the global
superpower, which could sharply exacerbate their potential
and real differences over a host of peninsular and regional
issues, including Korean unification. In particular, China’s
growing influence over and interdependence with South
Korea amid its continuing rivalry with the United States
could well make untenable the proposition that both
countries can jointly cooperate in resolving a host of
concrete policy issues and longer-term questions on the
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peninsula. Prominent examples include a North Korean
contingency, future status of USFK, the question of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in North Korea, and
the military capability and strategic orientation of a unified
Korea.
To Tokyo, the cross-Strait conflict also cuts across
several important contexts within which Japan’s major
domestic and foreign policy debates are conducted: the
U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan-China relations, and Japan’s
steadily growing political profile and security role in the
region.
As is well known, the future of China-Japan relations
will have a profound impact on post-Cold War East Asia’s
economic and political order. Japan and China embody the
world’s second and, by purchasing power parity
(PPP)-based calculations, third largest economies,
respectively, and wield growing political clout in regional
affairs. In terms of future regional stability, what is perhaps
more significant is whether the two major regional powers
will develop a relationship that is either strong and
cooperative or weak and confrontational in the years ahead.
Of equal importance is the diverse yet uncertain impact of
this evolving relationship on the future of East Asian
security, particularly in light of the absence of the unifying
Soviet threat and a continued U.S. policy dilemma vis-à-vis
Japan and China.7
Despite their huge and growing stakes in maintaining
an amicable relationship, however, China-Japan relations
will remain a difficult and often tense one. The persistence
of their traditional rivalry and historical distrust over time
suggests that these attitudes may have more to do with
deeply ingrained cultural, historical, and perceptual factors
than with the dictates of economic cooperation or a shared
interest in regional stability that would be mutually
beneficial.
As befits their traditional rivalry for regional influence
and as the present-day two most powerful East Asian
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states, Japan and China have a quite broad range of
bilateral concerns with each other. Additionally, China’s
security concerns with Japan are linked up with what
Chinese call U.S. regional “hegemonic” behavior—that is,
the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance, their joint
development of the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system,
and, most seriously, continued U.S. weapon sales to
Taiwan.8
Particularly worrisome to the Chinese leadership is any
possible connection between the strengthened U.S.-Japan
alliance and the Taiwan question, running the whole gamut
of the controversies over the scope of regional contingencies
in “areas surrounding Japan,” TMD, and Taipei’s overall
relations with Washington and Tokyo. A Taiwan Strait
conflict is also directly related to the ongoing debate on
Japan’s regional security role. At issue is a definitional shift
in Japan’s defense contribution from the “defense of the Far
East” (Article Six of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security
Treaty) to the “areas surrounding Japan,” as stipulated in
the November 1995 National Defense Program Outline
(NDPO) and reconfirmed in the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint
Declaration on Security and the September 1997 Review of
the Guideline for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (the
“new Guideline”).
China has adamantly opposed the revised
Guideline—for its possibility of U.S.-Japan collaboration in
a Taiwan crisis and of Japanese militarism.9 A major armed
confrontation over the Taiwan Strait involving United
States forces could lead to a further redefinition of
U.S.-Japanese security relations in the years ahead—a step
the United States and Japan took in early 1998 to meet the
requirements of the new Guideline. Implicit in the new
Guideline is enhanced collaboration between U.S.-allied
Japan and South Korea in a contingency, thus opening up
the possibility that the ROK could be at least indirectly
involved in a cross-Strait conflict.10
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Finally, in a major flare-up involving both China and the
United States, the ultimate question for Tokyo boils down to
this: Does Japan have any real alternative other than to
take sides with the United States? Japan’s constitutional
constraints, regional suspicions of Japan’s active
participation in regional military issues, as well as its
domestic political considerations, will surely put a severe
limit on Japan’s direct military involvement. But the
opposite is a nonstarter and could seriously impair the
alliance with the United States—a prospect that Japan
cannot afford, now or in the foreseeable future.11
Conflict in the South China Sea.
Unlike the essentially two-party cross-Strait conflict,
which posits an attack on Taiwan itself, a People’s Republic
of China (PRC)-initiated military crisis in the multilateral
maritime dispute in the South China Sea could trigger
broader—if less intense than the Taiwan case—
consequences in the region and beyond. First, China’s use of
force against one or more disputed territories occupied by
other claimants, not just low-profile armed displacement,
would likely galvanize Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) unity. Second, it would also precipitate
the internationalization of the dispute and U.S.
involvement, especially if it seriously obstructs freedom of
navigation. Furthermore, any disruptions in navigation
through the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) would
have a ripple effect throughout the regional (and Chinese)
economies, which are an integral part of the world economy.
These and other considerations, including lingering doubts
over the PLA’s long reach and sustainability, militate
against the military resolution of the conflicting claims,
even if a viable peaceful solution is not in sight either.12
The economic costs China has to bear will also be severe.
In addition to its vast economic ties with China, Japan
remains the number one creditor nation in Southeast Asia
and is heavily dependent on shipborne trade and oil imports
70

that pass through the major SLOCs in the South China Sea.
Japan’s high stakes in free passage, like those of the United
States, would most likely force Japan to take punitive
economic sanctions against China to a degree that has not
been seen before. In all likelihood, Japan’s step-by-step and
sequential reaction to Chinese provocation, in conjunction
with the United States and other states involved, would be a
heavy blow against China’s national interests.
Moreover, China’s armed provocation not only could
unwittingly provide Japan with a cause for its expanded
security role in the region with impunity, but it may also
invoke a nightmarish tightening of the U.S.-Japan alliance
vis-à-vis China—a Damocles’ sword in Chinese eyes. It may
eventually end the ongoing yet inconclusive domestic
debate in Japan about its defense objectives and security
role so that the containment of China will become a focus of
its individual or joint efforts with the United States.
On the other hand, while South Korea would likely join a
diplomatic united front with the United States, Japan, and
other claimants for a peaceful and early resolution of the
dispute—especially during the early phase of the conflict, it
is hard to imagine a major conflict in the remote South
China Sea having a direct bearing on its national security.
For South Korea, its consequences would largely be an
economic loss generated from disruptions in oil imports and
seaborne trade, on which it almost totally depends. For
these and other reasons, while South Korea can play no
major role in the conflict’s initial phase, it also understands
full well the grave consequences of disruption in oil imports
and seaborne trade. South Korea’s economic security and its
limited influence on the resolution of a South China Sea
contingency strongly calls for multilateral collaboration
with ASEAN, China, Japan, and the United States.
Its still peninsula-based security mind-set, however,
could be seriously tested if and when a South China Sea
conflict invokes the employment of U.S. forward-based
military power in Asia which, like the cross-Strait case,
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raises the possibility of a North Korean adventure. While
the level of U.S. commitment is a critical variable affecting
the involved countries’ behavior, including South Korea’s, a
Sino-U.S. confrontation would doubtless make it extremely
difficult for Seoul to remain neutral or to balance the allied
relationship with Washington and the growing ties with
Beijing.
Still, the South Korean public perception of the South
China Sea—i.e., a strategically important yet geographically and psychologically distant place—remains an
unknown variable. If such a detached mind-set continues to
prevail in South Korea, its commitment to the resolution of
a South China Sea conflict would be considerably lower than
in the case of the Taiwan Strait. In nearly zero-sum terms,
the overall costs China has to bear will be considerably less
if allied unity is maintained at a less-than-optimal level.
Conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.13
Direct parties to any major armed conflict over the
Senkakus/Diaoyus will be China and Japan, as Taiwan, the
other claimant, is not in a position to take sides with either
China or Japan. While the prospects for the use of force by
either side seem low (and there has been no precedent), the
possibility for a potential conflict could grow in the future,
as the frequency and the area of the PLAN’s operations have
increased. In recent years, moreover, the activities of
China’s intelligence-gathering ships within and near the
Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have sharply
increased from a mere four in 1997 to 16 in 1998 to 33 in
1999. As of September 10, 2000, 24 such sightings were
reported.14 Additionally, the number of Chinese “warships”
passing through the international waters in the East Sea
(Sea of Japan), which is situated east of the Korean
peninsula, has shot up from an average twice per year to
seven cases involving 31 ships during the first half of 2000.15
For its part, Japan also has increasingly dispatched
coastguard vessels to enforce the new fishery agreement
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with China and to fight pirate attacks in the East China
Sea.
As Japan is directly involved in the dispute, strategic
and economic costs to the Sino-Japanese relationship could
be as severe and consequential as those in the Taiwan Strait
or in the South China Sea, if Japan chooses to take this
course of action.
Recent developments inside and outside Japan,
including the growing strength of “right-wing,” hard-line
politicians, anti-piracy activities by its coastguard vessels,
and its planned acquisition of indigenous military
capabilities, point to the costly consequences of any future
confrontation between Beijing and Tokyo.
In a minor confrontation between China and Japan over
the Senkakus/Diaoyus, South Korea as a nonclaimant
would mostly likely distance itself from the dispute. The
United States, as a general rule, also does not support any
individual claims on territorial disputes. Even in an
unlikely event that the United States-Japan alliance is
invoked, it is inconceivable that South Korea will be asked
to play a substantial role in such a contingency.
South Korea, however, has long been watchful of
developments over those tiny islands for a different
reason—the future of the Senkakus/Diaoyus may offer a
clue to Tokdo/Takeshima in the East Sea (Sea of Japan),
which is claimed by both South Korea and Japan. South
Korea is also concerned with observance of the EEZ, the
median line, and the fishery and other bilateral maritime
agreements negotiated and ratified separately among
China, Japan, and itself during the latter half of the 1990s.16
Questions for Further Consideration.
In light of the devastatingly negative consequences of
China’s use of force discussed in this and other chapters in
the volume, it stands to reason that Chinese leaders would
73

most probably shy away from taking such an adventurous
course of action for years to come. It is also obvious that
China-initiated conflicts in any of the three cases under
review would have a far-reaching negative effect on its
relationships with Taiwan, ASEAN, Japan, and South
Korea—let alone the one with the United States. Viewed in
this light, fairly low-intensity, short-duration operations
are by far safer and more reasonable courses of action if the
current and future Chinese leadership ever attempts to do
so.
As is the case with Japan and South Korea, regional
perceptions of and reactions to China’s diplomatic and
military behavior will not be uniform. Each regional actor’s
relations with China are shaped by a wide array of factors,
including geographical proximity, historical and cultural
inheritance, territorial disputes, and economic relations.
Moreover, their strategic calculus has often been
significantly influenced by their respective security
relations with the United States, which is also the single
most important external factor restraining China’s
behavior.
If the purpose of analyzing the “Costs of Conflict” is to
better understand their horrible consequences and to
prevent such an eventuality from occurring, it is necessary
to note how best to get the messages across among the
parties involved, including China. First and foremost is the
U.S. determination for a peaceful resolution of the disputes.
Credible and demonstrated U.S. commitment, backed by its
military presence and bilateral alliances, is a must in
preventing unilateral acts of hostility from occurring. U.S.
neutral stance on disputed territorial claims is appropriate;
yet its principles on a peaceful settlement of disputes and on
the freedom of navigation need further clarification—e.g., a
set of shared norms and understandings rather than the
specification of potential triggers.17
Finally, it is important to recall that a peaceful
settlement of disputes is first and foremost the
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responsibility of the direct parties to the disputes. While the
United States role and commitment remains essential,
other states should also bear the responsibility for a
peaceful resolution of individual disputes in their respective
areas of concern. U.S. allies, in particular, should be able to
prepare for security and military support in a future
contingency. A shared understanding of the conflict’s
horrendous costs throughout the region should not only
reduce the chance for conflict but also guide the United
States-Asia relationship in the new millenium.
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CHAPTER 6
THE IMPACT OF A CONFLICT ON CHINA’S
RELATIONS
WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AUSTRALIA
Carlyle A. Thayer*
Frankly, I think China wants to take over Asia.
Philippine President Joseph Estrada.1

Introduction.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the impact of a
conflict on China’s relations with the states of Southeast
Asia and Australia. The most likely scenarios for conflict
involve China and Taiwan, China and Southeast Asian
claimants to territory in the South China Sea, and China
and its land neighbors Vietnam, Burma, and Laos. These
scenarios are discussed in the final section.
In the aftermath of the informal summit of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in
Singapore and the meeting of the ASEAN Plus Three
(China, Japan, and South Korea) held in November 2000, it
would appear that China is walking triumphantly on
Southeast Asia’s diplomatic stage.2 China’s relations with
regional states are probably at an all time high.3 Since early
1999, for example, China has negotiated long-term

*The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies, Department of the Army, the Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The author would like to thank
Herman Finley for exchanging ideas with him during the preparation of
this paper.
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cooperation agreements with all ten of Southeast Asia’s
states. China is presently negotiating a code of conduct for
the South China Sea with ASEAN representatives.
Sino-Australian relations equally may be characterized as
very good despite Chinese misgivings about Australia’s
possible participation in ballistic missile defense research.
Historical evidence suggests that over the last 50 years
Chinese leaders have been consistent in the use of force to
secure their interests. A recent quantitative survey of
militarized interstate dispute data for China indicates
Chinese resort to force on no less than 118 cases between
1949-92.4 Further, as Feigenbaum has argued, “virtually all
evidence suggests that three motivations . . . have driven
China’s post-1949 use of force: sovereignty claims over
major territories; border disputes; and strategic
considerations connected to the East Asian balance of
power.5
The central assumption of this chapter is that conflict
between China and Southeast Asia is less likely than
conflict between China and Taiwan. Southeast Asia’s
dilemma in the face of this possibility was aptly
summarized by a Singaporean official in the following
words: “(i)f either one is damaged, Singapore [read
Southeast Asia-ed.] will suffer a loss; if both are damaged,
its loss will be doubled.”6
Conflict between China and Taiwan could flare up at any
moment. In July 1999, for example, China reacted to the
statement by Taiwan’s President that the two should deal
with each other on a “state-to-state” level by conducting
military exercises in Fujian province and by directing
Chinese fighters to fly close to the “centerline” in the straits.
This led one analyst to conclude, “(t)he risk of an accidental
or deliberate military clash between China and Taiwan is
higher than at any time since March 1996.”7 Since then
China has continued to conduct large-scale military
exercises, including simulated amphibious landings, in an
effort to keep up its pressure on Taiwan.8 Most recently,
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Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of the Central Military
Commission, declared: “(d)uring the period of the 10th
five-year plan, it is certain that war will break out in the
Taiwan strait.”9
There are other factors operating which raise the
probability of conflict between China and Taiwan. A recent
study of “enduring rivalries” concluded “(r)esearch shows
that roughly half of the militarized disputes in the
international system take place among enduring
rivalries.”10 According to this study four sets of results
appear relevant to the China-Taiwan relationship:
1. Disputes over territory are more difficult to resolve
peacefully and more likely to result in military conflict.
2. Societies undergoing political transformation are
more prone to engage in conflict.
3. Under conditions of perceptual uncertainty, enduring
rivalries will be prolonged; outbreaks of conflict will be more
likely.
4. Enduring rivalries experiencing military build-ups
are more prone to outbreaks of conflict.
The China-Taiwan relationship was classified by Job,
Laliberté, and Wallace as an “enduring rivalry.” After
examining two major factors—perceptual uncertainty and
the military build-up—the authors concluded:
In two critical respects the contemporary PRC-ROC [People’s
Republic of China-Republic of China-ed.] rivalry exhibits
symptoms common to situations that carry a higher risk of
outbreak of conflict. Uncertainty prevails in that for both sides
“holding tough” on Taiwan Strait issues is important for
leaders seeking to sustain prestige with their domestic
audiences. There remain ample opportunity for factional
infighting in both capitals and thus for the pathologies caused
by misperception within and between both the PRC and ROC.
Added to this potentially volatile situation are the exigencies
posed by the fact that the PRC publicly retains the option to
use force in its dealings with the ROC. Both sides, in preparing
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for this possibility, have acquired a panoply of high-tech
weaponry, which recent history demonstrates has a
self-fulfilling quality to it. That is, even in the hands of highly
trained forces, the availability of such weapons promotes their
intentional or inadvertent usage, with dangerous
consequences.11

Before discussing conflict scenarios and the costs of
conflict on China’s relations with Southeast Asia and
Australia, this chapter first provides a brief overview of
China’s relations with Southeast Asia and Australia.
China and Southeast Asia.
Historically, China’s relations with Southeast Asia have
been bedeviled by Beijing’s support for communist
insurgents. An improvement in relations was only possible
once China terminated its assistance.12 During the late
1970s and 1980s China and Southeast Asia shared two
major goals in common: economic growth and containing
Soviet power. China-ASEAN relations grew particularly
close during the decade 1979-89 when both parties shared
the strategic objective of opposing Soviet-backed
Vietnamese hegemony in Cambodia. Although the end of
the Cold War diminished the salience of this factor in the
relationship, China’s economic growth and potential to
emerge as a major regional power predisposed Southeast
Asia’s states to enhance their cooperation with China.
China’s remarkable economic growth from the late
1970s resulted in a new activism in China’s approach to
Southeast Asia. This was welcomed in the region. According
to one analyst, “economics is most assuredly the driving
force of the relationship.” 13 Both sides—China and
ASEAN—stand to benefit from growing trade and
investment linkages. Taken as a group, Southeast Asia’s
states represent a formidable economic bloc. In 1995, for
example, the total GDP (as measured by purchasing power
parity) of nine ASEAN states (minus Cambodia) was
estimated at about U.S.$1,600 billion or about 60 percent of
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Japan’s GDP. That same year ASEAN’s foreign trade
totaled U.S.$636.6 billion, about ten times that of India and
82 percent of Japan’s. ASEAN was ranked the fourth largest
trading unit in the world.14
China’s relations with Southeast Asia improved in the
1980s and 1990s. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
visited Beijing in November 1985. That same year the
Chinese Foreign Minister visited Indonesia and negotiated
a resumption in direct trade. Premier Li Peng visited
Thailand in November 1988. The Tiananmen massacre of
June 1989 was an important turning point. ASEAN
members either muted their criticism or refrained from
criticizing China, considering the event an internal affair.
China, isolated by western reaction, turned its attention
south. In August 1990, China normalized relations with
Indonesia and then established diplomatic relations with
Singapore 2 months later. In July 1991, Chinese Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen attended the opening session of the
24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as a guest of Malaysia,
the host. Sino-Vietnamese relations were normalized in late
1991, and Vietnam Communist Party Secretary General Do
Muoi visited Beijing in November 1995. China became a full
dialogue partner in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial
Conference in July 1996.15
For China, the 1990s were seen as a transitional period
from the bipolarity of the Cold War to multipolarity. The
end of the Cold War meant that the U.S.-Soviet
Union-China strategic triangle dissolved. According to one
writer, “(t)he Chinese leadership hopes that the emergence
of regional powers and regional organizations in the
developing world will help to bring about a multipolarity
from the traditional one dominated by a small number of
major powers.”16 Some Chinese analysts consider ASEAN
one of the poles in a multipolar system. China supported the
creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. And
in 1995, China supported Vietnam’s membership in
ASEAN, and the membership of Laos and Burma in 1997.
The Cambodian domestic upheaval of 1997-98 witnessed a
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change of Chinese policy from supporter of the Khmer
Rouge to a backer of the Hun Sen government. During the
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, China earned much
political capital by the support it gave Southeast Asia’s
beleaguered economies. China not only refrained from
devaluing its currency, the renminbi, but it offered one
billion U.S. dollars in assistance to Thailand and provided
monetary support to Indonesia. At the December 1997
informal ASEAN Plus Three Summit, President Jiang
Zemin pledged 46 billion U.S. dollars to the International
Monetary Fund’s program to support Southeast Asia’s
economic recovery.
Chinese concerns were aroused by anti-Chinese rioting
in Indonesia in May 1998. This irritant in bilateral relations
was immediately addressed by President Wahid upon
coming to office. He made his first official overseas trip to
China and gave assurances that Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese
community would be protected. He also sought to encourage
the return of overseas Chinese investment that fled
Indonesia following the turmoil associated with the
downfall of President Suharto. In contrast, Indonesia’s
relations with the United States have become strained due
to U.S. advocacy of human rights and accountability in
cases where human rights have been grossly violated.
Indonesian Minister of Defense, Mohammad Mahfud, no
doubt exasperated by the position his country found itself
in, has stated:
(i)f Indonesia, India, China and Japan unite to set up a joint
defense pact, the U.S. would be limp. The U.S. can be arrogant
but I’m considering cooperation with other countries . . . As a
sovereign country, Indonesia should find other alternatives. We
don’t want to be continuously pressured by the U.S.17

Trade between China and ASEAN has expanded
steadily. It increased from U.S.$14.29 billion in 1994 to
U.S.$25.04 billion in 1997 to U.S.$31.96 billion in the first
10 months of 2000, a 47.9 percent increase over the same
period the previous year.18 China’s exports to Southeast
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Asia increased 20 percent during the first 10 months of
2000.19 But ASEAN’s share of total Chinese trade has
remained modest, 6.04 percent in 1994 and only 7.7 percent
in 1997. Nonetheless, ASEAN ranks fifth among China’s top
ten trade partners, coming after the United States, Hong
Kong, Japan, and the European Union, and before South
Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Canada, and Russia.20
Southeast Asia is also an important source of foreign
investment for China (see Table 1). Investment from the
region rose from U.S.$1.21 billion in 1993 to U.S.$3.62
billion in 1997. These figures probably understate the total,
as they do not take into account overseas Chinese
investment channeled through Hong Kong. Over
three-fourths of ASEAN’s officially recorded investment
comes from Singapore, which is one of the largest investors
in China. The Singapore government has a major
commitment to developing a new industrial park in Suzhou
city, for example.
But China also competes with Southeast Asia for
investment, trade, loans, and aid. This is set within the
wider pattern of “competition and interdependency among
Japan, the East Asian NIEs [Newly Industrializing
Economies-ed.], and the ASEAN states.”21 A recent report
commissioned by ASEAN revealed that in 2000, 61 percent
of foreign direct investment flows into emerging Asian
economies went to China and only 17 percent to ASEAN
states. These figures point to a major reversal of trends a
decade ago and diversion of investment away from
ASEAN.22
ASEAN members are particularly apprehensive about
China’s impending entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO). They fear that China’s low-cost
industries, such as textiles and toys, will displace ASEAN
goods in overseas markets. Premier Zhu Rongji, attempted
to assuage these fears during a visit to Singapore: “(t)here
will be definite competition. But there will definitely be no
threat . . . China’s entry into WTO will definitely be
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Country

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

664

289

-

58

268

6,575

11,570

11,163

9,354

7,998

-

-

-

15

39

9,142

20,099

25,900

45,995

38,183

Philippines

12.250

14,040

10,578

5,551

15,563

Singapore

67,480

117,961

186,061

224,716

280,696

Thailand

23,437

23,487

28,824

32,818

19,400

Vietnam

1,161

1,849

2,830

145

154

120,709

189,295

265,356

318,652

362,301

3.10%

4.38%

5.51%

5.81%

5.63%

Burma
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia

ASEAN
ASEAN as
a % of
China’s
Total

Source: Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “China’s ASEAN Policy in the 1990’s:
Pushing for Regional Multipolarity,” Contemporary Southeast Asia,
Vol. 21, No. 2, August 1999, p. 195, based on State Statistical Bureau,
compiler, China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistical
Publishing House, 1995-1998. Data on invenstments from Laos for
1993-95 and Brunei are not available. Cambodia joined ASEAN in April
1999.

Table 1. ASEAN’s Investments in China, 1993-97
(in U.S. $10,000)
beneficial to Asian countries. We would rather not join the
WTO if we were a threat.”23 From early 1999 China has
negotiated long-term cooperation framework agreements
with all ten of Southeast Asia’s states. China supports both
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and ASEAN Plus Three
processes. Premier Zhu Rongji supported a free trade area
between ASEAN and China and endorsed the proposal for
an East Asian Forum as “a good idea,” at the November
2000 ASEAN Plus Three meeting in Singapore.24 Premier
Zhu also expressed China’s interest in developing the
transportation infrastructure of the Mekong River basin
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including navigation along the Lancang-Mekong river,25
the Lao section of the Bangkok-Kunming highway, the
Trans-Asian Highway, and the Trans-Asia Railway.
Taiwan and Southeast Asia.
Economic relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asia
have grown noticeably since 1987. ASEAN states improved
their unofficial relations with Taipei in response to
Taiwan’s increased trade and investment activities. In
November 1993, at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Summit, Taiwan announced its “southward policy”
towards Southeast Asia. The next year Premier Lien Chan
paid vacation visits to Singapore and Malaysia; he was
followed by President Lee Teng-hui who visited the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. At the same time,
Taiwan’s Executive Yuan approved the “Operation Outline
for Strengthening Economic and Trading Relations with
Southeast Asia.” This policy document contained four
objectives: to expand trade and investment relations; to
reduce trade dependence on mainland China by
establishing production bases in Southeast Asia; to promote
economic prosperity of the region; and to participate in the
activities of international economic organizations in
Southeast Asia.26
Under its southward policy, Taiwan encouraged its
business community to invest in Southeast Asia.27 By
mid-1995 Taiwanese cumulative investment in ASEAN
reached U.S.$25 billion. Taiwanese investment is
concentrated in labor-intensive industries such as textiles,
paper and printing, metals, minerals, and electronic
appliances. Figures in Table 2 indicate that, starting in
1989, Malaysia overtook the Philippines and became the
prime beneficiary of Taiwanese investment. In 1990
Taiwanese investment in the region increased noticeably,
but in 1991-92 in the cases of the Philippines, Singapore,
and, to a lesser extent, Thailand, declined. This fall off was
due to a change in Taipei’s investment policy that
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authorized indirect investments in China. Taiwanese
investments then diverted to the mainland as a
consequence.
Year

Singapore

Philippines

1988

6,433

36,212

1989

5,109

1990

Indonesia

Thailand

Malaysia

Vietnam

1,923

11,886

1,708

na

66,312

311

51,604

158,646

na

47,611

123,607

61,817

149,397

184,885

na

1991

12,540

1,315

160,341

86,430

442,011

127,139

1992

8,790

1,219

39,930

83,293

155,727

20,167

1993

69,473

6,536

25,531

109,165

64,452

158,396

1994

100,732

9,600

20,571

57,323

101,127

108,378

1995

31,649

35,724

32,067

51,210

67,302

108,146

1996

164,978

74,252

82,612

71,413

93,534

100,479

1997

230,310

127,022

55,861

57,546

85,088

85,414

1998

158,176

38,777

19,541

131,186

19,736

110,078

1988
-98

835,912

520,576

500,505

860,453

1,375,216

708,197

Source: Adapted from Samuel C. Y. Ku, “The Political Economy of
Taiwan’s Relations with Vietnam,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.
21, No. 3, December 1999, p. 412. Ku relied on Ministry of Economic
Affairs, Statistics on Outward Investment, Technical Co-operation,
Outward Technical Co-operation and Indirect Mainland Investment,
Taipei: Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1998.

Table 2. Taiwan’s Investments in Southest Asia,
1988-98 (in thousand U.S. $)
An evaluation of Taiwan’s southward policy indicates
mixed results. As Samuel Ku has demonstrated, there are
three factors that account for this.28 First, ASEAN states
are dissatisfied with the level of economic resources
provided by Taiwan. Second, Taiwanese assistance and
influence has been offset by mainland China.29 Third, the
role of Taiwan’s private entrepreneurs has been disappointing. Taiwan has also not met its political objective of raising
88

its representation in international organizations. Taiwan
was not accorded dialogue status by ASEAN nor was
Taiwan admitted into the ASEAN Regional Forum. In brief,
ASEAN members have held firm to their one-China policy.
Taiwan-Malaysia relations are particularly strong. In
terms of trade, Taiwan is Malaysia’s fourth largest partner
after Japan, Singapore, and the United States. In 1997
two-way trade amounted to U.S.$7.3 billion. In March 1998
Vice President Lien Chan made a private visit to Malaysia,
a month later he was followed by Premier Vincent Siew who
offered to facilitate guarantees by Taiwan’s private banks
for bonds issued by Southeast Asian governments in
response to the financial crisis. At this time Malaysia
offered to serve as host for China-Taiwan talks on
reunification. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Summit held in Kuala Lumpur in November,
Taiwan offered to invest U.S.$930 million in ASEAN
countries. In November 2000, Taiwan and Malaysia held
the 13th annual ministerial-level economic conference.30
Chinese Defense Modernization and the South
China Sea.
Chinese naval modernization has raised regional
concerns and may have contributed to regional force
modernization efforts.31 According to Derek da Cunha,
Southeast Asian observers [are] alarmed at the prospect of a
more visible presence by the Chinese navy in the South China
Sea . . . Individually, none of the ASEAN states has the
military capability that could successfully oppose a
determined Chinese advance into the South China Sea and
they are unlikely to have such a capability in the foreseeable
future. Consequently, there is a real but silent fear in
Southeast Asia attached to the directions in the PLA’s
[People’s Liberation Army-ed.] modernization programs and
its operational doctrine.32

The PLA “is inflexible toward territorial disputes in the
South China Sea, and by extension, it is suspicious of
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ASEAN’s attitudes toward Taiwan.” 33 But the “China
threat” has not been the main driver of Southeast Asian
force modernization efforts.34
According to Jianxiang Bi,
(c)ollective security arrangements remain elusive in East and
Southeast Asia, despite the threat that Chinese joint operations
pose to security and prosperity. Regional powers have agreed to
disagree on forms of security arrangements and priorities to be
adopted.35

ASEAN is not a military alliance or a collective security
agreement. ASEAN members cooperate in such areas as:
intelligence sharing, counter-insurgency, piracy, drug
trafficking, smuggling, and illegal migration. They hold a
number of bilateral military exercises. But ASEAN is not a
unified bloc. China has military ties with Burma. Since the
early 1990s there have been persistent reports of increased
Chinese military contacts with Burma. In 1992 it was
reported that China had supplied U.S.$1.5 billion in
military arms and equipment to Yangon (Rangoon)
including fighter aircraft, patrol boats, artillery, tanks,
anti-aircraft guns, missiles, and other weapons.36 China is
reportedly involved in constructing a base for the Burmese
navy on Hianggyik Island and a radar station on Coco
island. Analysts speculate that the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army has established signals intelligence
facilities at both places. There is also speculation about
whether the PLA Navy will deploy from bases in Burma into
the Indian Ocean and Andaman Sea. In contrast, Singapore
sends its soldiers to Taiwan for training exercises.
Singapore is also a strong supporter of the U.S. military
presence in the region and has provided access to U.S.
warships at its Changi naval base. The United States has
alliance relations with Thailand and the Philippines. The
United States and the Philippines have negotiated a
Visiting Forces Agreement and conducted small-scale joint
exercises.
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In February 1995 Philippines reconnaissance aircraft
discovered that China had occupied and built what
appeared to be quasi-military structures on Mischief Reef in
the South China Sea. This marked the first occasion that
China had confronted a member of ASEAN so openly in this
area. Previous Chinese incursions into the South China
Sea—January 1974, March 1988, and 1992—were directed
at Vietnam.37 Chinese actions provoked ASEAN members
to adopt a unified stance at Sino-ASEAN discussions at the
senior official level held in Hangzhou in March 1995. This
unprecedented action prompted a more conciliatory
Chinese response at the August 1995 meeting of the ARF in
Brunei. There, China indicated for first time that it would
base its claims on international law including the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Flowing from the Mischief Reef incident, China and the
Philippines negotiated a code of conduct. But the
Philippines turned down Chinese offers of joint oil and gas
exploration. In April 1997, at Sino-ASEAN senior officials
discussions held in Huangshan, the Spratly islands were
placed on the agenda for the first time. Prior to this meeting
China had refused to discuss South China Sea issues in a
multilateral setting. In July, shortly after this meeting,
Filipino naval ships destroyed Chinese territorial markers
in the Spratlys. This prompted a Chinese diplomatic
protest. At the end of the year, at the informal summit
between ASEAN and China, South Korea, and Japan, a
joint statement was adopted that declared both sides would
resolve differences and disputes “through peaceful means
without resorting to the threat or use of force” and would
exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea. This
agreement, however, has not stopped a growing number of
minor incidents from occurring, including Philippine ships
ramming Chinese fishing vessels and the shooting to death
of a civilian Chinese boat captain. Chinese actions since
early 1995 have led exasperated Philippine officials to
accuse China of a “talk and take” strategy.38 Talks on a
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South China Sea code of conduct remain stalled as of
September 2001.
According to a Singapore analyst, “part of the current
Southeast Asian defense modernization and expansion
programs is a consequence of contingency planning related
to the Spratlys.”39 Another observer has asserted,
(t)he PLA is worried about potential reactions of ASEAN to any
Chinese joint operations. Territorial disputes in the South
China Sea have intensified regional tensions. China may not
seek to take over any country by attack, subversion, or economic
domination, but territorial disputes and a gradually
modernised PLA do threaten stability.40

ASEAN states have therefore acquired advanced air and
naval weapons and sought informal or formal security
partnerships, and according to Bi, “(t)his weaponry and
these security measures are implicitly, if not explicitly,
targeted against China.”41
After the discovery of Chinese construction activities on
Mischief Reef, for example, the Philippines revived its plans
for force modernization that included procurement of
aircraft and ships to defend its territorial claims. Concern
about Chinese assertiveness may have motivated Indonesia
to negotiate an Agreement on Maintaining Security with
Australia in 1995. The agreement bound its signatories to
consult in the event of an “adverse challenge to security.”
Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas is on the record as
stating that tensions in the South China Sea or conflict
between China and Taiwan were examples of “adverse
challenges” that could trigger the consultation process.42
Finally, Malaysia has moved to acquire diesel electric
submarines.43
Southeast Asia’s states have not adopted a unified policy
or strategy to deal with the rise of China as a regional power.
They have shaped their responses on a bilateral basis and in
a few instances collective action, such as the 1992 Manila
Declaration on the South China Sea. ASEAN states
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generally have refrained from statements which would
make the “China threat” a self fulfilling prophecy. During
the March 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait, for example,
ASEAN states were generally muted in their response to
China’s missile launches. All ASEAN states adhere to the
“one China policy” and view China-Taiwan tensions as an
internal affair. ASEAN members “wish to avoid any
provocations, confrontations, or even formal multilateral
discussions that China could perceive as part of a policy of
‘containment’.”44
In the face of China’s military muscle flexing, Southeast
Asia favors accommodation with China not confrontation.
ASEAN strategy, such as it exists, is to encourage Chinese
participation in multilateral organizations, such as the
ARF. ASEAN defense cooperation is mainly confined to
bilateral defense ties. These have been likened to a “spider’s
web.” Quite simply, the lack of shared threat perceptions
has kept ASEAN members from developing multilateral
military ties.45 According to Jianxiang Bi,
ASEAN members discuss only regional security issues; it is
unlikely that they would be involved in Beijing-Taiwan
conflicts. They might accept a powerful and unified China,
even if they feared it. On humanitarian grounds, however,
they may show moral support of the Taiwanese people, and
this could deeply embarrass China in the international
community . . . ASEAN deliberately avoids any direct
confrontation with China, and lack of political will and
military capability will minimise any chance that it would be
involved in cross-Strait conflicts . . . Without a firm
commitment by ASEAN, Japan, and the United States to
deter or oppose it, regional reactions to an intervention by the
PLA could be limited to short-term economic sanctions and
political condemnation.46

Analysts are not agreed, however, whether and at what
point Chinese assertiveness will lead to a united ASEAN
response. According to one writer,
(t)he PLA’s emphasis on improving its capabilities to win
regional wars by employing high-technology will only
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exacerbate ASEAN’s worries of a ‘China threat’ especially in the
context of China’s territorial disputes with ASEAN states and
its rapidly-increasing energy needs.47

Derek da Cunha argues that ASEAN will go even
further,
A suddenly assertive China . . . could well provide a coalescence
in threat perceptions by the ASEAN states, resulting in the
shelving of bilateral disputes so as to deal with the larger
security issue that affects the whole of Southeast Asia and
indeed the wider Asia-Pacific. Thus, China, contingent on its
future regional behavior, could well provide the spark for a
significant strategic rationale to ASEAN, and a unified
strategic policy for the grouping.48

Da Cunha speculates that a Standing ASEAN Naval
Force might be created to prevent Chinese interdiction of
sea lines of communications. In short, Chinese military
assertiveness that leads to interference or conflict with an
ASEAN member state’s sovereignty could result in the
abandonment of Southeast Asian deference towards China
and the adoption of a unified stance.49
Australia.
China and Australia normalized relations in 1972. This
signaled a major change in Australian perceptions from fear
of China (1949-early 1970s) to a strategic assessment in
which China was no longer viewed as a direct threat.
Australia’s strategic policy in the 1980s was predicated on
the assumption that China would emerge as a major
economic power in the region. According to Stuart Harris,
the former permanent head of the Department of Foreign
Affairs,
(t)he five specific objectives of Australia’s policy towards China
were: to shift Australia’s approach from fear of China to one of
friendly relations; to deal with China on its own merits and not
just as part of the East-West confrontation; to see China as an
opportunity rather than as a threat; to recognize China as a

94

potential great power; and to encourage China to participate
as an equal and co-operative member of the international
society.50

Australia encouraged China’s emphasis on domestic
economic development. Throughout the 1980s Australia’s
strategic policy was based on the liberal premise that
China’s external policy would be more cooperative as it
developed economic linkages with the economies of the
Asia-Pacific. Chinese economic growth was viewed as
mutually beneficial. Moreover, Chinese domestic stability
was seen as being dependent on continued growth. But
sustained high levels of economic growth posed the dilemma
that more resources would be available for Chinese military
expenditures.
Bilateral relations took a nose-dive in 1989 due to
Australia’s adverse reaction to the Tiananmen massacre.
China reportedly considered the feasibility of punishing
Australia for its highly critical reaction by retaliating
economically, but dropped the idea due to the negative costs
that China would incur.51 A major study of Australia’s
relations with China in the period from 1991-95 described it
as the “most difficult and challenging” period because of
China’s rapid rise as a regional power in both economic and
military terms. 52 Australian concerns about China’s
military potential increased measurably in 1993 and
1994.53 In 1995-96 Canberra held three principal concerns:
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, Chinese
nuclear testing, and military exercises directed against
Taiwan. The December 1995 Agreement on Maintaining
Security with Indonesia “constituted an important change
in Canberra’s foreign policy” and largely signaled
Australia’s “concerns about China’s emergence as a major
regional power.”54 These concerns directly contributed not
only to Prime Minister Paul Keating’s pursuit of a security
agreement with Indonesia but collaboration with Vietnam
to keep these two countries from being pulled into China’s
orbit.55
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Australia also pressed military engagement with
Southeast Asian states so much so that in the mid-1990s—it
could be argued—Australia conducted more military
exercises with ASEAN defense forces than the United
States.56 Finally, under the Coalition Government elected
in March 1996, Australia changed its orientation from
defense of Australia to developing capabilities to project
power beyond Southeast Asia. In 1997 Australia even
considered acquiring a cruise missile strike capability.
Australia’s first foreign affairs White Paper, issued in
1997, drew attention to changing power relativities due to
economic growth trends: “(t)en years ago only one East
Asian economy (Japan) was larger than Australia. By 1995
this number, measured in $US GDP terms, had risen to
three (Japan, China and the Republic of Korea).”57 The
White Paper further argued, “China’s economic growth,
with attendant confidence and enhanced influence, will be
the most important strategic development of the next 15
years. China is expected to be among the world’s three or
four largest economies within the next 15 years.58
Five issues have served to fuel tensions between Beijing
and Canberra: nuclear testing,59 human rights, Tibet,
illegal migrants, and the South China Sea. According to
Harris, “(t)he most sustained source of tension has been
over the Taiwan relationship. Both China and Taiwan are
major markets for Australia . . . .”60 According to the White
Paper,
(r)egional security could also be disrupted if one of the many
territorial disputes in the region were to flare up; if there were
conflict across the Taiwan Straits; if there were serious internal
instability in China or Indonesia; if countries of the region were
to reverse their support for US strategic engagement or if that
engagement were to come under threat because of domestic
pressures in the United States.61

Colin Mackerras has argued that the growing bilateral
economic relations are not only the core of the relationship
but the primary reason why it was cordial at the end of the
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twentieth century. By 1995, Australia had become China’s
tenth largest trading partner, while China had become
Australia’s sixth largest partner. In 1995 it was expected
that after the reversion of Hong Kong to mainland control,
the combined China market would be Australia’s second
largest.62
Year

Total Exports

Total Imports

Balance in China’s Favor

1994-95

2 963 666

3 648 776

685 109

1995-96

3 781 020

5 009 693

228 673

1996-97

3 584 393

4 203 342

618 949

1997-98

3 871 826

5 303 281

1 431 455

1998-99

3 947 314

6 106 343

2 159 029

Source: See endnote 63.

Table 3. Australia-China Commodity Trade,
1994-1999 (all figures in Australian dollars).
Bilateral trade is the most important aspect of economic
relations (see Table 3 above).63 According to Mackerras, “It
was mainly the economic factor that drove [John] Howard to
repair the relationship with China after the rather strained
first few months of his prime ministership.”64 Indeed, it was
the provision of Australian government loans that led to the
rapid increase of Australia’s exports to China in the
mid-1990s.65 Two-way trade has increased every year since
1994. Australia’s imports from China have risen
significantly every year as well. The trade balance is in
China’s favor, reversing previous trends in which the trade
balance was in Australia’s favor from 1980 until 1989.
Australia’s exports to China include: iron ore, wool, copper
ore, oilseeds, and coal. Wool sales are important to Australia
as China imports one-quarter of Australia’s wool exports.
Australian natural resources are of great importance for
the Chinese economy. One Chinese analyst has written that
Australia’s natural resources and technologies were
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“indispensable raw materials for China’s iron and steel
industry and textile industry [and were] needed in China’s
economic construction.”66
Chinese strategic interest in iron ore is illustrated by
Chinese investment in Australia that greatly exceeds
Australian investment in China (see Table 4). In particular,
China has invested in the Mt. Channar Iron Ore Mine in
Western Australia. Australia is presently promoting the
sale of liquefied natural gas.
Year

Chinese
Investment
in Australia

Australian
Investment
in China

Balance in
Australia’s
Favor

1995-96

1,397

551

846

1996-97

1,221

984

237

1997-98

2,345

1,241

1,104

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. The Statistical Bureau of
China reported that Australia’s “actually used foreign direct and other”
investment figures in China were as follows: U.S. $194 million (1996);
U.S. $314 million (1998) and U.S. $278 million (1998).

Table 4. China-Australian Investment, 1995-1998
(all figures in thousand Australian dollars).
In the early 1990s Australian investment in China
increased six times in a 3-year period 1993-95. By 1995,
total Australian investment funds in China reached
U.S.$3.52 billion (only U.S.$780 was committed). In terms
of the number of investment projects, Australian ranked
ninth. Also, China and Australia have profited from the
growth of tourism that has been facilitated by the growth of
air linkages between the two countries. Chinese tourist
numbers have risen from 54,000 in 1996 to 76,500 in 1998.
Australian tourist numbers increased from 132,700 to
186,400 over the same period.
Australia’s reservations and concerns about the rise of
China as a regional power in the 1990s did not hinder the
development of bilateral relations. In March-April 1997, for
98

example, Prime Minister John Howard visited China with
top priority assigned to developing economic cooperation.
He stressed the complementarity of the two economies. In
February 1998, China’s Defense Minister Chi Haotian,
visited Australia for the first time as part of the process of
developing a regional defense dialogue. In May, three
Chinese warships visited Sydney in the minister’s wake.
Australia’s Defense Minister, John Moore, paid a reciprocal
visit to China in May 1999. Finally, President Jiang Zemin
visited Australia in September 1999.
Officially, Australia adheres to the one-China policy.
Nonetheless, there is strong domestic support for a
democratic Taiwan, particularly from among the local
Chinese community. According to Harris, it is far from
certain what Australia would do if Taiwan declared
independence, and conflict broke out with China. “While the
issue would be divisive domestically,” he wrote, “the strong
likelihood is that Australia would do little beyond making
what it considered the right declaratory noise.”67 Chinese
actions in the South China Sea represent another major
issue that could affect bilateral relations. On this issue
Australian policy will be heavily influenced by its relations
with ASEAN.
Conflict Scenarios.
China’s military doctrine of “local wars” posits that these
conflicts will be brief and of high intensity and will be fought
on Chinese territory; territory which is claimed by China; or
areas close to Chinese territory such as Taiwan, the South
China Sea, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. As noted in the
introduction, the central tenet of this chapter is that the
most likely conflicts involving China are, first, a clash with
Taiwan over national sovereignty issues68 and, second,
conflict between China and one or more of the claimants to
territory in the South China Sea (primarily Vietnam and
the Philippines). A less probable scenario involves conflict
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between China and one of its Southeast Asian land
neighbors—Vietnam, Laos, or Burma.
There are five likely conflict scenarios (see Figure 1): (1)
between China-Taiwan in which the United States does not
intervene; (2) between China-Taiwan in which the United
States intervenes successfully; (3) between China-Taiwan
in which the United States intervenes unsuccessfully; (4)
between China and one of the regional claimants in the
South China Sea; and (5) between China and one of its land
border neighbors. In terms of a China-Taiwan conflict,
Beijing has at least five major options short of invasion or
local war: escalation of invasion exercises; information
warfare attacks; harassment of Taiwan’s commercial
shipping; testing ballistic missiles near Taiwan; and seizure
of one or more of Taiwan’s offshore islands.69 The recent
historical record of China-Taiwan relations indicates that
China is likely to alternate coercive diplomacy with political
inducements.70
This chapter does not propose to examine each scenario
in detail because of the complexity and uncertainties
involved. For example, each scenario branches out as
various possible variations of the factors involved are
Scenario 1. Conflict between China-Taiwan in which the United
States does not intervene.
Scenario 2. Conflict between China-Taiwan in which the United
States intervenes successfully.
Scenario 3. Conflict between China-Taiwan in which the United
States intervenes unsuccessfully.
Scenario 4. Conflict involving China and one of the claimants to
territory in the South China Sea.
Scenario 5. Conflict between China and one of its land border
neighbors (Vietnam, Laos or Myanmar).

Figure 1. Five Likely Conflict Scenarios.
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considered. Among the major factors are: the kind of
provocation that leads to conflict (e.g. unilateral declaration
of independence by Taiwan); whether the conflict is brief or
protracted; the kinds of targets struck and the extent of
civilian casualties and damage to the infrastructure;
whether or not nuclear weapons are used; and reactions by
the United States and other members of the international
community.
For example, a unilateral declaration of independence
by Taiwan would not be supported by the United States
under existing policy. Taiwan could not look to Australia or
Southeast Asia for political or other support. These
countries would adhere to their one-China policy while
deploring the use of force and calling for a quick end to
armed hostilities. China would incur minimal political and
economic costs if the conflict was of short duration.
Protracted conflict could incur higher penalties depending
on international reaction. Southeast Asian and Australian
responses would be determined to a large extent by the
reactions of the United States, Japan, and other states.
Australia would be among the first to impose some form of
economic sanctions on the belligerents to encourage a
ceasefire, if agreed by the international community. The
ASEAN position is less certain.
The failure of the United States to intervene in other
scenarios involving conflict between China and Taiwan
would serve to undermine its security posture in the
Asia-Pacific. Quite simply, American security guarantees
would lose their credibility. Australia would move to shore
up its defense links with Southeast Asian states. Singapore,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam are likely to
hedge their bets by increasing the scope of multilateral
military cooperation. If China prevailed in a scenario
one-type conflict, Southeast Asian states most likely would
continue their pattern of deference and accommodation
towards Beijing. If a stalemate developed, ASEAN trade
and investment would likely decline in both China and
Taiwan until a cease-fire was obtained. But under
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conditions of stalemate ASEAN states are not likely to alter
their one-China policy, however.
China could incur varying costs depending on how each
conflict scenario unfolds. At one extreme, conflict could
result in political and economic sanctions and the
coalescence of an anti-China military grouping of regional
states under U.S. leadership. Such costs could be incurred
by an unprovoked Chinese attack and unsuccessful
invasion of Taiwan—with or without U.S. intervention
(scenarios one and three). In brief, if Taiwan is able to
successfully defend itself against an invasion launched by
the mainland it would put paid to the one-China policy. If
Taiwan sustained large numbers of civilian casualties and
damage to its infrastructure this could lead to international
sympathy. Domestic pressures in America, for example,
could lead the United States to extend diplomatic
recognition to Taiwan as a sovereign state. Undoubtedly
this would lead to a break in China-U.S. relations. In these
circumstances pressure would mount on U.S. allies, Japan,
South Korea, and Australia,71 to follow America’s lead. This
in turn might prompt some members of ASEAN to follow
suit and recognize the realities of two Chinas.
According to one analyst, the South China Sea would be
an ideal arena for “local war” when China improves its
logistics and mid-air refueling capabilities. 72 These
capabilities will allow China to seize and hold features in
the Spratly Islands. At present Chinese forces can only
attack and destroy targets in this area. The PLA’s Air Force
medium range bombers equipped with air-launched cruise
missiles “would pose a problem for those ASEAN air forces
without airborne early-warning and control aircraft and/or
air defense systems capable of dealing with supersonic
cruise missiles.”73 Even without resort to conflict, any
increased presence of PLA naval ships in the South China
Sea would exert a psychological effect on regional states. In
the event of major conflict between China and one of the
claimant states to territory in the South China Sea
(scenario four), China could incur the additional cost of
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political and economic sanctions by ASEAN states.74
China’s extensive political ties, embodied in long-term
cooperation agreements, could be undone quickly. The
ASEAN Plus Three consultative arrangements also would
become moribund. Australia could be expected to back
Southeast Asian states in cases where conflict has been
initiated by China.
Short of an attempted invasion of Taiwan, China’s resort
to force in all five scenarios above would reinforce anxieties
about Chinese military power already held by several
Southeast Asian states. This grouping could conceivably
coalesce into a de facto military grouping aligned to
Australia and the United States. Derek da Cunha argues
that one result could be the formation of a Standing ASEAN
Naval Force to participate in safe-guarding of sea lines of
communication (SLOCs).
Finally, it should be noted that conflict between China
and Taiwan under any of the first three scenarios would
result in a momentary fall of foreign investment and a
disruption of trade from Southeast Asia and Australia.
However, the major costs are likely to be borne not by China
but by regional states. As noted above, “(i)f either one
[China or Taiwan] is damaged, Singapore [read Southeast
Asia-ed.] will suffer a loss; if both are damaged, its loss will
be doubled.”75 In other words, in a conflict situation the
ASEAN states would be affected by the disruption of or loss
of trade and investment from Taiwan and China.
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CHAPTER 7
TAIWAN AND THE CHINESE MILITARY1
Ellis Joffe
No issue is more volatile in East Asia today than the
triangular relationship between China, Taiwan, and the
United States. Although war is neither imminent nor
inevitable, given the desire of all three sides to avoid it, it
cannot be ruled out, unless major changes occur in the
positions of China or Taiwan. Even without war, this
relationship will continue to be tense in the coming months.
The source of tensions lies in the irreconcilable positions
of the three sides. China considers the reunification of
Taiwan with the mainland under the “one-China” principle
as non-negotiable, and has threatened to use force if Taiwan
declares independence, or if it balks indefinitely at talks on
reunification. The Taiwan government has made
significant moves toward independence, and will continue
to resist reunification under China’s sovereignty. The
United States is committed to the peaceful resolution of the
issue, but has not ruled out military intervention if China
attacks Taiwan.
China’s Military and Taiwan Policymaking.
How the issue unfolds is impossible to predict. Although
Taiwan’s new president, Chen Shui-bian, has vowed not to
declare independence, he has not accepted the “one-China”
principle, which China views as a prerequisite to
negotiations. Since the freezing of the status quo, in which
Taiwan is independent in all but name, is unacceptable to
China in the long run, the Chinese leaders will not give up
the threat to use military force unless taiwan accepts this
principle. and since this is not likely, a peaceful resolution of
the crisis is not in sight at present.
111

This alone is enough to bring China’s military leaders to
the center of deliberations on Taiwan as advisers and
planners due to their expertise. However, their
participation has obviously gone beyond that. They have
become pivotal players in the formulation of China’s Taiwan
strategy. This is to due to their new role on the Chinese
political scene.2
This role stems from the vast changes that have
transformed Chinese politics in the last decade. Driving this
transformation has been a momentous leadership
changeover from a revolutionary generation to a
post-revolutionary one, which is different in stature, style,
and sentiments. These differences have recast party-army
relations in a fresh pattern that has greatly increased the
political capacity of the military.
The most important difference lies in the stature of the
paramount leader. Unlike his predecessors, Mao Zedong
and Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin does not have the one
outstanding political asset that had enabled them to
dominate the military: personal authority that had ensured
the automatic support of the army chiefs in all
circumstances.
Jiang, in contrast, cannot impose decisions on military
leaders arbitrarily with respect to issues that are of vital
interest to the armed forces. He has to work out their prior
approval in order to ensure compliance, which, in sharp
contrast to previous periods, is conditional. This enables
them to influence policy outcomes as never before.
Another difference relates to the characteristics of
China’s new military commanders. They are more
specialized than their predecessors, more committed to
military values, and more connected by educational and
service ties. In short, they are more professional.3 They are
also more inclined to stay out of political involvement, which
diverts the armed forces away from professional pursuits
and can be dangerous.
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But this has not prevented military involvement in
policy areas that concern their interests. Paradoxically,
professionalism has intensified, rather than reduced, such
involvement. This is because the enhanced sense of
expertise and exclusiveness nurtured by professionalism
impels the military to assume a major policymaking role in
areas for which they feel responsible and qualified.
Taiwan falls most prominently into this category. It is
where new military politics intersect with professionalism.
Politics has brought the military to the center of Taiwan
policymaking; professionalism provides the rationale for
their involvement. And this combination is reinforced by a
resurgent Chinese nationalism of which the military are, in
their own self-image, the nation’s foremost guardians.
Even so, China’s military leaders have not muscled their
way into the policy process. Since the Taiwan issue became
militarized after the Taiwan crisis of the mid-1990s, it has
become clear that major decisions might lead to war with
Taiwan and the United States. Consequently, such
decisions can hardly be reached by the leadership without
military participation. In fact, their participation is
indispensable, in view of the fact that Jiang Zemin and his
generation of colleagues have no military experience and no
military qualifications. The question, then, is not whether
the military are central in this process, but whether, as is
widely reported, they dominate it with a hard line towards
Taiwan.
Taiwan and Civil-Military Relations.
This is a murky area because it cuts to the inner
workings of the Chinese leadership’s policymaking process,
which is shrouded in secrecy. From the little that is known
about it—and about the crisis of 1995/1996—it can be
surmised that under Jiang, the process is probably marked
by divisions and debates but, in the end, rests on a
consensus. PLA leaders define the parameters of China’s
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Taiwan policy, but do not dictate it. There are other players,
no less important, in the decisionmaking process.
Foremost among them is Jiang. Although his personal
stature does not seem to have improved much during his
years as paramount leader, Jiang appears to have
considerably bolstered his political position. This he has
done by utilizing his institutional prerogatives—especially
the powers of appointment and dismissal–-and political
exposure—especially well-publicized tours in China and
abroad. Given the ethic of compliance with hierarchical
authority imbedded both in China’s political culture and in
the tradition of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the rise
in Jiang’s national standing has doubtless strengthened his
hand in relation to the military leaders. While he still needs
their consent behind major decisions, he can presumably
get it if he does not defect peremptorily from the accepted
consensus.
The military also have to contend with other leaders.
Under Mao and Deng the policymaking process had been
much more personal than formal, involved a small handful
of personalities, and relied largely on long-standing
personal contacts and informal consultations. Under Jiang,
it is more diffuse, draws in a greater number of participants,
and is more procedural and impersonal.
The military might also be at a disadvantage in the more
institutionally-oriented policy milieu, because after the
1997 15th Party congress, they have no representative in
the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Party’s
supreme body. The leadership’s decision not to appoint a
representative to that body was in line with the distancing
of the military from politics and from involvement in the
routine running of the country, and should not be overstated
as a limitation on their power. This is because the two top
military chiefs sit on the Politburo, and, especially, because
Jiang Zemin, as chairman of the Military Affairs
Commission, hears the views of the most senior
commanders and undoubtedly transmits them to the
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Standing Committee in his capacity as its chairman. Still,
this is not the same as having a military presence in this
Committee.
The result is that, unless there is a military crisis that
calls for military solutions, army commanders presumably
do not carry more weight than other leaders when it comes
to the broader implications of policy decisions. These
leaders have no less a stake in the decisions, and, in the
more open process, surely do not leave the playing field to
the military.
In any case, whatever the balance of forces, there are no
indications of serious conflict between civil and military
leaders over the principles of Taiwan policy. This is because
conflict has been averted by a convergence of views. Such
convergence derives from several sources.
The first and most important is an emotional
nationalism that posits reunification with Taiwan as the
elemental embodiment of China’s sovereignty, national
honor, and prestige, and views its achievement as a
non-negotiable condition for the restoration of China’s
rightful place in the international arena. While these
sentiments are probably strongest in the military, in the
light of their self-image and corporate in-breeding, they are
expressed by all leading political figures.
Whether or not such expressions are genuine is
irrelevant. What is relevant is that the entire Chinese
leadership has committed itself publicly to reunification,
and no leader, most notably Jiang Zemin, can afford to stray
from this consensus. Mao or Deng could redefine the limits
of consensus, Jiang cannot. They could postpone or sidestep
the Taiwan issue, but for Jiang and his colleagues to waver
on Taiwan could be politically lethal.
This is where the military define the issue. They are not
driving the civilians into uncompromising nationalistic
positions, because there is no need for that. But they are
holding the line of national consensus against any signs of
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backsliding. At any rate, in the current circumstances,
backsliding is not realistic, not only because of Jiang’s
political calculations, but also because he has linked his
historical legacy and the legitimacy of his leadership to the
elimination of this painful reminder that, until Taiwan is
reunified with China, their great victory in China’s civil war
will remain incomplete.
There is also a potent practical side to the military’s
commitment to reunification. Since the mid-1990s it has
provided the underpinning for the increased purchase of
modern weapons, and they will not give it up lightly.
Under Deng the PLA was starved of funds on the
grounds that economic development took priority over
weapons upgrading. This had been a prime reason for
military involvement in money-making economic activities
that damaged their professionalism. At the start of the
1990s, a combination of factors had brought about an
increase in the military budget: the economic surge, Jiang’s
desire to find favor with the generals, and the lessons of the
Gulf War.
However, the military still had to contend with
arguments from civilians that economic progress came
before military modernization, and the acquisition of new
weapons progressed slowly. This process was accelerated
only after the Taiwan crisis of 1995/1996, when the
appearance of two American carrier groups near Taiwan
moved the Chinese to defuse it.4 From this crisis, the
Chinese leadership drew several conclusions.
The first was that Taiwan’s leaders were determined to
proceed towards independence, an unacceptable trend that
they would most likely have to terminate by the eventual
use of force. Second, for this purpose, they would have to
acquire an adequate combat capability, the attainment of
which was speeded up. Third, resort to force meant that the
Chinese would have to deter American military intervention or, more likely, confront it. Finally, preparations for the
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military resolution of the Taiwan issue would become the
main mission of the PLA and the focus of its development.
The Chinese leadership’s unity on Taiwan strategy has
probably not precluded differences over tactics. Surface
manifestations of such differences have been clear before
the election of Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan and after the
election. Statements from military leaders and their press
have been much more extreme in tone and menacing in
content than those emanating from party papers and
leaders.
Still, it is difficult to determine whether these
differences constitute a division of views or a division of
labor. Given the basic consensus, it is more likely that the
military have been assigned, or assumed, the “bad cop” role,
threatening Taiwan with destruction, especially since they
command the weapons to carry out such threats. In
contrast, the civilians play the role of the “good cop,” taking
a softer stance in an effort to convince Taiwan leaders and
people that it is in their interest to back away from policies
that will bring down upon them the fate promised by the
military.
It is also possible that divisions are real. However, it is
difficult to see the purpose of the tough talk from the
military, other than to intimidate the Taiwanese. If the aim
is to pressure the civilian leaders, the question is, to what
end? Given the unpreparedness of the armed forces for
major action at this time, it is not likely that this is their
immediate preference—unless Taiwan declares
independence, in which case it would not be necessary to
push their civilian counterparts.
If the bellicose statements from the military were made
on their own initiative, this would point to their new
autonomy under Jiang rather than to policy conflicts, since
the common purpose is to bend the Taiwanese to China’s
will. Another possibility is that the bluster stems from
bureaucratic rather than strategic objectives—to sustain a
crisis atmosphere in order to support military demands for
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new weapons. In any case, whatever differences there are
appear to be tactical—how best to coerce Taiwan with words
rather than force—and not over the principle of
reunification.
There are probably differences within the military as
well. These are likely to be primarily between two groups,
which presumably parallel similar divisions among the
civilians.5 On the one hand, hard-line officers who support a
threatening verbal stance towards Taiwan, perhaps
accompanied by shows of force, and even limited punitive
action. And, on the other hand, officers who assume that
China will ultimately have to resort to force, but favor
postponing military action until the armed forces are better
prepared. A third, more low-keyed, view among civilians
believes that high-handed attempts to pressure Taiwan
have been counterproductive. This view presumably has no
substantial support in the military.
In any case, whatever views may be prevalent in the
military, only the top commanders communicate with the
civilians. Lower-ranking officers and analysts in military
research organs do not deal in a free-wheeling fashion with
civilian leaders. They transmit their opinions upwards
through proper channels. Despite what is frequently
reported, the leadership is not subject to pressures from all
levels of the military. The Chinese army is a disciplined
hierarchical organization, which is represented only by its
most senior commanders. Although these commanders
might present different assessments and recommendations
in inner councils, there are no public signs of serious
differences on how they view Taiwan.
The Chinese Military Views Taiwan.
The military’s views on how to deal with the Taiwan
problem are no less murky than civil-military relations, but
not for lack of information. These views have been
disseminated in military statements and publications, in
articles inspired or planted in the Hong Kong press, and in
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conversations with foreigners. The difficulty is that the
publicized views do not tell the whole story, or even the true
story. What China’s military really think or propose to do
remains an enigma. Nonetheless, it is important to look at
what they say for public consumption, and then to assess
their options.
Their public pronouncements are tough,
straightforward, and confident. They have several obvious
purposes. One is to put the military in the front rank of
leaders who speak out on Taiwan. Another is to threaten
and coerce the Taiwanese. A third is to deter the United
States from military intervention. An additional one is to
mislead both Taiwan and the United States about China’s
plans and capabilities. A fifth one is to boost the morale of
the troops. These pronouncements highlight several
themes.
The first is a thunderous threat that no compromise on
reunification is possible. Statements in this vein appeared
in a rising stream on the eve of the March election in
Taiwan, and continued after it. They were marked by
virulent language, and their message was simple: a
declaration of independence by Taiwan meant war, and the
PLA is poised to prevent the separation of Taiwan from the
mainland by force.6
Elaborating on this theme, a Hong Kong paper quoted a
Chinese military expert as saying that if Taiwan’s new
leaders did not accept the “one-China” principle, China
would not hesitate to smash Taiwan and then rebuild it to
safeguard its national sovereignty.7 To underline this,
another Hong Kong paper revealed that after the election
the Central Military Commission had ordered the
redeployment of navy, air force, and missile units to areas
facing Taiwan and had given them priority in the
acquisition of new high-tech weapons.8
Justification for the military’s commitment to
reunification was provided by a Hong Kong journal, which
published a document that had purportedly been issued by
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the Central Military Commission, China’s top military
body.9 Although the authenticity of the document is in
doubt, it reflects views that the Chinese military
presumably want to propagate for public relations
purposes, which suggests their involvement, if not
complicity, in its publication.
The document portrays reunification as a historical
mission that transcends political divisions and represents
the will of all Chinese, including those in Taiwan. The
Taiwan problem, it says, is a legacy of the civil war and is
China’s internal affair. Its resolution is essential to erasing
the humiliation of colonialism and ensuring China’s
national dignity, because its enemies use Taiwan to block
China’s rise on the global scene.
A second theme sounds a note of pessimism about a
peaceful settlement. It was most explicitly expressed by
Chinese officers in private conversations with foreign
observers.10 They were skeptical about the possibility of a
solution after the election, and said that the PLA was
preoccupied with the acceleration of preparations for
military action, for which it had received special funds. They
believed that the United States opposed reunification for
the strategic objective of keeping China mired in the Taiwan
problem. There is, of course, no way of knowing how
widespread such views are, and whether they are genuine
or merely meant to send a message.
A third theme underscores China’s military superiority
over Taiwan. Speaking at a conference in the United States,
a senior Chinese military analyst noted that despite
Taiwan’s purchase of modern weapons in recent years, its
armed forces suffer from serious deficiencies. One is the
absence of integrated weapons systems. Another is the
inability of its military industry to support a protracted war
of attrition. A third is Taiwan’s geography, which does not
provide adequate space for maneuvering. A fourth is the
concentration of its strategic and tactical targets, which
increases their vulnerability to attack.
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In contrast, he said, the PLA is better prepared
psychologically and enjoys more popular support. It has
combat experience and higher morale. The initiative and
timing for action lies in its hands, once Taiwan declares
independence. Moreover, once the Chinese government
orders military action, the PLA will not desist from its
objective: it will launch as many attacks as needed to take
the island.11
That it has the wherewithal to do this was emphasized in
an article published in a Beijing journal by two military
analysts. The PLA, they said, has accelerated its transition
from a manpower-intensive into a science-and-technologyintensive force, which emphasized quality rather than
quantity. Listing a wide range of improvements that have
occurred in all branches of the armed forces, the writers
highlighted the PLA’s ability to integrate weapons systems
and to carry out combined-forces operations.12
Taiwan’s weaknesses were also pointed out in the
document ascribed to the Central Military Commission.
Taiwan’s defense system and planning, it said, are not
suited to withstanding a large-scale and extended invasion.
Although the quality of its equipment is not bad, its
quantity is limited. After a massive first strike, Taiwan’s
forces will not be able to put up effective resistance. The
PLA will, therefore, be able to take control of Taiwan before
U.S. intervention, and then concentrate its forces on
fighting the United States.
Regarding this possibility, the document concedes that
from a technological standpoint, the armed forces of the
United States have no match in the world. However, this
applies to the entire American military organization. In the
event of war, only one-third of its forces can be deployed
rapidly overseas.
Furthermore, the United States does not have the
advantage over China that it does over small powers such as
Iraq and Yugoslavia, because the Chinese will fight close to
home, whereas U.S. forces will be exhausted by a far-off
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expedition. If the war will consist of missile strikes,
moreover, the Chinese enjoy an advantage in the number of
short and medium range missiles.
An additional advantage stems from the lessons that the
Chinese had gained from fighting American forces in
Vietnam, where they had been mainly responsible for air
defenses and had gained considerable experience. Since
then, to be sure, there have been many changes, of which the
most telling have been in personnel qualifications and
equipment of the Chinese. This means that the United
States will not be able to gain the air dominance that it had
over Iraq and Yugoslavia.
In a missile exchange, the document claims, the
strategic superiority of the United States will be nullified by
the fact that both China’s offensive and defensive
operations will be launched from its own territory. Once the
United States launches an attack, its front-line forces and
bases will be vulnerable to Chinese missile strikes, which
will confront them with difficulties in weapons and logistics.
The first aim of the Chinese is deterrence. According to
the document, at an appropriate time the Chinese will
disclose to the United States information on China’s
strategic weapons so that the Americans will be aware of the
price they would have to pay for intervention.
A Chinese military publication was more blunt. The
United States, it said, will not sacrifice 200 million
Americans for 20 million Taiwanese. They will acknowledge
this and withdraw.13 Another military journal, quoted in a
Hong Kong paper, said that China had made preparations
to fight a nuclear war with the United States.14
This possibility was downplayed by the supposed
document of the Central Military Commission. It is against
U.S. interests, it said, to fight a nuclear war for Taiwan, and
even American anti-China politicians will have to respect
public opinion. China is willing to sustain major losses to
defend even one square inch of land, whereas anti-war
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sentiment in the United States will oppose large numbers of
casualties.
Unlike Iraq and Yugoslavia, China has nuclear weapons
that are part of its strategic posture. The PLA, the document
asserted, would gain complete control of Taiwan before the
full deployment of U.S. troops, leaving retaliation as the
only option for the United States. It would then have to try
and bomb China into submission, as it did Iraq and
Yugoslavia. This is wishful thinking.
The reason was explained in the article by the two
Chinese military writers. Despite changes in the conditions
of warfare, they said, “people’s war” is not obsolete as
demonstrated by the war over Kosovo. This was because the
Yugoslavs had relied on the people in helping the armed
forces in a variety of ways—such as camouflage, armaments
production, and catching spies–-to aid the armed forces. In
the view of the writers, the will of the Yugoslav people on the
one hand, and wavering popular support in the NATO
countries on the other, were decisive factors in ending the
bombing.15
In many publications the Chinese have also stressed the
option of asymmetrical warfare—electronic and
information—in which they will target the “nerve centers”
of a technologically-superior United States.16
Given the high level of hyperbole in these statements,
there is little doubt that their purpose is to exert political
and psychological pressure rather than to signal impending
military action. The Chinese clearly prefer to prevent the
break away of Taiwan without use of force. If however, they
feel compelled to take military action, their options will be
determined by their aims.
China’s Aims and Military Options.
No aspect of the Taiwan problem has riveted more
attention, nor generated more divisions among observers,
than war scenarios in the Taiwan Straits. And no aspect is
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more difficult to assess. China’s intentions and operational
plans are a closely-guarded secret, and its possible actions
can only be inferred from indirect indications and
conjecture.
Conjecture has to be focused. There is little point in
running through all possible scenarios, or assessing the
overall capabilities of China’s armed forces in relation to
Taiwan and the United States, without posing a critical
question beforehand: what would be China’s objectives in
attacking Taiwan? Since the PLA’s plans are geared toward
these objectives, speculation on China’s possible options
should first consider what these might be.
The starting point is the assumption that China will
attack Taiwan only in the most extreme circumstances—
first, if Taiwan’s leaders formally declare independence and
separate Taiwan irrevocably from China. Given the
fundamental factors that drive China’s leaders—
nationalism, the linkage between Taiwan and legitimacy,
the state of elite political relations, and the stand of the
military—they will not be able to tolerate such an affront to
China’s national honor and such an infringement on its
sovereignty.
They will also not be able to tolerate an indefinite
rejection by Taiwan of China’s demands for negotiations on
the basis of the “one-China” principle, although since the
Bush administration has come into office, the Chinese seem
to have put these demands on the back burner. This is
tantamount to de facto independence, since behind the
screen of postponement Taiwan’s leaders will continue to
consolidate their international position.
In both cases—declaration or delay—China’s ultimate
recourse will be to military action, although in the first case
China will be under some pressure to respond rapidly,
whereas in the second, it will be able to put off action until
its armed forces are upgraded, and they are in no hurry to
take such action. Since Taiwan’s new leaders are unlikely to

124

declare independence, the ball will continue to be in China’s
court.
If the Chinese decide to attack, the damage to China’s
economic development, international posture, and regional
relations will be incalculable. For such consequences, they
will settle for nothing less than total achievement of their
objectives. And, in contrast to previous crises, these
presumably will be unlimited.
In the past, China’s aim in initiating limited military
activities had been to signal a refusal to acquiesce in an
unacceptable situation—a drift toward a “two-Chinas”
policy in 1954 and 1958, and Taiwan’s moves under Lee
Teng-hui toward an independent international posture in
1995/1996. Its aim in initiating future action will be
different: to bring about the unconditional surrender of
Taiwan’s leaders to China’s demands, or to conquer the
island and eliminate its leaders. Their military courses of
action will be tailored to these ends.
But these ends also limit their options. A broad range of
low-intensity operations—such as shows of force, military
maneuvers, overflights, or capture of Taiwan’s outlying
islands—might have psychological effects on the
population, but are not likely to coerce the leadership into
submission. For this purpose, only three options seem
feasible: blockade of Taiwan’s sea lanes, missile attacks,
and amphibious invasion.
In all these cases, the Chinese have to assume that the
United States will intervene. From their vantage point, this
assumption is underpinned by recent experience. The first
is Washington’s dispatch of two carrier groups to the
vicinity of Taiwan in 1996, which ended China’s menacing
missile tests around the island and defused the crisis.17 The
second is the “U.S.-led” NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia
during the Kosovo crisis, which the Chinese view as fueled
by America’s quest to become the world’s sole superpower
that seeks to impose its will on other nations. Foremost
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among these is China, whose rise to great power status the
United States is determined to block.
Despite their assertions, if the Chinese decide to take
military action against Taiwan, it will not be because they
believe in their capability to deter U.S. intervention or to
neutralize it. It will be because of their belief—also drawn
from Kosovo—in their ability to withstand bombardment by
the United States, which will be restrained by its allies and
by public opinion at home and abroad. Even so, no
leadership will lightly take action that subjects its
population to such hardships.18
Given the probability of U.S. intervention, all of China’s
options contain a high degree of uncertainty.19 In the case of
a blockade—whose forms could range from deterring ships
by marking lanes for missile firing, through physically
stopping them, to submarine attacks—the effects will
certainly undermine Taiwan’s economy, or even destroy it,
if it is effectively enforced for a long period. What is
uncertain is the ability of the PLA navy and air force to
sustain a blockade against Taiwan’s military, and even
more, against the United States.
The second option—missile strikes—would devastate
Taiwan’s strategic centers and cause considerable suffering
to the population. One uncertainty, however, is the form of
American response. Another is the resolve of Taiwan’s
population to rally behind the leadership.
The last option—an amphibious invasion—will not be
realistic for several years because of China’s military
deficiencies, Taiwan’s defense posture, and U.S. power. The
Chinese armed forces are training for such an invasion, and
the leadership is focusing on acquiring modern weapons
systems that are designed to build up sealift capabilities
and upgrade air and naval support for an invasion.
However, they are not doing this on a “quick fix” basis, and it
will take a decade or so before the Chinese are reasonably
ready to undertake such a vast operation.
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Considering the limitations of all the options, the most
likely seems to be missile strikes. This is, however,
extremely risky. The Chinese leadership cannot afford to
fail, and once it begins such strikes, it will have to continue
until Taiwan surrenders. If the combination of Taiwan’s
determination and U.S. intervention preclude an early
surrender, the Chinese will have to extend bombardment
until they wreak terrible havoc on the population and
destroy the island. Assuming they can pull this off
militarily, the price will be horrific.
Pending major advances in their capabilities, the
Chinese military are not likely to recommend large-scale
operations. They will threaten to use force, and might carry
out low-intensity actions to back up their threats, but they
will stop short of starting a war which will be open-ended,
and for which they are not ready. This is the logical
conclusion. If, however, they feel intolerably provoked by
the political moves of the Taiwan leadership, logic cannot be
counted on to prevail.
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CHAPTER 8
HOMELAND DEFENSE WITH TAIWANESE
CHARACTERISTICS:
PRESIDENT CHEN SHUI-BIAN’S NEW
DEFENSE CONCEPT
Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang
We must develop our future military readiness in the
directions of “precision deep strike, early warning capabilities,
and information superiority,” under the concept of “decisive
campaign beyond boundaries.”
President Chen Shui-bian1

On June 16, 2000, President Chen Shui-bian in his
speech at the 76th anniversary of the Chinese Military
Academy in Kaohsiung, characterized his new national
defense concept as “decisive campaign beyond boundaries”
(juezhan jingwai or jingwai juezhan),2 suggesting that the
armed forces of the Republic of China (hereafter Taiwan
military) would depart from their “pure defensive” position
and pursue a proactive military posture. Chen’s remarks
immediately generated hard debates within and outside
Taiwan’s defense community, which worried that his
pronouncement would create confusion and invite strong
reactions from Beijing. In addition, some analysts believe
that such a defense concept would raise the anxiety of
foreign countries, especially the United States, over an
increasingly provocative Taiwan.
This chapter examines President Chen’s defense concept
of “decisive campaign beyond boundaries,” its origin,
contents, and possible impact upon Taiwan’s security and
defense policies in the future. The author first reviews the
evolution of the defense strategies of the Republic of China
(hereafter ROC or Taiwan) at different stages in the past 5
decades and observes the emergence of a new defense
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concept during recent years. Secondly, the author discusses
how Chen Shui-bian and his advisors formulated the
defense concept of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
its roots, substance, and feasibility. Lastly, the author
examines the political and military implications of Chen’s
defense concept with some policy recommendations.
THE EVOLUTION OF TAIWAN’s DEFENSE POLICY
Since the Republic of China government retreated to
Taiwan after it lost the civil war to the Chinese Communists
in 1949, its defense policy has gone through several
adjustments due to changes in the international
environment, domestic politics, and, more importantly, the
U.S.-Taiwan relationship. When Chen Shui-bian took office
as Taiwan’s president, he not only assumed the
responsibility of national security, but also inherited the
legacy of defense policies before him. In the following
sections, the author will briefly review the evolution of
defense policies under each president, from Chiang
Kai’shek to Lee Teng-hui.
Chiang Kai’shek.
Throughout his life since restoring Kuomintang
(Nationalist Party, KMT) rule in Taiwan, President Chiang
Kai’shek never gave up his goal of “recovering the mainland
by force” (fangong dalu). On the other side of the Taiwan
Strait, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also upheld a
policy of “liberating Taiwan by force” (wuli jiefang). During
that period of political and military confrontation, Taiwan
maintained a large number of forces and an offensive
defense policy, believing the armed struggle would continue
until a final resolution. The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense
Treaty, signed in 1953, provided a critical security
guarantee for Taiwan, but it also prevented Chiang
Kai’shek from carrying out military adventures against the
PRC. From the early 1950s to about the mid-1960s, the
Taiwan military only conducted several small-scale
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military actions against the offshore islands held by
Communist China near the Fujian coast without clear
victory. When Washington improved its relations with
Beijing and started the normalization process in the early
1970s, Taiwan’s objective of recovering the mainland faded
away rapidly.
Chiang Ching-kuo.
With the military option shattered, President Chiang
Ching-kuo revised Taiwan’s political strategy to
“reunification with the three principles of the people”
(sanmin zhuyi tongyi zhongguo). Parallel to Chiang
Ching-kuo’s presidency, the PRC also shifted its policy
toward Taiwan to “peaceful unification” (heping tongyi).
Military confrontation was replaced by a political offensive
across the Taiwan Strait. During that period, however,
Beijing maintained that it would not renounce the use of
force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Under such a threat,
Taiwan adopted a defense concept of “converging offense
with defense” (gongshou yiti),3 emphasizing mobilization,
readiness, and military modernization.4 Although Chiang
Ching-kuo realized the diminishing possibility of a military
solution to the unification issue, he did not rule out a
possible military offensive against the mainland. Under
this concept, Taiwan maintained that large ground forces
are necessary for possible offensive actions.
Lee Teng-hui (1st term).
Following the footsteps of Chiang Ching-kuo, President
Lee Teng-hui modified Taiwan’s political strategy to
“unification under freedom, democracy, equal prosperity”
(ziyou, minzhu, junfu tongyi zhongguo). The end of the Cold
War, the spread of democracy around the world, and
Beijing’s continued focus on economic development
provided a relatively peaceful environment for Lee to
initiate his constitutional reform and political
liberalization. In 1991, he pronounced the end of “the period
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of mobilization in suppressing communist rebellion,”
indirectly recognizing the legality of Beijing’s rule over the
mainland. Cross-strait relations were further stabilized
when representatives of both sides held their first
semi-official talks in Singapore in 1993, testifying that both
Taipei and Beijing would prefer peaceful means in dealing
with the unification issue. At the same time, under the
pressure of the opposition DPP, Taiwan’s defense policy was
modified to “pure defense” (shoushi fangyu).5 In other
words, Taiwan would not seek preemptive military actions
against the mainland, but focused on homeland defense.
Lee Teng-hui (2nd term).
Unlike his first term in office, although Lee Teng-hui
preserved the remote goal of China unification, he gradually
revealed his reluctance to deal with an agenda set by the
Beijing government, especially after the Taiwan Strait
crisis in 1996, when the PRC lobbed missiles against
Taiwan. Since then, Taiwan’s political agenda shifted to
“status quo with separated identity,” while its defense
strategy was changed to “resolute defense, effective
deterrence” (fangwei gushou, youxiao hezu).6 Cross-strait
military tension reached a new height in the wake of Lee’s
remarks about “special state-to-state relations” when he
redefined the Beijing-Taipei relationship in July 1999. In
addition to continued political quarrels, small-scale hostile
military contacts began taking place across the middle line
of the Taiwan Strait without real war. The tension brought
Taiwan to change its defense guideline to “effective
deterrence, resolute defense” (youxiao hezu, fangwei
gushou),7 a more proactive position than before.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AS A TURNING
POINT
The 2000 presidential campaign highlighted a change in
perceptions of Taiwan defense requirements. By examining
the defense strategies of the campaign platforms of all three
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major presidential candidates, one could find a clear
tendency that a new proactive national defense concept
would replace Lee Teng-hui’s “pure defense” strategy. KMT
candidate Lian Chan advocated the concept of “active
defense” (jiji fangyu); independent candidate James Soong8
preferred a strategic concept of “forward defense” (qianjin
fangyu); and the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian created the
term “preemptive defense” (xianzhi fangyu), all of which are
different from the defense strategy previously pronounced.
Lian Chan‘s Active Defense.
The KMT presidential candidate, then Vice President
Lian Chan, revealed his defense policy platform in his
opening keynote speech at an Armed Forces University
conference on December 8, 1999:
Our current defense strategy is built upon the strategic
concept of “resolute defense and effective deterrence.”
Resolute defense should not be interpreted as passively
awaiting for enemy’s attack; rather, it should be understood as
conducting tactical offense based on our defensive strategy. In
other words, Taiwan’s defense strategy can be moved forward
to that of “active defense, effective deterrence” (jiji
fangyu, youxiao hezu). 9

Lian’s speech marked an ambiguous departure from Lee
Teng-hui’s strategic concept of “resolute defense” and
caused some confusion. Defense analysts were not sure
whether this change was the result of a thorough policy
review by the defense ministry or of premature thinking by
his campaign staff. Besides, Lian did not give any definition
of his “active defense” nor elaborate how the concept differed
from the PRC military strategy of “active defense.” His
remarks generated some debates in local newspapers and
within the Defense Ministry.
Based on his “new” strategic concept set forth in the
speech, Lian went on to suggest that Taiwan’s national
defense should focus on:
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• Expanding the use of digital technology in the military
build up;
• strengthening missile defense capability; and
• building up credible deterrence by enhancing naval
and air power and developing long-range surface-to-surface
missiles as its second strike capability.
His remarks immediately raised the eyebrows of the
defense community in Taiwan, who questioned the
offensive nature of such a strategy. However the missile
part was deleted in the official press release of the
Presidential Office later that day.10 Throughout the rest of
the presidential campaign, Lian did not further elaborate
his concept of “active defense” and the term has been
gradually fading away as a result of Lian’s defeat in the
presidential election.
James Soong—Forward Defense.
James Soong considers Lian’s defense concept of “active
defense” as a move in right direction, but opposes the ideas
of developing long-range missiles for Taiwan’s second strike
capability, arguing that Taiwan does not possess key
technologies for building missiles and it would invite
international sanctions against Taipei. He believes:
When armed conflict breaks out, our first vital issue of concern
is whether we have a preemptive capability to deter invasion.
Taiwan enjoys very limited depth of defense, and military
installations may not be able to survive the first strike.
Therefore, we consider that a strong defense should be built on
the strategic objective of “active deterrence and effective
defense” (jiji hezu, youxiao fangwei) and the defense concept of
“forward defense,”11 consisting with 3Cs—Communication,
Capability, and Credibility.12

Based on his perception of future military challenges,
Soong proposes that Taiwan should push its defense line
westward, close to the Chinese mainland, making China’s
coastline major areas of operations to extend Taiwan’s
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depth of defense. Soong further defines the guideline for his
“forward defense”:
• establishing a 3-step decision process of 1) early
warning system, 2) crisis management mechanism, and 3)
decision for preemptive or retaliation attack against the
mainland;
• developing precision and effective land attack cruise
missiles (LACM) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),
targeting military installations, missile bases, airports, and
ports within the areas of threat to delay or destroy the
offensive capability of the PLA; and,
• increasing the survivability of Taiwan’s defense
capability by acquiring or developing certain numbers of
modern submarines that can mine the Chinese harbors or
wage retaliatory assaults against mainland targets.13
Given Soong’s close relationship with the military
establishment, it was widely believed that many active duty
and retired generals and admirals have indirectly shaped
Soong’s views on future military challenges in the Taiwan
Strait and contributed to his defense policy. If that was true,
the “proactive” defense concept mentioned above merits
further study.
Chen Shui-bian—Preemptive Defense.
Chen Shui-bian has long been recognized as Taiwan’s
“leading specialist in defense affairs” in the eyes of his
colleagues in the Legislative Yuan. Not only because he was
co-chairman of the defense committee but also because of
his interests in the defense budget and organization. It was
not a surprise that Chen was the first among three major
presidential candidates who revealed his defense policy.
The DPP presidential campaign platform argued:
In the aspect of military strategy, being an island state
surrounded by oceans, Taiwan’s security threats come
primarily from air and naval attacks beyond its boundary.
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Accordingly, Taiwan should adjust its military strategy from
“pure defense” to that of “offensive defense” (gongshi fangyu).
Taiwan should also abandon the old concept of attrition
warfare, which seeks decisive campaign at beach areas, and
replace it with a military force that can paralyze enemy’s
warfighting capability and keeping the war away from Taiwan
as far as possible. In the aspect of military preparation and
readiness, based on the principle of conducting “decisive
campaign beyond boundary,” Taiwan military should actively
build up capability that can strike against source of threat;
enhancing naval and air forces; develop joint operations and
information warfare capabilities.14

Based on these perceptions, Chen formulated his
defense concept as “preemptive defense,” which means
maintaining a strong deterrence posture during peacetime
through the development of information warfare and long
range precision strike capabilities. But, in wartime, Taiwan
should apply preemptive measures:
• to maintain information, naval and air superiority;
• to suppress and destroy the enemy’s C4I system and its
warfighting and logistic capabilities;
• to conduct antisubmarine and anti-blockade warfare;
and
• to effectively control the scale of military conflict and
keep war away from Taiwan’s territory.15
For the purpose of attracting votes, policy platforms and
campaign promises of any presidential candidate could be
seen as more idealistic than reality and may have limited
implications for policy direction once he is elected.
Nonetheless, by examining the defense policies outlined by
all three major presidential candidates, one can find some
commonalities among them:
1. The logic behind their defense policies appears to be
more offensive in nature than that in the Lee Teng-hui era.
2. They agreed that Taiwan should actively seek the
initiative in military operations against the PRC.
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3. In a war with the PRC, preemptive and/or retaliatory
measures are not excluded in their policy options.
4. They all agreed that the areas of operations in
cross-strait military conflict should be kept far away from
Taiwan.
5. They all gave more emphasis on naval and air power,
and information warfare in a future force build up.
These common perceptions do not, however, suggest
some of these conceptual consensuses would be translated
into policies no matter who was elected president. But they
do reflect some general trends in defense thinking among
political leaders in Taiwan. One of the keys in this strategic
transformation attempt is whether the uniformed services
share the same vision of such changes, and the degree of
support that different candidates could get from the
military.
CONCEPTUALIZING CHEN SHUI-BIAN’S
DEFENSE CONCEPT
Chen’s position on defense affairs was presented as part
of the DPP National Security White Paper, a collective work
of a small number of DPP leaders and many independent
scholars. There has been no direct evidence showing how
much the Paper reflects Chen’s personal views on defense
affairs. However, by examining his previous works, one can
better understand the origins of Chen’s defense thinking.
DPP and Chen Shui-bian on Defense Affairs.
Chen is one of the very few DPP members who has shown
interest in defense policy. Indeed, the DPP as a whole has
had very limited impact on Taiwan’s defense affairs. It was
because of the “closed system” of Taiwan’s military
community and decision process on the one hand; and on the
other hand, the lack of professional military officers and
civilian specialists who are willing to identify themselves
with the DPP due to its pro-Taiwan independence stance.
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The Military, Defense Policy, and the DPP. The pioneer
within the DPP in studying defense affairs is Mr. Huang
Huang-hsiung, a senior member of the Control Yuan.16 He is
the author of Taiwan’s first but unofficial Defense White
Paper, published in 1989, 3 years before the Ministry of
National Defense issued its first official Defense White
Paper.17 Mr. Kang Ning-hsiang, another respected DPP
defense specialist, has been a senior member and chairman
of the Defense Committee of the Control Yuan. Mr. Kang
made his name known by his knowledge of foreign military
procurement procedures and by his investigation of several
corruption cases.18 Huang and Kang are the only two senior
members of the DPP who have long public records involving
defense policies.
Chen, as a younger generation legislator, followed the
footsteps of Huang Huang-hsiung in the pursuit of defense
issues in the Legislative Yuan and was rapidly recognized
as the country’s leading legislator who challenged the
military establishment on almost every possible occasion by
verbal interrogation, street protest, and even physical
confrontation. In 1992, He and his protégé, Ko Chen-heng,
co-authored the second nonofficial Defense White Paper,
presenting not only his extended interests in defense
studies but also his dedication to defense reform and
reorganization.19 Since Chen was elected the Mayor of
Taipei in 1994, there was no significant DPP presence in
defense affairs in the Legislative Yuan except Dr. Parris
Chang, a professor of international relations from
Pennsylvania State University. Representing the DPP’s
overseas constituency, Chang served as the Party’s
representative in Washington, and a strong critic of the
KMT’s defense policy. He was also the convener of the
defense policy advisory group in Chen’s presidential
campaign.
Dr. Michael Ming-hsian Tsai made his name as a
long-time supporter of the Taiwan independence movement
in the United States. After returning to Taiwan and being
elected as Legislator representing the City of Taichung,
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Tsai has shown great interest in military affairs and became
a co-chair of the Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan.
According to former premier and defense minister Tang Fei,
Tsai has been very instrumental in fostering defense reform
and in the passage of the defense reorganization bill in early
2000. It was reported that Tsai was one of the leading
candidates for the position of deputy minister of defense in
the Chen administration. Although he did not get the
appointment, Tsai continues to show his great interest in
defense affairs. In October 2000 he published Taiwan’s first
bilingual defense journal—Taiwan Defense Affairs
(Quarterly)—making it much easier for Taiwan’s domestic
discussions of defense policy and military affairs to reach
interested foreign readers.
In recent years, more DPP legislators, such as Lee
Wen-chung and Chen Chung-hsin, have shown their
interest in defense affairs20 by convening public hearings
and participating in various conferences on defense
matters. Through such efforts, they gradually were able to
engage defense officials as well as scholars in the
community.
DPP and Key Defense Issues. In general terms, very few
members of the DPP had shown interest in defense affairs.
This was partly due to the fact that the military has long
been an institution that resisted civilian participation and
intervention. In addition, the Taiwan independence
position of the DPP was considered disloyal to the
Constitution by the military, which upholds the belief in
China’s eventual unity. In such an environment, the only
way for the DPP to exercise influence over defense affairs
was through the legislative process. In analyzing the DPP
tactics of the past 10 years, one can find the following
correlated steps:
• Build up a certain reputation in defense affairs.
Legislator Huang Huang-hsiung chose to deal with the
military establishment by publishing his own Defense
White Paper in 1989. Chen Shui-bian followed the same
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approach and published his in 1992.21 These efforts have
made their names known to professional soldiers, defense
policy circles, and the academic community.
• Push for strategic transformation. By advocating a
defensive military strategy, the DPP forced the KMT
government to openly admit that Taiwan’s defense policy
has been adjusted to “pure defense.” Such a move brought
about two significant implications. First, it showed that an
offensive strategy aiming at recovering the mainland could
not reflect the reality. Secondly, a change of defense policy
would pave the way for defense budget cuts.22
• Trim down defense budget and resources. Once “pure
defense” became the official defense policy, the DPP pushed
the government to cut the defense budget and divert
resources to other expenditures, such as economic
development and social welfare programs. The DPP also
asked the defense ministry to shorten the time for political
education, reducing political control over the military. By
doing so, the DPP was able to gradually chop off the
influence of the military establishment over domestic
politics.23
• Call for defense reorganization. The last step the DPP
took was defense reorganization to reflect the defensive
strategy. They argued that, under the new strategy, Taiwan
does not need a force structure for offensive operations since
retaking the mainland by force was no longer a national
objective. By advocating a defense reform with “the
convergence of military policy and military command
systems,” the DPP hoped to institutionalize civilian control
over the military establishment.24
Through these tactical maneuvers in the legislative process,
the DPP has been successful in not only influencing defense
policies, but also transforming its image from an
anti-military establishment to that of defense reformer.
The Overall Concept of Chen’s Defense Policy. It was
clear that when pushing for force cuts and reduction of the
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defense budget in the first half of the 1990s, the DPP and
Chen were in large part aiming at weakening the KMT’s
party control over the military. Even most DPP members
admit today that at that time they never thought that a DPP
member could become the Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces before the turn of the century.
When Chen was nominated as a presidential candidate
in 1999, he and the DPP organized a group of advisors and
formulated a new Defense White Paper.25 As part of a
general national security campaign platform, Chen’s
defense policy covers a wide range of issues, including
civilian control over the military, defense reorganization,
active defense strategy, joint warfare, advanced technology,
military personnel reform, and the mobilization system.
The following section will keep the focus on Chen’s views on
military strategy and related issues.
Preventive Defense. Chen considers that one of the
highest priorities for the president is to prevent war and
preserve peace. He believes that Taiwan’s security cannot
be assured if both sides get into an arms race. Therefore, the
DPP advocates a “proactive confidence building mechanism
to promote mutual trust between the two states (liang
guo)—Taiwan and China, in order to reduce tensions across
the Taiwan Strait and to forge a peaceful and stable
environment in the Asia-Pacific region for common
development.”26 To formulate their preventive policies,
Chen and his defense policy advisors borrowed many
concepts from the practices of foreign countries such as
increasing military transparency, publishing a Defense
White Paper, establishing hot lines, and promoting
personnel exchanges. All of these are idealistic concepts and
are legitimate to be included in a campaign document; but
translating them into effective policies would be extremely
difficult through a unilateral effort by Taiwan.
Active Deterrence. The DPP conceives that Taiwan is
under tremendous military threats from the PRC and
understands that hostile military actions may not be
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prevented even through confidence building and other
measures. Therefore, in peacetime, Chen believes Taiwan
should build up an effective deterrence capability, including
1) maintaining necessary defense forces; 2) improving force
survivability; and 3) preserving a second-strike capability.
If a military crisis escalates to the brink of a war, Chen
believes Taiwan should take active measures, such as a
show of force, military exercise, partial mobilization, and
other actions to demonstrate the determination of Taiwan
to deter military adventurism.27
Decisive Strike. Should preventive efforts and
deterrence both fail, Chen believes “attack is the best
defense” and calls for decisive military actions against the
enemy. In his mind, extending Taiwan’s defense depth
forward into the enemy’s territory, suppressing and
destroying the enemy’s command and control systems, and
paralyzing the enemy’s capability to wage war against
Taiwan are necessary and “legitimate” measures for
national defense once Taiwan is perceived to be under
attack. Keeping the war/area of operations in the enemy’s
territory, or beyond Taiwan’s boundary is the highest
principle in military operations.28
Chen’s 3-in-1 defense policy of prevent-deter-strike is
similar to the U.S. national military strategy of
prevent-deter-defeat. Given Taiwan’s unique international
status and limited military capability, however, the
“offensive” nature in military actions called by Chen has
been rather hard to understand for many observers in
Taiwan as well as in international community.
Jue Zhan Jing Wai—The Confused Terminology.
Among Chen’s various defense concepts, the most
debated terminology of “decisive campaign beyond
boundary” surfaced for the first time when Chen’s campaign
platform was published in late 1999.29 But the term caught
little attention in Taiwan even after Chen was elected
president on March 18, 2000. In strict terms, “decisive
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campaign beyond boundary” was not an official policy until
President Chen pronounced it in his remarks at the Chinese
Military Academy, which generated a whole host of debate
across the defense community in seminars, talk shows and
the printed press.
Boundary and Beyond. The term “jing wai” could be
translated as areas beyond “boundary,” “territory,” “war
zone,” or “area of operations.” In Chen’s presidential
campaign platform, the DPP did not clearly conceptualize
the term, but loosely implied that it meant areas beyond the
homeland. In geographical terms, “jing wai” could mean the
entire Taiwan Strait, covering the areas from Taiwan’s west
coast to the east coast of the mainland. It could also mean
the eastern half of the Taiwan Strait, an area between
Taiwan’s coastlines and the arbitrary middle line. In
political terms, “jing wai” could mean the areas beyond
Taiwan’s jurisdiction, i.e., any place other than Taiwan,
Penghu, Quemoy, and Matzu. By the ROC constitution,
however, the mainland remains part of national territory;
accordingly, “jing wai” carries no sensible meaning at all. In
reality, Quemoy and Matzu are too far away from Taiwan
and hard to defend. Then the question becomes whether the
two offshore islands are viewed as part of “jing wai.”
Further, in the age of information warfare, how can one
clearly define “boundary” or “territory”? The lack of clear
definition and articulation of such a term by Chen and his
advisors has created great confusion within the defense
ministry and in a larger part the entire military
establishment.
Decisive Campaign. Decisive campaign is understood as
a large-scale military engagement between conflicting
parties in a particular period of time and at a certain
location by which its result would have significant impact
on the final outcome of a war. When Chen pronounced the
term “decisive campaign beyond boundary” in June 2000,
neither himself nor his national defense advisors offered a
definition of “decisive campaign.” In the context of
cross-strait conflict, it is hard to imagine how a decisive
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campaign would take place, evolve, and come to an end. In
the post-World War II history, rarely can we find a “decisive
campaign” that could bring about an end of military conflict.
Given the current balance of comprehensive national power
and military strength across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan
would find it extremely hard to force a decisive campaign on
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Moreover, China,
by its sheer size and multi-layer force deployment, would
enjoy more freedom of action in a military conflict against
Taiwan. To change the overall strategic posture or
discourage China’s will to continue the war through a
decisive military campaign would be almost impossible.
Even if Taiwan could acquire a strong capability to
decisively defeat the PLA at some point, the conduct of such
a campaign would require clear preparation and planning.
A vague, loosely defined terminology may not be executable
at the operational level.
The confusion and debates over the terminology that
generated in the public surprised many defense watchers
close to the DPP who had been directly involved in
formulating the concept. According to them, the term
“decisive campaign beyond boundary” was deliberately
created by some of Chen’s advisors to challenge the existing
defense concept of “decisive campaign at beach areas”
(tanan juezhan), which was considered too passive and gave
too much emphasis on the ground forces. They argued that
the motivation behind the term “decisive campaign beyond
boundary” was in fact very simple and easy to understand:
keeping the war away from the homeland as far as possible.
For some of Chen’s advisors, it has been rather unfortunate
that the whole defense community and interested
academics went into nasty debates over their laxly picked
terminology.30
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THE CONCEPTUAL DEBATES OVER “DECISIVE
CAMPAIGN BEYOND BOUNDARY”
If Chen had lost the presidential campaign, the term
“decisive campaign beyond boundary” might have been
buried or forgotten at least for the next 4 years. However,
meaningful debates are warranted since Chen assumed the
presidency, and publicly pronounced it at a military
institution. So far, the term “decisive campaign beyond
boundary” has not been officially adopted by the Taiwan
military and has not appeared in any official document
issued by the Ministry of National Defense. The debate
within Taiwan’s defense community continues.
In the prolonged debate since Chen’s official
announcement in June 2000, generally three groupings
have emerged: 1) the (young) DPP advisors promoting
Chen’s idea, 2) defense specialists opposing the concept, and
3) the active duty professional military, who are caught in
between.
The Extended DPP Views.
Some young policy researchers and advisors within the
DPP continued to argue that “decisive campaign beyond
boundary” is a right approach in guiding defense policy.
They argue that the concept should not be discarded but
further developed and perfected. According to the
publications by these young scholars, the concept of
“decisive campaign beyond boundary” has some room for
theoretical development and practical implications.
First Strike. Based on Chen’s campaign platform,
Taiwan would not engage in armed conflict with the
mainland until deterrence fails. In other words, once the
PRC initiates a war or shows obvious signs that it is
preparing to use force, Taiwan will have the right to conduct
attacks against targets on the mainland. Since Chen’s
official announcement of “decisive campaign beyond
boundary,” several defense advisors within the DPP have
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started a new round of assessment on the legality of
“anticipatory self-defense” in international law, the relative
blurred line between first strike and second strike,31 the
feasibility of preemptive air strike against the mainland,32
and other theoretical studies. According to their
perceptions, in the practice of international law it is not
entirely illegal to strike first if the PRC’s hostility can be
verified.
Defense Depth. The DPP defense advisors consider the
short distance, about 70 to 100 nautical miles, of the Taiwan
Strait cannot provide Taiwan sufficient depth of defense.
They believe that “deep strike” (zongshen daji) and “source
attack” (yuantou gongji) is the necessary and best way to
conduct decisive operations. Based on such perceptions,
Taiwan would be able to significantly increase its strategic
depth by expanding the areas of operations far into the
enemy’s territory.33
Seizing Initiative. Seizing the initiative in military
operations, in the eyes of DPP defense specialists, is the key
to the security of Taiwan. They consider Taiwan cannot sit
idly by, watching the PLA maneuver and assemble on the
other side of the Taiwan Strait, and take no action.
Therefore, the old thinking of passively “accepting the first
blow” (houfa zhiren) and “annihilation of invading enemy at
beach areas” (jiandi yu tantou) are the worst option. They
believe that it is important for the Taiwan military to take
the initiative strategically and tactically to ensure the
possibility of success.
Operational Concept. DPP advisors argued that the
“decisive campaign beyond boundary” idea was not
intended to annihilate enemy forces on a large scale, but to
1) paralyze the enemy’s capability to conduct operations; 2)
alter the enemy’s operational and logistical plans; or, 3) at
least delay the enemy’s offensive to a certain degree.34 In
case of air operations, the DPP defense advisors suggest
that the primary targets on the mainland are the air force
bases and short range ballistic missile launching sites
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within 250 nautical miles in range, and secondary targets
within 500 nautical miles.35
Political Gain. One of the new concepts developed within
the DPP has been using Taiwan’s strong military capability
as the base to force and increase the country’s international
visibility and participation. They argue, with “certain
long-range strike capability and appropriate naval forces,”
Taiwan would have a better chance to get itself invited to
international and regional security dialogue. Offensive
force build up is politically beneficial by adding Taiwan’s
weight in multilateral security forums and bargaining chips
in future arms control.36
The Opposition Views.
Since Chen’s announcement of “decisive campaign
beyond boundary,” many prominent defense analysts in
Taiwan have expressed strong opposition to such a concept,
discrediting the concept as strategically unwise,
operationally difficult, technically premature, and
organizationally biased. 37
Strategic level.
• Provocative to China. The strongest critique of Chen’s
defense concept has been the wisdom and rationale behind
the idea of keeping the battle space in the Chinese
mainland. Many specialists consider such a concept may be
a political statement aiming at boosting domestic morale
and confidence, but it could unnecessarily antagonize
Beijing when China has strong suspicions and reservations
about the newly established DPP Administration.
• Damaging International Relations. Most of Taiwan
analysts opposing Chen’s defense concept argue that even if
the President is thinking of offensive military options in a
future conflict with China, it is extremely unwise to “talk”
too much about Taiwan’s offensive options. Given Taiwan’s
difficult international relations, a clear statement that
reveals the intention of taking preemptive actions against
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the mainland would be politically devastating for Taiwan
because it will enrage Washington and neighbors in the
Asia-Pacific region and in the end hurt Taiwan’s foreign
relations.
• Complicating Foreign Military Assistance. Taiwan’s
military development relies heavily on continuing foreign
military assistance. The cold reality is that nations,
especially the United States, would provide Taiwan
advanced military systems only on the basis that Taiwan
adopts a defensive military strategy. If Taiwan shows its
intention of taking offensive military actions against China,
many countries would take a more cautious policy and
constrain their military sales and technology transfers to
Taiwan.
• Intentions Surpass Capability. On the preemptive
concept of “decisive campaign beyond boundary,” most
specialists in Taiwan consider it unrealistic simply because
Taiwan does not have the capability to support such an idea.
They argue that Taiwan’s current order of battle, including
tactical combat aircraft, short range antiship missiles, and
limited command and control capabilities, could attack only
limited Chinese targets, but is far from being able to conduct
a decisive campaign on the Chinese mainland. They
question Chen’s unsophisticated knowledge of the real
capacity of the Taiwan military.
• When to Attack? When introducing the concept of
“decisive campaign beyond boundary,” Chen failed to clarify
whether it means preemptive or retaliatory military actions
against China. Even if he implies that Taiwan will not fire
the first shot, it would be extremely difficult to identify the
“proper” timing for the Taiwan military to act. If DPP
advisors consider that a hostile Chinese massive military
assembly in the coastal areas warrants a rapid military
response, the international community may react
negatively and oppose a preemptive attack from Taiwan.
Even if Chen’s new defense concept means that Taiwan will
take the first blow and then retaliate, no one could assure
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that the surviving military forces after a Chinese
preemptive attack are capable of conducting Chen’s
“decisive campaign beyond boundary.”
• Exit strategy? Finally, if we assume that all the ideas
such as first strike and other preemptive measures
suggested by the DPP may be doable options in Chen’s new
defense concept, still, it does not provide a “guideline to end
a war” (zhongzhan zhidao) for Taiwan’s military. Given the
sheer size of China, the PLA’s ultra-nationalistic way of
thinking, and its enormous war machine, it is hard to
imagine that Beijing would easily bring the military
campaign to an end without a clear outcome. The question
then is how long can Taiwan survive an expected massive
retaliation and sustain a war of attrition across the Taiwan
Strait?
Operational level.
• Missile Defense. It is widely perceived that in the
initial stage of a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait,
the PRC will most likely start with an air attack on Taiwan
with its short range ballistic missiles, but in the foreseeable
future, Taiwan would not be able to acquire sufficient
capability to defend itself from Chinese missiles. One can
surely argue that the best missile defense is to wage
preemptive assault against PRC’s missile launchers;
however, Taiwan’s limited long-range offensive systems,
lack of surveillance and reconnaissance capability, and
China’s increasingly mobile SRBM systems, all have made
such options unattainable. In fact, Chinese missiles can
destroy most of Taiwan’s critical defense structures without
engaging in a decisive campaign in the sea area and
airspace of the Taiwan Strait.
• Air superiority. For the Taiwan Air Force, maintaining
air superiority relies on active defense in the airspace over
the Taiwan Strait. However, the challenge has been the fact
that the PLA Air Force and Naval Air Force have several
hundred combat aircraft stationed in about a dozen air force
bases in the 250 nautical miles of range opposite to Taiwan.
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In addition to the quantitative edge in aircraft, the
continuously modernized PLA’s anti-air missiles can now
threaten Taiwan aircraft flying beyond the middle line of
the Taiwan Strait. In the case of air war in the Strait, even if
Taiwan can destroy most of the PLA combat aircraft based
in the coastal provinces; China would still be able to transfer
its second tier air force to the region and force the Taiwan
Air Force into a war of attrition. However, Chen’s concept of
“decisive campaign beyond boundary” requires Taiwan’s
Air Force not only to defend Taiwan, but also to be able to
conduct attacks against China’s military assets well into
the mainland airspace to compromise the PLA’s warfighting
capabilities. But the fact is that unless Taiwan builds up a
meaningful long-range precision strike capability capable of
attacking PLA air force bases 600 nautical miles opposite to
Taiwan, it would be hard for Taiwan to seek a “decisive
campaign” and maintain control of the air over the Taiwan
Strait.
• Sea denial. In order to pursue a “decisive naval
campaign” in the Taiwan Strait, ideally, the Taiwan Navy
needs to be able to shape the tempo of operations and
pressure the PLA Navy for an engagement at a chosen time
and location. The conduct of meaningful sea denial
operations requires the Taiwan Navy taking proactive
actions and pushing the areas of operations away from the
Taiwan coast to maintain navigation and some forms of safe
passage in the Taiwan Strait. More importantly, the
Taiwan Navy must be able to uphold its inner line
superiority by preventing an assembly of the PLA Navy’s
East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.38
All of these operations would keep the Taiwan Navy
operating beyond the middle line of the Taiwan Strait and
within the range of China’s coastal artillery, land-based
surface-to-surface missiles, and air force. Whether the
Taiwan Navy can carry out such multi-missions is difficult
to assess, but failing to do that, it would be impossible for
Taiwan to sustain its sea denial operations.
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• Antisubmarine warfare. Theoretically, antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) operations are better kept away from the
Taiwan coast to reduce the possibility of the PLA Navy
attacking ships sailing in the Strait and conducting
mine-laying operations. In practice however, it has always
been hard for the submarines to locate ships sailing on the
high seas. Accordingly, the PLA Navy submarines are likely
to be deployed near Taiwan’s coastlines and harbor areas.39
How can the concept of “decisive campaign beyond
boundary” be practically applied in ASW operations
remains a big question.
• Information warfare. In a world of information
revolution, the old concept of geographical “boundary”
makes little sense. When information warfare becomes a
new but ambiguous form of conflict, “decisive campaign”
may become a disconnected concept. In fact the “soft” nature
of information warfare has made both winner and loser
somewhat nonidentifiable. The DPP defense advisors
developed the concept of “decisive campaign beyond
boundary” based on conventional warfare thinking in which
time and locations are critical. When information warfare
becomes a viable option for both China and Taiwan as
offensive measures against each other’s command and
control nodes and critical infrastructures, Chen’s new
defense concept would become almost irrelevant.
Other Critical Concerns. Many critics of Chen’s defense
policy have argued that before developing the concept of
“decisive campaign beyond boundary,” the DPP failed to
consider several critical issues, such as:
• Technology Acquisition. If the current Taiwan force is
not capable of implementing a preemptive strike against
China, what would be the Chen government’s defense
technology policy and weapons systems development
programs which will support the concept of “source attack”
on the mainland? What are the critical military
technologies necessary to support such missions? Would
Taiwan be able to develop and acquire those technologies
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without external assistance? Knowing Taiwan’s intention,
are foreign countries willing to provide those critical
technologies to Taiwan?
• Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Options? If
Taiwan were contemplating preemptive and/or retaliatory
attacks against the mainland, what are the forces available
to carry out such missions? If Taiwan’s existing
conventional arms are not up to the mission, both in terms of
firepower and delivery systems, is the DPP thinking of other
options? Without sufficient deterrents in Taiwan’s
inventory, Chen’s concept would naturally lead to a
suspicion by the opposition and the international
community that Taiwan may eventually go for a nuclear
option. Can the ideas of developing medium- and long-range
missiles and WMD, i.e. nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons, survive in Taiwan’s political environment? Would
the international community allow Taiwan to take such a
course without harsh preventive measures and punitive
sanctions?
• Policy Deliberation. Taiwan’s former Chief of the
General Staff, Hau Pei-tsun, questioned whether Chen’s
announcement of “decisive campaign beyond boundary” in
June 2000 was a conclusion of well-deliberated consensus
within the military. In fact, three days after Chen’s
remarks, Defense Minister Wu Shih-wen told the defense
committee of the Legislative Yuan that the Ministry of
National Defense had not yet “clearly thought through” the
definition of President Chen’s concept.40 In addition, on July
4, 2000, then Premier Tang Fei admitted in a Legislative
Yuan plenary session that he was not consulted in advance
and personally has reservations regarding the use of such
terms.41 According to extensive media inquiries in the wake
of Chen’s public pronouncement of his new defense concept,
it was quite clear that almost the entire defense ministry
and general staff were kept in the dark. If that were really
the case, the DPP advisors owed the Taiwan military a
sensible and comprehensive explanation.

152

The PRC Response. The Chinese government and the
PLA did not fiercely respond to Chen’s call for a new defense
concept. The People’s Daily considers Chen’s announcement
as part of his Taiwan independence agenda, but warns that
Taiwan’s existing military force is not capable of extending
war into the Chinese mainland.42 In a workshop hosted by
the Strategic Department of the Academy of Military
Science, PLA officers from the National Defense University,
the Navy Research Institute, and the Nanjing Political
College agreed that Chen’s new military concept is
contradictory to Taiwan’s existing defense concept, and is
not well-received by the military establishment.43
The Professional Soldiers.
Being caught between the new DPP defense policy
makers promoting the concept of “decisive campaign beyond
boundary,” and realistic defense specialists opposing such
an idea, the Taiwan military as a whole has experienced a
difficult time since June 2000. Chief of the General Staff
Tang Yau-ming chose to swallow all the critiques to protect
the president. The challenge then, has been how to close the
gaps between the intention of the commander-in-chief and
the existing capability of the armed forces.
Although two former military chiefs, General Hau and
General Tang, and many retired senior military officials
openly expressed their strong reservations over Chen’s new
defense concept, the active duty officers at the MND and the
Joint Staff had no choice but to justify the president’s act.
Although admitting that the MND had not yet
conceptualized the new policy, Minister Wu insisted that
the military would carry out any mission assigned by the
president with or without such capability.44 Wu suggested
that the concept of “decisive campaign beyond boundary”
could be understood as “resisting Chinese invasion in the
areas 12 nautical miles beyond the island of Taiwan.”45 The
Joint Staff went further to identify its position with the
president. To answer the mounting confusion over Chen’s
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new defense concept, Chief of the General Staff Tang held a
special press conference on July 7, 2000, and suggested the
following interpretations:
• Making it clear that it was the Joint Staff that drafted
Chen’s June 16, 2000 speech; and the president did not
make any change of the suggested text or wording.
• For the concept of “beyond boundary,” the Taiwan
military considers it as the areas of operations in the
Taiwan Strait, but definitely not on the mainland.
• The concept of “decisive campaign beyond boundary” is
not newly created, and in fact has long been the guidance for
the Taiwan military. Keeping the war away from Taiwan
Island has been a concept emphasized by all Chiefs of the
General Staff since the early 1960s.
• The concept of “decisive campaign beyond boundary” is
similar to that of “converging offense with defense” in the
Chiang Ching-kuo era, and is also parallel to the concept of
“resolute defense, effective deterrence” under the Lee
Teng-hui presidency.
• The Taiwan military is more or less capable of keeping
up with the goal of “resolute defense.” Military construction
is an integrated and long-term process and “decisive
campaign beyond boundary” is one of our long-term
objectives.46
In addition, the defense ministry interpreted the
president’s new defense concept by borrowing a concept
developed by Dr. Ta-wei Yu, defense minister during the
1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Dr. Yu has a famous four-step
strategy for Taiwan defense:
1) resist enemy at mainland coast,
2) attack enemy in the strait,
3) destroy enemy at Taiwan coast, and
4) annihilate enemy at beach areas.47
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According to General Cheng Shih-yu, executive director of
J-3, the Taiwan military is currently capable of carrying out
the last two missions under the existing military guideline
of “decisive campaign at beach areas.” The military
considers the first two steps are similar to Chen’s concept of
“decisive campaign beyond boundary,” and thus the concept
has been in existence for 40 years.48
Indeed, the defense ministry worked hard to shield the
president from being interrogated by the opposition and the
press on the issue. Chen himself also somewhat modified his
statement later when he visited the Army Headquarters,
indicating that, should Air Force and the Navy fail to stop
the Chinese invasion, the ground force will be the vital
element for a decisive campaign to ensure national
survival.49 In reality, in Defense White Paper 2000, the first
one under Chen’s presidency, the MND does not include
Chen’s new defense concept and maintains its original
position of “effective deterrence, resolute defense” as
Taiwan’s defense guideline. Moreover, some creative
military officers have privately suggested a modification of
Chen’s concept to “military operations beyond boundary”
(jingwai zuozhan) or “resisting invasion beyond boundary”
(judi jingwai), which are much more mild than the DPP’s
use of terminology and closer to Taiwan’s real intention as
well as military capability.50
REFLECTION AND CONCLUSION
To most Taiwan defense specialists questioning the
concept of “decisive campaign beyond boundary,” the DPP
and its defense advisors are inexperienced, nonpragmatic,
a n d la ck u n derst and i ng of mi l i tar y af f ai r s and
international realpolitik. However, close watchers of
Taiwan politics may have observed that since Taiwan’s last
presidential election, there has been a growing voice within
Taiwan advocating a military build-up with offensive
characteristics. This may reflect a growing sense of
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insecurity of the Taiwan people in the face of an emerging
Chinese power.
Politically, Taiwan’s continuing democratization has not
yet led to an improvement in its international status. For
the Taiwan people, Beijing’s peaceful unification pledge is
compromised by its own insistence on keeping the force
option. The rapid growth of China’s comprehensive national
power is gradually changing the strategic balance across
the Taiwan Strait. Militarily, the PRC missile threats are
real, but there is no sufficient way to defend Taiwan from
being harassed. As discussed earlier, technologies of
ballistic and cruise missile defense are not yet matured and
even if sophisticated missile defense systems were to be
available, Taiwan would have difficulty acquiring such a
system due to financial costs and Chinese objections.
Consequently, it becomes easy to understand that
increasing numbers of Taiwan people are contemplating
offensive options to sustain an “effective deterrence”
against the Chinese threat and the uneasy strategic balance
in the Taiwan Strait that has been maintained for the past
50 years.
For the United States and other countries in the
Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan’s emerging offensive concept of
homeland defense may be a source of instability in the
Asia-Pacific region. It would ignite a new round of arms
race, intensify China’s military build up, poison the already
difficult Washington-Beijing relationship, and eventually
damage Taiwan’s own security. To honor Taiwan’s
democratic effort, to prevent Taiwan from being an isolated
fighter, to encourage dialogue across the Taiwan Strait, and
to protect the common security and commercial interests in
the region, it may be necessary for the United States and its
allies to convince the Taipei government to maintain a
defensive military strategy by offering sufficient security
assurance and by keeping a dynamic military balance in the
Taiwan Strait.
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CHAPTER 9
THE ARMS CONTROL AND
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COSTS
OF A CHINESE CONFLICT
Wendy Frieman
INTRODUCTION
The theme chosen for this conference, the potential costs
of conflict, offers participants the chance to be more precise
than is usually the case when speculating about Chinese
security policy. Although it is a comparatively easy task to
project the costs of a given conflict for the United States, to
do so from a Chinese perspective is a useful, if more
challenging, exercise. It reveals the degree to which
different countries, and different players within countries,
disagree first, on what constitutes a cost, and second, on
which costs would be bearable.
This chapter is an attempt to address one aspect of
potential Chinese conflict. It is focused on the role of
ballistic missiles in a local conflict and how that role would
change in the context of theater or national missile defense
deployments cum sales by the United States or allies in
Asia.
The chapter begins with assumptions about what local
conflict would mean for China, following which is an
overview of China’s ballistic missile inventory and how
those weapons could be used in that conflict, and the degree
to which the possession of these weapons affects China’s
calculation of the costs of conflict. The third section
re-examines each of the previous questions raised in the
context of potential U.S. or allied missile defense
deployments, and addresses whether or not China’s
perception of the cost of conflict might change as a result of
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U.S. deployments. The final section of the chapter offers
tentative conclusions about how costs might be raised or
lowered.
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT LOCAL CONFLICT
Several key assumptions underpin this analysis. The
first is that (absent an incursion by another power into the
Chinese mainland) China would only become involved in a
local conflict to protect freedom of action with respect to
Taiwan or the disputed territories in the South China Sea
(the Spratly or Paracel Islands) and the East China Sea (the
Senkaku Islands). In either case, the distance between the
Chinese mainland and the theater would be less than 1,000
miles. The second assumption is that between now and the
date of such a conflict, China would not enter into military
alliances with partners who would then also get involved in
the conflict. The third assumption is that between now and
the date of such a conflict, U.S. political and military
arrangements will remain more or less as they are today.
The fourth assumption is that China will remain united as a
political entity, albeit one with a relatively weak central
government, and will not abandon its commitment to
China’s reemergence as a significant regional and global
actor. Finally, this analysis assumes that if the United
States were to become involved, it would be in support of an
Asian country (including Taiwan) in conflict with China.
THE ROLE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES
China’s conventional weapons to support a local war are
being modernized slowly, and the last decade has seen
steady improvements in the capabilities of Chinese surface
ships, submarines, and aircraft, as well as the C4 systems
on which they depend. However, China’s tactical ballistic
missile inventory has been growing much more rapidly,
both in size and in sophistication, and it is very likely that
these missiles would play an important role in a local
conflict. In addition, China is modernizing its strategic
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missiles, which, even if they would not be deployed in a local
conflict, would nevertheless be relevant.
Theater Ballistic Missiles.
China currently has the following theater missiles in
service (characteristics are summarized in Table 1, and
basing locations are shown in Figure 1).
MISSILE

TYPE

MAXIMUM
RANGE

PAYLOAD

ESTIMATED
CEP

CSS-2

IRBM

2800 km

2150 kg

3.0-3.5 km

CSS-5

MRBM

1800 km

600 kg

.3-.4 km

CSS-6

SRBM

600 km

950 kg

.3 km

CSS-7

SRBM

300 km

800 kg

Not
available

Sources: Center for Defense Information, www.cdiss.org/china_thtm;
and Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
cns.miis.edu/iiop/cnsdata.

Table 1. Theater Missiles Characteristics.
1. DF-11 (CSS-7, also known as the M-11). This is a 300
km range missile with a circular error probable (CEP) of
150-200 meters. It has inertial guidance and solid
propellant, and requires a 30-minute launch preparation
time. It can carry a single nuclear warhead (350kt) or a
single or cluster conventional warhead. China has deployed
a total of approximately 40 DF-11s at two bases: one at
Yong’an, 220 miles from Taiwan, and one at the Xianyou
missile complex, about 135 miles from Taiwan. Each base is
equipped with tunnels to store the missiles; each will
support a brigade-size force with 16 truck launchers and 97
CSS-7 mobile missiles.1 The manufacturer of the weapon,
the Sanjiang Space Corporation, is currently modifying this
missile. The new system, referred to as CSS-7 Mod 2, or the
M-11 follow-on, is about two meters longer than the Mod 1,
and is believed to have a longer range, a larger warhead,
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and greater accuracy than the earlier DF-11. According to
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) figures,
China has deployed 40 DF-11s.
2. The DF-15 (CSS-6 or M-9) is a solid-fueled,
single-stage mobile missile whose operational preparation
time is 30 minutes. It is 9.1 meters long and has a range of
200-600 km, a CEP of about 280m, and the ability to carry a
500kg payload (a single nuclear warhead of 50-350 kt or a
conventional warhead). It uses an inertial guidance system
on the warhead section. The DF-15 utilizes a Chinesedeveloped eight-wheeled cross-country Transporter Erector
Launcher [TEL]. A total of 200 missiles are based in three
locations: Leping, Nanping, and Yong’an. Leping, in Jiangxi
Province, nearly 600 kilometers from Taipei, is also the
headquarters of the 815th ballistic missile brigade. The
DF-15 missiles are stored at Leping, which has direct
railway links with Yongan and Nanping. Three to four
hours would be required to transport missiles from Leping
to Yongan via railway.
3. The DF-21 (CSS-5) is a two-stage medium range
ballistic missile (MRBM) with a range of 1800 km and a CEP
of 300-400m. China has approximately 50 in service.
Originally intended only for delivery of nuclear warheads, it
has been modified to carry a single conventional warhead
(600kg) as well. It requires 10-15 minutes of launch
preparation time. It is based at Liangxiwang, Tonghua,
Jianshui, and Chuxiong.
4. The DF-3A (CSS-2) has a range of 2800 km and a CEP
of 2.5-4 km. It is scheduled to be replaced by the DF-21
within 2 years. It carries of a payload of 2150 kg (single
nuclear warhead of 1-5 MT) and requires 120-150 minutes
launch preparation time. It can be launched from either
permanent pads or portable launch stands. An estimated
90-120 DF-3s were deployed in the 1980s. They are based at
Liangxiwang and Dalong.
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Figure 1. Basing Locations for Theater Missiles
in Service.
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Strategic Ballistic Missiles.
China’s land-based strategic forces have been the
subject of many well-researched papers and articles, and it
is not necessary to repeat here the knowledge that is
publicly available on the internet and other sources. The
critical point for this analysis is that China has a survivable
nuclear deterrent. China’s strategic nuclear systems
include the DF-4 (CSS-3), the DF 5/5A (CSS-4), the DF-31,
and the DF-41. These last two are still under development.
The key characteristics of these weapons are summarized in
Table 2. There is general agreement on several points: First,
China is making the conversion from fixed missile sites to
mobile platforms and from liquid fueled to solid fueled
missiles.2 Second, China is pursuing multiple independent
reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology, with evidence of
increased activity since 1983, and will likely achieve the
capability to MIRV its strategic missiles.3 Third, by any
comparative standard, China’s existing strategic force is
still small, consisting of no more than several dozen
missiles.4
MAXIMUM
RANGE

MISSILE

PAYLOAD

CEP

CSS-3

4750 km

2150 kg

3-3.5 km

CSS-4

13000+ km

3200 kg

.5-3 km

DF-31

8000 km

700 kg

.5 km

DF-41

12000 km

800 kg

.7-.8 km

Sources: Center for Defense Information, www.cdiss.org/china_htm;
and Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
cns.miis.edu/iiop/cnsdata.

Table 2. Strategic Nuclear Missiles
Characteristics.
Most observers also agree that China could easily
increase the size and capabilities of the strategic missile
force. However, much disagreement exists over what the
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motivation would be, how quickly this might happen, under
what circumstances, and how large a force China wants.
The increase between 1997 and 2000 in Chinese theater
missile inventories as reported by the IISS is as follows:5
SYSTEM

1997
INVENTORY

1998
INVENTORY

1999
INVENTORY

2000
INVENTORY

CSS-2

38

38

38

30

CSS-5

8

8

8

50

CSS-6

4

4

150

200

CSS-7

40

Table 3. Increase in Chinese Theater Missile
Inventories.
Numbers for the CSS-2 have been declining because this
system is apparently being replaced. If these figures are
ignored, the table shows an average annual increase of 70
missiles. If current trends continue without further
acceleration, by 2007, China will have an additional 490
missiles for a total of 780 missiles.
Use of Ballistic Missiles in a Local Conflict.
The precise way in which China would use these missiles
in a local conflict would be determined by specific
circumstances. Theater missiles could be used for a wide
range of missions. The only historical evidence to date is
China’s 1996 firing of ballistic missiles across the Taiwan
Strait, which constituted an act of coercion more than an
operational military move. In an actual conflict, China could
designate and inflict damage on a number of important
target sets:
• enemy airfields
• enemy ports
• enemy air defense bases
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• enemy surface to surface missile bases
• enemy C4 systems
• enemy population centers.
If the United States were to intervene in a local conflict,
Chinese theater ballistic missiles could inflict damage on
U.S. aircraft carriers or other naval vessels, as well as on
U.S. airfields in Japan.
The amount of damage the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) could currently inflict is open to question because of
the fact that the CEP of many of these systems is larger than
the targets against which they would be used. Whether the
target is an Asian adversary, or U.S. forces deployed in
support of that adversary, the key to success in destroying
military assets with conventional weapons is a low CEP.
Existing weapons, with their large CEPs, are primarily
useful as weapons of coercion because their inherent
inaccuracy is likely to preclude militarily relevant
targeting. If the adversary is Taiwan, a high CEP missile is
an extremely effective show of force given the high
population density—even if the missile does not hit its
target, there will be a lot of collateral damage. If the target is
U.S. forces at sea, high CEP weapons are considerably less
effective. China is currently working on improvements to
existing systems that would dramatically reduce the CEP to
25-40m.6 These efforts will have significant payoffs if they
are successful. If China were to achieve a low CEP, the
threat to a regional adversary would increase substantially,
because China could be confident of a successful
pre-emptive strike against key military targets. Moreover,
the resulting threat to U.S. forces would greatly complicate
U.S. military planning and the deployment of U.S. troops to
the region. In addition, a lower CEP decreases the weight of
the warhead, which would allow for an increase in the
potential range of the missile.
The role of China’s strategic missiles in a local conflict
would be much more indirect. The fact that China has a
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nuclear deterrent by definition affects the degree to which
other Asian countries would be willing to engage in a direct
military confrontation with China. It also, of course, poses
constraints on the degree to which the United States is
willing to become involved, and on the nature and timing of
that involvement. The existence of the Chinese nuclear
deterrent is a strategic “fact of life” that would be implicitly
considered in every decision about how and where to deploy
U.S. forces in an Asian conflict.
Given the rapid growth of China’s ballistic missile
inventory in recent years, it is safe to assume that the
military leadership believes that the possession of these
weapons will lower, and not raise, the cost of a regional
conflict. This assumption is likely to hold true if China uses
the missiles for coercive purposes. In fact, from China’s
perspective, coercion is an extremely low cost option,
because it is likely to meet with only a limited response from
the United States. The mere possession of the weapons
therefore offers to China the possibility of resolving a
situation without overt military activity and loss of life.
Counterbalancing this scenario is a more dangerous
possibility: namely that coercion will not be effective, and
China will actually have to use the missiles against specific
targets. If this happens, the costs could be very high,
astronomical in fact, from both a military and a political
perspective.
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CONFLICT
IN THE CONTEXT OF MISSILE DEFENSE
Given the attention now devoted to missile defense for
U.S. forces, U.S. allies, and the U.S. homeland, it is worth
asking whether or not the existence of these defenses would
in any way increase the cost of conflict for China under the
conditions set forth above. This analysis examines
primarily the military consequences of theater and national
missile defense.
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First, it is necessary to review the types of missile
defense systems that could be deployed, the area they could
cover, the number of weapons to be used, and the likely
deployment dates.
Two theater missile defense systems are referred to as
“lower tier.” The first is Navy Area Defense, a vertical
launch platform deployed on cruisers and destroyers (such
as the AEGIS) that can be used for both offensive and
defensive missile launches. The purpose of these weapons is
to defend at short range; they are aimed at enemy short
range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), cruise missiles, and
aircraft. The U.S. Navy intends to deploy this system on 40
ships. The second is the Patriot missile. The original
Patriots were deployed during the Gulf War to destroy
SCUD short-range ballistic missiles. Since the Gulf War
they have undergone considerable modification to improve
their effectiveness, and they are now referred to as PAC-2.
Further modifications will result in a PAC-3 missile that
will defend not only against SRBMS but also against cruise
missiles and aircraft. The PAC-3 is scheduled for
deployment in 2001 (although several observers believe it
will not be ready until later).7
Two missile defense systems are referred to as “upper
tier.” These weapons are intended to defend against
medium range threats and to provide coverage over a larger
area. One upper-tier weapon is the U.S. Army Theater High
Altitude Defense System (THAAD), a land based missile
that is intended to hit incoming missiles either inside or
outside the atmosphere. It is scheduled to be ready for
deployment in 2007. The Navy Theater Wide (NTW)
system, which might be ready by 2006, uses a booster to
launch a projectile that would kill an enemy missile before it
enters the atmosphere. It cannot be used for short-range
threats such as cruise missiles or SRBMs (which don’t leave
the atmosphere).
Finally, there are numerous options under consideration
for U.S. national missile defense. These must be considered
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because, if China’s strategic nuclear deterrent is relevant to
a regional conflict, so are developments that might
undermine the viability of that deterrent. The details of
U.S. national missile defense programs have been spelled
out in many other documents, so only a brief description is
provided here. The current program is a combination of
ground-based interceptors and an “exoatmospheric kill
vehicle” intended to stop an incoming missile before it
enters the atmosphere. These weapons are supported by
sensors and radars of various types. Current plans for
deployment in Alaska will provide protection from up to five
single warhead ICBMs equipped with simple penetration
aids. An expanded force of up to 100 interceptors could be
ready by 2007; this system could protect against an attack of
25 single warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs).
An alternative to the exoatmospheric vehicle is a
interceptor that would hit the enemy missile in the boost
phase. The earliest date a boost phase weapon could be
deployed is 2008. Four technical options for boost phase
intercept are currently being pursued: the airborne laser,
interceptors launched from unmanned aerial vehicles, a
space based laser weapon, and a sea based boost phase
weapon. The airborne laser, if successful, could potentially
be useful in the Asian theater.
In order to determine how the existence of these
weapons would affect a regional conflict, it is critical to
understand who can acquire them and how they will be
deployed. The relevant Asian players are Japan, which
could be drawn into a regional conflict because of alliance
commitments, and Taiwan. It is unlikely that any of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries with which China is likely to come into conflict
over disputed South China Sea territories will acquire and
deploy theater missile defense. U.S. deployments of theater
missile defense (TMD) are relevant both because the United
States has troops permanently stationed in Asia, and
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because additional U.S. forces could be deployed in the
event of a conflict.
Taiwan already has PAC-2 and would like PAC-3, as
well as AEGIS equipped destroyers (Navy Area Defense).
Taiwan has requested THAAD, but the United States has
not agreed to sell the weapon when it becomes available.
Taiwan also has an indigenously produced Patriot missile
equivalent called the Sky Bow.
Japan has deployed PAC-2 and can acquire PAC-3 when
the system comes on line. The Japanese are cooperating
with the United States on Navy Theater Wide defense, but
have not yet made a firm decision about purchasing the first
version of NTW (referred to as Block I) when it is available
in 2006. Japan has not indicated interest in purchasing or
deploying THAAD since the early 1990s and appears
unlikely to do so.
The United States has deployed one Patriot battery in
Korea. Although the United States has not stated with
certainty who will be eligible to buy future TMD systems, a
1999 Department of Defense (DoD) analysis provided a
“notional” TMD Asian architecture.8 This information,
together with other unclassified sources, make it possible to
make some assumptions based on the range of the weapons
they are intended to defend against. It is likely that THAAD
will be used by U.S. forces in Korea and possibly Japan as
well. Navy Area Wide and Navy Theater Wide weapon
systems will be deployed on ships that are part of the
Seventh Fleet. Table 3 thus provides a summary of potential
and plausible TMD deployments in Asia.
If it is true, as previously suggested, that the possession
of ballistic missiles lowers the cost of China’s decision to use
coercive measures, then it would logically follow that the
presence of anti-missile systems would raise the cost
proportionately. This logic only holds, however, to the
extent that missile defense systems will be either difficult or
expensive to overcome. China appears to have made a
calculation that these systems can be overcome, and is
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poised to respond in a relatively low cost manner. The
easiest way to neutralize the existence of U.S., Japanese,
Korean, or Taiwanese weapons is to expand offensive forces
until they can overwhelm foreign defenses. In order for this
approach to be effective, China would have to make two
commitments. First, it would be necessary to achieve
substantial gains in CEP, as previously discussed. It is well
established that Chinese scientists and engineers are
working on improved guidance, and there is every reason to
believe that they will be successful in achieving a CEP of
25-40m with commercially available technology. It is true
that improvements in accuracy might take several more
years, but it is also true that it will take a few more years for
the United States to deploy effective TMD. Thus, the two
timelines are likely to converge.
SYSTEM/
DEPLOYMENT
DATE

TAIWAN

JSDF

USFJ

KDF

USFK

Patriot
(PAC-3)/’01

X

X

X

X

X

Navy Area
Defense/ ‘03

X

X

THAAD/’07

X

X

Navy Theater
Wide/’06

X

?

US NAVY
PACIFIC

X
X

X

X

X

Table 4. Potential and Plausible TMD
Deployments in Asia.
Second, it will be necessary for China to commit to a
substantial increase in the theater missile inventory.
Initially, it might not be possible to offset every TMD system
in Asia, but it is reasonable to expect that China will
attempt to make sure it can overwhelm any TMD weapon
that could plausibly be deployed in Taiwan between now
and 2007. The financial cost of this endeavor will depend on
the exact number of TMD systems that will actually come on
line. There are no official documents that indicate the total
number of TMD weapons that will be available within the
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next 10 years for deployment in Asia or sale to Asian allies.9
Nevertheless, based on the 1999 report referred to above, as
well as other DoD planning and acquisition documents, it is
fair to make certain assumptions about missile defense
available to Taiwan. These calculations are based purely on
what systems will actually be built, and not on any political
considerations that might affect their sale or deployment. It
is plausible that by 2007, before THAAD is operational,
there could be a total of 330 combined upper and lower tier
ship based missiles, in addition to 48 Patriot missiles
defending Taiwan.10 To offset each of these and reserve
some forces for other Asian contingencies, China would
realistically need 1000 more missiles than it has today, or
an additional 166 missiles a year for the next 6 years.11
Chinese defense contractors have demonstrated the ability
to ramp up production, given the average increase of 70
theater missiles a year for the past 4 years. There would
certainly be a monetary cost, but it would not be beyond
China’s means. Mark Stokes has estimated that the cost to
China, per theater ballistic missile, is approximately
$500,000.12 This means an additional expenditure to China
of $83 million a year for the next 6 years. Expanded
inventories pose no other easily identifiable costs, since they
would not violate any treaty commitments, and they would
not, in and of themselves, trigger any economic or political
sanctions.
The same basic argument holds true for U.S. national
missile defense. China’s possession of a nuclear deterrent
provides numerous military options that it would not
otherwise have, in addition to significant prestige and
political power. Although in theory, boost phase intercept
defense systems would not cover Chinese ICBMs, it is very
likely that China will take no chances and will make sure
that the ICBM inventory is large enough to defeat any
plausible U.S. national missile defense. Here again, the
monetary cost involved is minimal compared with the cost of
U.S. defenses. Over the next 10 years, the United States
could conceivably deploy as many as 250 anti-missile
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weapons. One Chinese analyst therefore speculated that
China would need approximately 250 additional ICBMs
(beyond the 24 missiles China is believed to currently have)
over the next 10 years to be certain of defeating any U.S.
nuclear missile defense (NMD), and further speculated that
each missile would cost China 100 million Chinese RMB, or
approximately U.S.$12.5 million. This would amount to an
expenditure of 25 billion RMB, or U.S.$3.12 billion,
approximately 25 percent of the current announced Chinese
defense budget, or less than 2.5 percent per year for the next
10 years. To be sure, this would entail certain opportunity
costs, and it might entail political costs if significant
progress is made on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. But
even given those potential costs, it is difficult to see how
China could fail to increase its ICBM inventory to
compensate for U.S. national missile defense systems. The
risks that China’s nuclear deterrent could be undermined
are probably, from China’s perspective, medium to high,
whereas the costs of eliminating that risk are, by any
objective standard, extremely low.13
Whether a further expansion of Chinese theater and
strategic missile inventories would constitute an “arms
race” is an interesting, but perhaps an academic, question.
It is true that historically arms races have been the result of
an “offense-defense” cycle rather than the other way
around. However, there are no analogous situations from
history that can be used to draw inferences about this
particular action-reaction cycle. Even if it were possible to
make predictions with any confidence, the threat of an arms
race does not seem very compelling to any of the
participants. The fact that the original deployment of
Chinese missiles might have started an arms race, and the
fact that U.S. missile defense deployments might be
accelerating that race seem equally irrelevant to both sides.
Because the American missile defense “train” appears to
have left the station, and because it does not seem
reasonable to expect that the Chinese will believe U.S.
assertions that missile defense systems will have no effect
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on China’s defense posture, the only exogenous event that
could break this cycle is a regime imposed limit on missile
deployment. Unfortunately, international arms control and
nonproliferation experts have had a difficult time designing
and implementing effective regimes to deal with ballistic
missiles. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is
not a formal treaty, but rather an understanding among
certain countries that produce ballistic missiles about how
to limit missile and missile related exports. There are very
few items that members are precluded from exporting, but a
large number of items over which members agree to exercise
restraint. Although China has made a number of bilateral
pledges with respect to the MTCR, each one of these
commitments is qualified or limited in some way, and none
constitutes a formal treaty. Even if China were a legal
member of the MTCR, however, its provisions would not
ensure any constraints on Chinese options in a local conflict.
For P-5 countries, the MTCR governs transfers of missiles
and missile technologies, but not inventories. China is not
dependent on missile sales from abroad, and China’s recent
acceleration in missile production would not in any way
constitute a violation or an infringement of MTCR terms,
even if China were a formal member, which it is not.
Moreover, it is not likely that the scope of the MTCR will
expand to cover domestic inventories. Russian Prime
Minister Putin hosted a missile control meeting in March
2000 for G-8 countries, but the focus of this meeting was to
find ways to make MTCR transfer provisions less
discriminatory, and not to expand the arrangement to cover
national holdings, which would likely meet strong
opposition by all P-5 members.
Many U.S. officials and scholars view with alarm
China’s increasing theater and strategic missile
inventories. Whether these concerns are legitimate from a
security perspective, it is too soon to tell. But it is worth
remembering that however troubling these missiles might
be to the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and perhaps other
Asian countries who do not want to say so publicly, there is
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no international regime of any kind anywhere now, or on the
horizon, that will put a brake on future Chinese
development in this area. It is safe to say, moreover, that
there is not even an international “norm” or consensus that
China’s missiles are inherently destabilizing.
COSTS VERSUS CONSEQUENCES
A minimum of two plausible motivations or intentions
lie behind plans for U.S. theater and national missile
defense, and it is worth enumerating them because they are
often assumed to be one and the same, whereas each has a
different chance of realization. The missile defense effort, in
fact, appears to be a convergence of the views of at least two
different groups of advocates for the system. The first set of
advocates are motivated by the desire to protect U.S. troops,
U.S. allies, U.S. friends (and, in the case of NMD, the United
States homeland) from missiles from so-called states of
concern. This is the official position of the United States
government. Advocates from this group admit that China’s
defense posture will be affected, but insist that China is not
the object of U.S. NMD and TMD programs. The second
group of advocates wants to ensure American protection
from Chinese strategic or theater ballistic missiles, which
they see as a genuine security threat to the United States.
As one analyst expressed it: “. . . The development and
deployment of a robust, highly-capable American ballistic
missile defense (BMD) program must go forward with all
deliberate speed. Washington should stop denying that
there is a link between China’s nuclear modernization,
conventional missile buildup, and proliferation practices
and the requirement for BMD. These issues are related.”14
Whether the first military objective can be met appears
to be a highly debatable point. This first objective,
protection of U.S. troops, friends, allies, and homeland, is a
monumental task, and recent NMD system tests do not
suggest that it will be accomplished anytime soon. The
second objective, neutralizing an emerging China threat, is
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equally difficult although for different reasons. In the case
of Taiwan, for example, American TMD systems would
provide relatively little actual defense, and would function
almost exclusively as a political gesture. Based on the
information in the public domain, it is very hard to see a
scenario in which U.S. missile defense deployments will
cause China to stop, or even slow down, its military
modernization program, and many have argued that the
impact will be exactly the reverse.
Implied in the arguments of those who see Chinese
missiles as a direct threat to the United States is the notion
that the Chinese will change their minds if Washington
would only stand up to them. This is consistent with the idea
that the United States needs to “respond” to Chinese missile
deployments and overall defense modernization. In the
words of one critic,
The (Clinton) White House hardly says a word about China’s
ongoing ballistic missile buildup; its irresponsible proliferation
practices, or its robust strategic modernization program. I,
personally, am at a loss for why this silence persists. Chinese
national security policies and practices are critical to peace and
stability in Asia and American interests. The PRC’s actions are
having a direct effect on American deliberations about missile
defenses–plain and simple. We must make this clear to
Beijing.15

The assumption is that once China understands the
linkage between cause and effect, China will remove all
their missiles from Fujian province and refrain from further
increases in the inventory, or at least that they will start to
behave more reasonably and slow down the rate of
deployment. It is very likely, however, that the Chinese
understand perfectly well that it is their missiles that have
promoted an interest in TMD for Taiwan. In fact, they
understand it only too well, and reject the U.S. response as
inappropriate interference in a domestic issue. They have
probably already assessed in advance the price they will
have to pay, and have decided that the game is worth the
candle.
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An alternative approach proposed informally by an
American academic toward the end of 2000 is a compromise
whereby if China agrees to remove its theater missiles (or at
least some of them) from Fujian Province, the United States
would re-think its plans to sell TMD to Taiwan. The
assumption is that the promise of U.S. restraint would
constitute a meaningful incentive. However, it is hard to
imagine China agreeing to such a request. A U.S. offer to
stop doing what China believed to be illegitimate to begin
with hardly constitutes a meaningful incentive. Not to
mention the fact that the idea would be politically
unthinkable in Washington.
Yet another scenario is a compromise in which the
United States would agree to limits on TMD and NMD
deployments in return for Chinese limits on nuclear and
missile modernization, accompanied by transparency
measures. According to a newspaper report of the meeting
at which this proposal was discussed, the Chinese
would have to convince American planners that any nuclear
buildup would go only so far and would be keyed to the size of
the American shield, allowing China to keep something
resembling the minimal capacity for a counterattack that it
has had in the past but not fundamentally altering the
balance. The immediate goal would not necessarily be a treaty.
Rather, the two countries could begin by seeking a more
private and informal “strategic understanding” about the
expected size of the shield, as well as the number and kinds of
offensive weapons China planned to develop.”16

China’s leadership would have a very difficult time agreeing
to this proposition in a public way. Agreement would appear
to legitimize the U.S. ability to pose limits on Chinese power
and sovereign rights. For the scenario to work, China would,
ironically, have to make a nontransparent commitment to
be more open! And it is likely that conservative politicians
and bureaucrats in Washington would oppose such a
compromise, for exactly the same reason. The United States
would be put in the position of accepting Chinese imposed
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limits on what many in Washington perceive to be a critical
defense program.
Many others, of course, take a harder line, and suggest
that the United States must ensure that there are
consequences to China for deployment of these missiles. The
underlying assumption is that the United States can find
and impose a consequence accompanied by a cost so
unpalatable that China will rethink its security policy and
its options for dealing with Taiwan. Consequences are not
the same as costs. To date, no one has identified any real
costs for China other than the deployment of a very modest
TMD system, which China could choose to overcome. The
result would most likely not be more acceptable Chinese
behavior, and it might actually be a further military build
up. An effective U.S. response would require the United
States to make a convincing case to the rest of the world that
China’s missile buildup is doing demonstrable harm. It
would require developing an international consensus on the
need for limits on Chinese military, as well as a consensus
on what the limits should be, followed by international
support for enforcing those limits.
Given all these contradictions, a question worth
considering is why the Chinese themselves are so bent out of
shape about U.S. missile defense plans. At face value,
Chinese arguments about the potential harm that could be
done to China by missile defense are way out of proportion to
the actual cost to China of overcoming U.S. defenses, which
are (by Chinese admission) down at the nuisance level.
Perhaps the answer is that China lacks the capacity to deal
with any more nuisances right now, and resents the United
States adding to its list of emerging power problems.
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CHAPTER 10
“EATING IMPERIAL GRAIN”?:
THE ONGOING DIVESTITURE OF THE
CHINESE MILITARY-BUSINESS COMPLEX,
1998-20001
James Mulvenon
Introduction.
On July 22, 1998, at an enlarged session of the Central
Military Commission (CMC), CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin
gave a speech in which he called for the dissolution of the
military-business complex, asserting:
To make concerted efforts to properly develop the army in an
all-around manner, the central authorities decided: The army
and the armed police [wu jing] should earnestly screen and
rectify [qingli] various commercial companies operated by
their subordinate units, and shall not carry out any
commercial activities in the future . . . Military and armed
police units should resolutely implement the central
authorities’ resolution and fulfill as soon as possible the
requirements that their subordinate units shall not carry out
any commercial activities in the future.2

Jiang then sought to consolidate the decree by publicly
releasing the announcement through the party’s extensive
propaganda apparatus. That night, Jiang’s speech at the
meeting was broadcast on the CCTV Evening News, which
has the highest rating in China and is closely watched by
other Chinese media for cues about important stories.
Observers took special note of the fact that the Chinese
leader was shown flanked by the top brass of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), implying at least tacit consent to
the decision by the military. The next day, the Party’s
official newspaper, People’s Daily, ran a banner headline,
declaring “PLA Four General Departments Convened in
187

Beijing to Carry Out the Decision of the Anti-Smuggling
Meeting,” with the subtitle “Chairman Jiang Talked
Seriously About Divestiture.”3 The announcement was then
publicly seconded in subsequent days by key members of the
military and civilian leadership, including the de facto head
of the PLA, General Zhang Wannian, Chief of the General
Staff General Fu Quanyou (July 23),4 General Logistics
Department (GLD) Director Wang Ke (July 24),5 General
Political Department (GPD) Director General Yu Yongbo
(July 25),6 and General Armament Department (GAD)
Director General Cao Gangchuan (July 26),7 as well as
Politburo Standing Committee member Hu Jintao.8 From
the media barrage, it appeared that the decision might
actually have the political momentum to dislodge the
Chinese military from its difficult Catch-22.
While the divestiture announcement was immediately
picked up by Western and Chinese media and portrayed as a
dramatic reversal of policy, the reality of the situation was
much more complicated. Divestiture was not a sudden
decision at all. Jiang Zemin reportedly first floated the idea
of military “eating imperial grain” (chi huangliang, i.e., be
funded solely by the government) in 1990, but it was judged
to be impractical. In the absence of divestiture, the PLA
underwent over 8 years of rectification and consolidation
campaigns in the military enterprise system, and
divestiture should, in many ways, be seen as the logical
culmination of that effort. Moreover, the July 1998 meeting
was not even the first divestiture announcement. A decision
to divest had actually been made over a year earlier in May
1997, though the major transfers were not set to begin until
3 years later in May 2000. One important prefatory move,
the withdrawal of the preferential tax rates enjoyed by PLA
enterprises (local companies previously paid 33 percent
while PLA enterprises paid only 9 percent), had been
implemented in early 1998, and the PLA had reportedly
drawn up a plan for divestiture at least 6 months in advance
of the July 1998 announcement.9
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Thus, Jiang’s order represented only an acceleration of
the divestiture timetable. The complete reasons are not
entirely known, but there are at least two competing stories.
One rumor claims that divestiture was initiated by an angry
Jiang Zemin upon receiving an account of the excessively
corrupt activities of six PLA and People’s Armed Police
(PAP) companies, the most egregious of which involved oil
smuggling that was bankrupting the country’s two
geographical oil monopolies. 1 0 Indeed, there were
widespread reports of rampant smuggling by the military
during the Asian economic turmoil in early 1998, allegedly
depriving the government of hundreds of billions of
renminbi of customs revenue and worsening deflation.11
A second version of the story actually begins with Zhu
Rongji.12 According to cited U.S. intelligence sources, Zhu
Rongji angered the PLA at the July 17, 1998, meeting of the
anti-smuggling work conference by accusing the General
Political Department’s Tiancheng Group of rampant
corruption.13 In particular, he singled out a case in which
the company had avoided paying RMB50 million in import
and sales taxes after purchasing a shipment of partially
processed iron ore from Australia. “Every time our customs
officials tried to snare these bastards, some powerful
military person appeared to speak on their behalf,” Zhu
allegedly charged at the closed-door meeting. As anger and
resentment spread through the PLA leadership, Jiang
Zemin allegedly appeared at the conference 4 days later to
lend his support to Zhu, confirming that “some units and
individuals” in the PLA were involved in smuggling.
According to this account, Jiang thereupon announced the
divestiture order.
These accounts of the decision to divest the PLA of its
enterprises raise a fundamental analytical question: how
did the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) work
their way out of what could only be described as the fiscal
and political Catch-22 of military commercialism? Contrary
to the conflictual civil-military scenario put forward by
many observers in the Hong Kong media, the evidence
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instead suggests that the divestiture in principle was
largely supported by a corruption-weary military
leadership. They generally agreed with the political,
military, and economic rationales for divestiture. On the
political front, divestiture was aimed at curtailing
corruption within the ranks. The civilian leadership argued
that as long as the military operated in the commercial
economy, it was subject to “negative influences.” Jiang
Zemin reportedly spoke of preventing the military from
“changing color” and of keeping the military “pure.” At a
military level, divestiture was designed to return the PLA to
its primary professional mission: preparing for war. Finally,
from an economic perspective, there was recognition that
the military was not terribly adept at running commercial
operations.
A key condition for military acquiescence to divestiture,
however, was an assurance from the civilians that the PLA
would receive a sufficiently generous compensation
package for handing over its businesses. Indeed, sources in
Beijing confirm that the faultlines in the divestiture process
could be drawn between supporters, including the senior
military leadership and the combat units, and those who
have resisted the ban, especially members of the logistics
and enterprise management structure, military region
(MR) commands, and military district commands that stood
to lose their primary source of legal and illegal income.14
The heart of the bargain between the PLA and the
civilian leadership therefore centered on financial
compensation—in this case two separate financial deals.
The first was the one-time transfer of the PLA’s divested
enterprises. Reportedly, the financial burden for these
enterprises, including their weighty social welfare costs and
debts, was to be placed upon local and provincial
governments rather than the central government, though
no money was to change hands. This devolution of
responsibility from the center to the localities was seen by
many as yet another attempt by Zhu Rongji to restore some
measure of macro-level economic authority in China by
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forcing the lower levels of the system to assume greater
financial responsibility for the economic units in their area.
The second negotiation focused on the annual budget
increases to make up for lost enterprise revenues, with the
goal of consolidating Jiang’s earlier decree to the military to
“eat imperial grain” rather than rely on business for
revenue. Before the divestiture was completed, Hong Kong
sources reported that the PLA would receive between
RMB15-30 billion per year, with the exact time frame
subject to negotiation.15 Two months later, one of the same
authors reported that the PLA would receive RMB50 billion
as compensation for its lost enterprises.16 The Wall Street
Journal quoted U.S. diplomats as saying the government
offered about $1.2 billion, but the military demanded $24
billion. Sources at the GLD claimed in December 1998 that
the PLA would receive between RMB4-5 billion in
additional annual compensation, complementing continued
double-digit budget increases.17
For local units, however, the prospects of a lucrative
budget deal must be have been bittersweet, since it required
them to buy into what might be called “the trickle-down
theory of PLA economics.” Whereas units previously had
relatively direct control over enterprise finances, they now
had to place their faith in the notion that the budget funds
would trickle down through the system from Beijing to their
level. Previous experience with the Chinese military
bureaucracy did not inspire confidence that this would come
to pass. To ameliorate these concerns, the military
leadership took steps in the fall of 1998 to improve the
standard of living for the rank and file. The principal
measure was an increase in the salaries of servicemen by an
average of an additional 10-25 percent, depending on rank
and location.18 One lieutenant general in Beijing reportedly
received a raise of RMB400 per month, while two senior
colonels claimed increases of 20 percent from 1700RMB to
2040RMB.19 Overall, the average soldier in the PLA was
reportedly expected to receive an additional RMB100 per
month.20
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Phase One: Organization and Strategy.
Organization of the divestiture effort actually preceded
Jiang’s July 22 speech. On July 20, 1998, Jiang chaired a
meeting of the Politburo and reportedly asserted that “the
military cannot run businesses any more or the tool of the
proletariat dictatorship would be lost and the red color of
the socialist land would change.” General Zhang Wannian,
Vice-Chairman of the CMC, convened a meeting on July 21
to set up a military leadership small group, and in that
meeting a set of two milestones were reportedly established:
by the end of 1999, all businesses would sever their links
with the military and starting from 1999, the military would
rely entirely on the government budget.
Immediately after Jiang’s July 22 speech, the four
General Departments convened a meeting to implement the
decision, discussing the issue from July 23-26.21 The four
directors and political commissar Li Jinai attended the
meeting, which established a special task force to oversee
divestiture. The four general departments eventually
selected 30 cadres to staff the office of the military’s leading
small group. The participants also drafted a preliminary
plan, and began to lay out policies for dealing with issues
such as displaced workers, debts and credits, and real
estate.
At the same time, a top-level, civilian-led leading group
was reportedly established, with Jiang Zemin’s chosen
successor, Hu Jintao, as the head, and other party,
government, and military leaders, including Zhang
Wannian, and Luo Gan, as members.22 Hu’s appointment
served an important prelude to his official appointment as
vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission at the
end of October 1999.23 Despite Hong Kong media stories to
the contrary, there do not appear to have been any major
cleavages in the top civilian leadership over divestiture.24
One well-informed observer relates that Jiang and Zhu
were closely united on the issue, with Jiang providing the
political clout and Zhu providing economic instructions to
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his subordinates at the State Economic and Trade
Commission (SETC) as to the specifics of the separation.25
Over the next few weeks, corresponding leadership small
groups at lower levels of the system, including military
units and State Economic and Trade Commission branches,
were also established.
During the summer, the divestiture process was delayed
significantly by the massive flooding, in which the military
played a heroic role. By October 6-7, the situation had
sufficiently stabilized for Central Committee, State Council
and Central Military Commission to convene the
“Divestiture of Military, People’s Armed Police, and Law
Enforcement Organs Work Meeting,” aimed at producing a
detailed plan for the separation of enterprises from units.26
At that meeting, a new temporary organization was created,
known as the “National Office for the Handover of
Enterprises Under the Army, People’s Armed Police, and
Law Enforcement Organs.”27 The office of this leading group
was staffed primarily by personnel from the State Economic
and Trade Commission. The following 18 organizations
were also involved: the four General Departments, the
People’s Armed Police Headquarters, officials from the
Politics and Law Departments of the State Development
and Planning Commission, the Commission on Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND),
the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Inspection,
the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of the Treasury,
the Ministry of Personnel, the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economics, the
People’s Bank, the General Tax Bureau, the Industrial and
Commercial Bureau, and the Ministry of State Security.
The Handover Office was tasked with the promulgation of
detailed regulations governing the handover and takeover
of military enterprises, the organization and coordination of
divestiture, and oversight over lower-level offices. The
national office was also given responsibility for the
divestiture of ministry-level enterprises.28 Similar offices
were also set up by the State Economic and Trade
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Commissions of provinces and autonomous regions to take
charge of the takeover of enterprises based within their
geographic purview.
On October 9, after a series of work conferences, the four
General Departments of the PLA again convened another
meeting, entitled the “Divestiture of Military and People’s
Armed Police Work Conference.”29 Also in attendance were
representatives of the CMC General Office, military region
headquarters, and military district headquarters. At this
meeting, detailed plans regarding the handover of military
firms were prepared. The guiding principle of this effort, as
defined by the Central Committee was: “turning over
enterprises first, consolidating them later.”30 Accordingly,
the work teams were sent to the units to get a proper
accounting of the units’ legal and illegal commercial
activities. Information on illegal activities was used to
prepare cases for the military’s discipline inspection
commission, while data on the legal enterprises were used
to give the military leadership a clear picture of the extent
and financial viability of the military-business complex.
Specifically, the work teams sought to assess the number of
enterprises that required transfer, the number of enterprise
employees involved in the process, and the asset/debt values
of the enterprises. This first phase was completed by
mid-October 1998. One official government assessment of
the asset value of enterprises owned by the military was
roughly RMB50 billion (U.S.$6.02 billion).31
Phase Two: Formal Registration and Asset
Valuation.
The second phase of the divestiture, begun in late
October 1998, involved the formal registration and
assessment of assets of the enterprises, followed by the
expected official transfer of these enterprises to Handover
Offices at the state, provincial, autonomous district, and
municipality level.32 The 16-character slogan for this phase
was “comprehensive combing, good planning, discretionary
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treatment, and step-by-step implementation.”33 In general,
stable enterprises were to be transferred to the
governments, while profitable companies were to be placed
underneath the SETC offices. In addition, a considerable
number of banking, security, and trading companies that
were poorly managed and operated, together with those
industrial enterprises that have suffered serious losses
were expected to be reorganized or closed down altogether.34
More specifically, divestiture affected each of the six
parts of the PLA’s business empire in different ways. The
original divestiture order explicitly targeted commercial
enterprises (jingying xing qiye), mandating that all of these
businesses should be either handed over to civilian
authorities or closed down. For the other five parts of the
system, the leading groups have been forced to adopt a
series of gradual policies:
• Units meeting logistics needs (baozhang xing qiye
providing houqin fuwu), including repair shops, munitions
factories, and uniform factories, were partially divested,
with some businesses handed over to civilian authorities
and others retained by the military. The guiding rationale
asserts that the military does not need to make all of these
things itself, and should be able to outsource some of this
production.
• Farms (nongchang), covering several million mu of
land, have been completely retained.
• Fee-for-service businesses (youchang fuwu), such as
hospitals and research facilities (keyan danwei), were
retained because the facilities have excess capacity and
highly advanced equipment not generally found in the
civilian sector. In the case of hospitals, the military alone
cannot provide enough patients to make efficient use of
these resources. By serving the public, they can raise their
level of expertise and earn a relatively insignificant amount
of money for the military at the same time.
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• Welfare businesses (fuli xing qiye), including factories
set up to provide employment to military dependents (also
known as jiasu gongchang), were partially divested, with
some closed and others, particularly those in remote areas
where relatives have no other options for employment,
retained.
• Cover operations (yanhu qiye), including enterprises
providing cover for intelligence gathering, national
security, foreign affairs, and united front operations, were
partially divested.
The center [the top-level leading group] decreed that all
military enterprises should be dealt with in one of three
ways. The first option was “handover” (yi jiao) to civilian
authorities. This applied to commercial operations and
hotels, though not to guesthouses (zhaodaisuo). Most
enterprises were to be handed over to local authorities.
Some were handed over to the central government,
specifically to the State Economic and Trade Commission
(Jingmaowei). Local authorities were not to provide any
compensation, which was supposed to come from the central
government in the form of a lump sum. Military employees
of these enterprises could choose to return to the military or
to stay with the enterprise. Not surprisingly, lower ranking
military employees tended to stay with the enterprise, while
higher ranking employees tended to return to the
perquisites of the military. The second option was closure
(chexiao) of the enterprise. There were many reasons for
closure, including commercial nonviability, heavy debts, or
the location of the enterprise within the perimeter of a
military installation, which meant that the business could
not be handed over to the civilian authorities without
creating a security problem. The third and final option was
retention (baoliu), which was generally applied to those
enterprises meeting specific military needs (baozhang xing
qiye).
Not surprisingly, the divestiture encountered some
resistance among military units reluctant to part with their
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enterprises during this second phase. Some departments
reportedly attempted to fold their enterprises under
subordinate institutions that were not being screened by
the central authorities.35 Others tried to shield their
profitable enterprises while willingly sacrificing their
bankrupt enterprises. In cases where the enterprise was
using the label of “military enterprise” (jundui qiye) as a
convenient cover for tax reductions and privileged access to
transport or raw materials, individuals or units tried to
have the enterprises re-classified as nonmilitary
enterprises. A significant number of enterprises were
reportedly transferred to the control of relatives of military
officers or defrocked military officers, meaning that these
enterprises retained their unofficial links to their former
units. Some of this backsliding was considered so serious
that the office of the military leading small group in the first
half of December 1998 was forced to dispatch four work
groups of 30 members each to inspect the larger units.
Even some of the divestiture transfers themselves
involved elements of illegality. One of the military’s highest
profile enterprises, the five-star Palace Hotel in Beijing,
attracted interest from numerous civilian companies.36
Eventually, the General Staff Department sold their joint
venture stake in the hotel to a state enterprise, China
Everbright Group, Ltd., which was looking to expand its
hotel assets. According to the PRC Joint Venture Law,
however, the remaining co-owners, Hong Kong’s Peninsula
Group (which managed the hotel) and Japanese
construction company, Kumagai Gumi, should have
enjoyed the right of first refusal of the army’s shares.
Instead, Peninsula got to approve the transfer only after it
was arranged. Ironically, therefore, a process designed to
reduce the incidence of illegality among the armed forces
was itself provoking illegal behavior. Moreover, the deal
may even be detrimental to Peninsula Group. In 1997,
China Everbright set up its own hotel management firm,
and might take over from Peninsula when the latter’s
management contract comes up for re-extension in 2002.
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The emerging details of the second phase also aroused
resentment among the central, provincial, and municipal
bureaucrats, who were being “forced” to take over the PLA’s
many large and bankrupt enterprises.37 The transfer of
these enterprises to government offices was seen by many
as another component of Zhu Rongji’s strategy to
re-centralize macro-level decisionmaking authority and
extract more resources from the provinces, many of which
were perceived to have benefited disproportionately from
reform at the expense of central coffers. For the local
governments, however, these enterprises were simply
another burden. The factories were particularly
unattractive to the civilian governments, who would be
saddled with the fiscal costs of free social services
(education, housing, health care, etc.) for thousands of
unemployed or underemployed workers. Furthermore, local
officials would assume responsibility for finding new jobs for
these workers, adding to their already weighty burden in
this area. Some of the problems were addressed at a critical
“transfer work meeting” convened on November 29.
December 15, 1998: Official Handover.
By December 15, 1998, the government officially
announced the end of the second phase. Reportedly, 2,937
firms belonging to the PLA and People’s Armed Police were
transferred to local governments, and 3,928 enterprises
were closed.38 The big loser was the GLD, which saw more
than 82 percent of its enterprises transferred or closed. A
partial list of the enterprises can be found in Table 1.
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Units
Divested

Province
39

Hebei
Guangdong

40
41

Jiangsu
Beijing
Shenyang

42
43
44

Hainan

45

Shanghai

46

Tianjin

47

Jiangxi

48

Lanzhou

Workers

Output
Value

Profits

122
390

6700

Asset
Values

Debt
Values

1.47b

1.07b

2.0b

64

1.4b

68

2300

47

762

830m

1.4b
534m

29
9

600

30m

300m

67
8

687

45.7m

68

Table 1. Partial List of Divested PLA and PAP
Enterprises.
One-third of the companies and their subsidiaries were
retained by divestiture offices at the central level, while the
remaining two-thirds were transferred to divestiture offices
at the local level. Profitable regional military
conglomerates, such the Jinling Pharmaceuticals Group in
the Nanjing MR, were placed directly under the direction of
the regional commission.49 By contrast, the 10 mid-sized
firms and 40 small-sized firms of the Strategic Rocket
Forces, whose businesses had not been terribly profitable,
were given to their local governments.50 The commercial
elements of China’s most profitable military conglomerates,
such as Xinxing, Songliao, and Sanjiu (999), were not
handed over to local governments for reorganization, but
were instead placed directly under the control of the State
Economic and Trade Commission in Beijing.51 Eventually,
it was thought that these large companies would be
independent, state-owned conglomerates. As an example,
the experiences of Xinxing in this process are representative
of the fate of these big firms.52 Because Xinxing contained
enterprises engaged in both military and non-production,
its handover was very complicated. In the end, 56 numbered
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factories, which produced machines, logistics materials,
clothes, and hats for the PLA, were kept under military
control, but the trade group was transferred to the SETC.
The ten specialized firms owned by Xinxing were reduced to
seven after divestiture, with Xinxing Foundry retained by
the military and two other firms transferred to chemical
groups. At the same time, three new firms, including the
General Logistics Construction Company that built the
Military Museum, the new CMC Building, and the Beijing
301 Hospital, were added to Xinxing, restoring the number
of firms to ten.
All of the large-size firms were subject to a broad set of
rules. The central government would still control the
nomination of the leadership of large-size firms, groups, and
major enterprises of important industries. In terms of
accounting and budget, the Ministry of Treasury would
manage the financial affairs of those firms managed by the
central government. All firms were required to participate
in local social insurance schemes according to geographic
divisions.
The remaining 8,000-10,000 enterprises, most of which
were the smaller, subsistence-oriented enterprises at the
local unit level, remained in the military.53 The reforms
were also “suspended” in some sectors, especially civil
aviation, railway and posts and telecommunications,
because of the “special nature” of these industries.54 For
example, the Air Force’s China United Airlines was
permitted to continue operating.55 Other notable exceptions
included the 56 numbered factories previously under the
control of the GLD’s Xinxing Group, which remained under
the administrative control of the General Logistic
Department’s pared-down Factory Management
Department (formerly the larger Production Management
Department); and Poly Group, which was divided between
the General Equipment Department (arms trading
elements like Poly-Technologies) and COSTIND.
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Phase Three: The Real Bargaining Begins.
A Handover Office Work Meeting was held December 28,
1998, at the Jingfeng Hotel in Beijing.56 The meeting,
chaired by Handover Office Director Sheng Huaren, was
attended by the CEOs of the 148 large-size PLA and PAP
enterprises handed over to the SETC Handover Office.
According to Sheng, these 148 enterprises and groups
included 903 factories and subsidiaries, all of which had also
been relinquished to the national office, and other military
enterprises, which had been given to local handover offices.
While these moves were significant in their scale and scope,
the Central Committee’s guidance cited above also
suggested that the opening two phases of the divestiture
were only the beginning of a much longer, and more
protracted process of allocating and restructuring
thousands of troubled enterprises. According to Qin
Chaozheng, the director of the Economic and Trade
Commission of the Hebei Provincial Government:
It will be an arduous task to turn these enterprises over to
proper units for their management and to standardize their
operation. More than half of these enterprises are poor in
management. It is necessary to further improve their
management mechanisms and turn them into legal and
competitive entities that are suitable to the market economy
and that are able to conduct management independently.57

The first task for the third phase of the divestiture
process, which began after the December 15 transfers,
involves going through the accounts of all PLA enterprises,
which must be squared before these enterprises are allowed
to become fully civilianized or merged with civilian firms. It
is expected that this process will take at least 2-3 years,
depending on the number of major corruption cases that are
generated. The asset evaluation was to be performed by
accounting agencies designated by the SETC.58 Some initial
results of the third phase have already been publicized.
Among many examples, the PLA’s 9791 Cement Factory
was turned over to local authorities in Tongchuan City on
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March 30, 1999, and renamed the “Shaanxi Provincial
Lishan Cement Plant.” 59 In March 1999, it was also
announced that 150 large enterprises formerly owned by
the military and the armed police were being transformed
into state-owned corporate groups.60 Xinxing, for example,
remains as an independent, nonmilitary entity, controlling
one of the General Logistics Department’s largest
construction units. The top-level management of the large
enterprises is being selected and appointed by the central
government, especially the Ministry of Finance, which was
placed in charge of supervising the assets of these
enterprises. By contrast, nearly all of the smaller
enterprises have been handed over to local authorities.
Regardless of size, however, all enterprises are being
required to transfer their credit liabilities, as well as
participate in the medicare insurance programs on behalf of
their employees. Those that failed to offset their debts
would be overhauled, shut down or acquired by other, viable
companies.
Exempted from Divestiture: PLA Telecoms.
Military commercial telecommunications ventures were
one sector singled out for special exemptions. Interviews in
Beijing strongly suggest that PLA telecoms in general was
given a “get-out-of-jail-free” card from the central
leadership, because the resulting information technology
acquisition was seen as an essential contributor to the
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C4I)
revolution currently underway in the PLA. To manage the
post-divestiture operations, the PLA created two
communications groups. Reportedly, the first is dedicated
exclusively to internal military traffic at high levels of
security. The second leases capacity of existing networks to
civilian operators. In the latter case, the PLA was
considered to be de-linked if they did not directly enroll
individual subscribers (i.e., deal directly with “the public”),
yet they could lease to operators who did enroll customers
(i.e., cable companies). While radio paging was abandoned
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(e.g., China International Trust and Investment
Corporation [CITIC] Pacific bought the Bayi radio paging
business in Guangzhou) and many companies had to break
their high-profile links with foreign companies, the China
Electronic Systems Engineering Company (CESEC) in
particular was not only allowed to stay in business but in
some cases expand its operations.
One illustrative case of the new ambiguous status of
PLA telecommunications involves a fiber optic network
previously managed by the Guangzhou Military Region. At
the end of 1998, the network’s managing unit, the Office of
Technology Support for Economic Construction (OTSEC),
was nominally transferred over to the Guangdong
provincial government as part of the divestiture process. By
all accounts, the transfer appears to be a legal ruse to allow
the PLA to continue to be engaged in commercial telecom
activities. The office remains essentially military and it still
oversees much of the military telecom network in the
Guangzhou MR, as well as the optical fiber network. The
OTSEC is still actively negotiating with a large number of
Chinese and foreign companies to lease surplus PLA
telecoms networks and to build an updated high speed data
and voice transmission network. In February 2000, Hong
Kong-based CITIC Pacific purchased the fiber network
itself from the PLA to be the cornerstone of its new network
rollout. It is said that CITIC spent over 2 billion RMB
buying the unused fiber from the military. An $80 million
purchase of optical equipment from Lucent will expand the
capacity of the existing 16,000km of fiber and extend it to
over 32,000km nationwide. Despite the sale of the network
to civilians, however, interviews indicate that the PLA
continues to retain controlling ownership of the lines
through civilian fronts.
Perhaps the most salient example of the uncertain legal
and regulatory status of continuing PLA telecommunications ventures involves the “Great Wall” Code Division
Multiple Access (CDMA) cellular project owned by the
General Staff Department Communications Department’s
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commercial arm, CESEC. In accordance with divestiture,
CESEC sold its 20 percent share in the Nanjing-based
satellite joint venture holding company with KPN Royal
Dutch Telecom, but retained initial control of the four trial
CDMA networks in Beijing, Tianjin, Xi’an, and Shanghai.
In 1999, CESEC’s civilian partner in the deals, China
Telecom, was ordered out of the projects, so that the
networks could be prepared for handover to China Unicom,
the weak number two telecom player which was betting on
CDMA to help it gain a respectable market share against
the larger Global System for Mobile Communications
(GSM) networks run by China Telecom. As quickly as this
arrangement was offered, however, the central authorities
reversed themselves, and announced that the PLA would be
retaining ownership of the networks. There are many
competing reasons why the transfer fell through. China
Telecom did not want Unicom to get Great Wall’s CDMA
networks, since the combined CDMA assets of the two
players posed a greater threat to the dominant market
share enjoyed by China Telecom’s GSM networks. Unicom
did not want to be bothered with Great Wall’s overhead,
which included significant debt, personnel, housing,
pension, and other social welfare costs. Moreover, the Great
Wall system is a narrow-band second-generation CDMA
standard, and Unicom wanted to move to the broadband
third-generation standard.
Before resuming its CDMA business, however, CESEC
had to solve a big problem. Divestiture explicitly prohibited
the PLA from dealing directly with customers, so they
needed a new partner that could serve as an “interface.”
Eventually, CESEC appeared to partner with ChinaSat,
the satellite communications company spun off from China
Telecom. Since Great Wall was the name of the now defunct
joint venture between CESEC and China Telecom, the
Great Wall joint venture was formally superceded by a
company called China Century Mobile Communications
Company, whose investors reportedly include CESEC,
ChinaSat, the Beijing Municipal Government, Datang
204

Group, and Beijing Zhongguancun Technology
Development Ltd. The latter company, which plans to
invest U.S.$6 million in Century Mobile once it is approved
by the central government, is itself owned in part by two of
China’s best known companies, Founder Group and Legend
Group Holdings, the country’s biggest computer maker.
Additional technical support (and perhaps a small share of
equity investment) will likely be provided by the Chinese
Academy of Telecommunications Technology, a research
institute under the Ministry of Information Industry.
CESEC’s role in Century Mobile is also multi-faceted,
undercutting earlier reports that ChinaSat would be the de
facto operator of the networks with CESEC as a passive
investor. Instead, it appears that CESEC has retained its
primary role as the designer, builder and integrator of
communications networks. As stated by one official from
Shenzhou Great Wall Communications Development
Center, the PLA company overseeing the trial CDMA
network in Beijing: “Other companies will invest in the
network, and we will build it.”61
The first public hint of these new developments
appeared in late December 1999, when Samsung and a
company named Hebei Century Mobile Communications
began construction of a new CDMA network serving 11
cities in Hebei province. In a press release only circulated in
Korea, Samsung heralded the opening of the Hebei 133
CDMA mobile telephone network. The Korean company
reportedly supplied U.S.$31 million of mobile systems
equipment, including 11 mobile switching centers (capable
of servicing 200,000 subscribers) and 165 base stations, and
expected more than U.S.$200 million in follow-up orders. By
February 2000, this network reportedly had attracted
15,000 subscribers.62
The Great Wall/Century Mobile case is a striking
illustration of the continuing role of the PLA in commercial
telecoms operations, and certainly suggests that
telecommunications was exempted from divestiture. At the
very least, it suggests that the civilian leadership is willing
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to turn a blind eye to the activities, because of their side
benefits for the military’s own communications system.
Divestiture, therefore, was not a blanket condemnation of
the military’s participation in business, but instead was a
process capable of making logical exceptions, especially
when it threatened to throw the baby out with the
bathwater. At the same time, the PLA telecommunications
networks continue to operate in a hazy, inchoate gray area,
with neither central approval nor rebuke. At a July 18,
2000, cabinet meeting, for instance, State Council
“Document No. 40" was reportedly issued, ordering the
military once again to turn the Great Wall networks over to
China Unicom as well as the 10MHz of frequency in the
800MHz band that the military was using for its CDMA
systems. For more than a month, the military allegedly
resisted the command, hoping to retain some or all of the
networks and frequencies for its own secure
communications. As of September 2001 it is still not clear
whether the transfer has been completed.
Divestiture Problems: Resource Allocation and
Discipline.
As the divestiture entered 1999,some serious
bureaucratic and political conflicts began to surface.
Overall, they can be divided into two categories: resource
allocation and discipline. Each of these disputes has
important implications for our assessment of the final
success or failure of the divestiture process.
In terms of resource allocation, early trends suggested
that the PLA’s compensation, especially in the area of the
official budget, was going to be far less than the military
expected. In March 1999, Minister of Finance Xiang
Huaicheng announced the military budget for the new fiscal
year in his annual work report:
In line with the CCP Central Committee request, central
finances will provide appropriate subsidies to the army, armed
police force, and political and law organs after their severance of
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ties with enterprises. In this connection, this year’s defense
expense will be 104.65 billion yuan, up 12.7 percent from the
previous year because of the provision of subsidies to the army
and of regular increases.63

Outside observers immediately noticed the meagerness
of the figure, both in relative and absolute terms. At a
relative level, the 12.7 percent increase was not
significantly higher than the 12 percent increase of the
previous year, calling into question the notion that the fiscal
priority of the PLA had been augmented. Even in absolute
terms, the increase of RMB13.65 billion between 1998 and
1999 was not that much larger than the RMB10.43 billion
increase between 1997 and 1998, and reportedly included
only a RMB3 billion compensation for the loss of business
income. Where was the additional RMB15-50 billion
reported in the Hong Kong media? Why did the military
receive only RMB3 billion extra when even the official
China Daily newspaper pegged the estimated annual
profits and taxes of the enterprises at RMB5 billion
(U.S.$602 million)?64
There are several plausible explanations for this
budgeting outcome. The first, and most difficult to prove, is
that that PLA was sufficiently compensated with off-budget
funds that are not calculated into the official budget. Given
the Byzantine nature of the Chinese budgeting process, we
may never have a definite estimate of any off-budget
compensation. The second explanation is that the PLA did
not have as much as leverage in the divestiture process as it
or outsiders thought, allowing the civilian leadership to get
the military out of business “on the cheap.” The third
possibility, supported by a loud chorus of PLA grumbling
and complaining, is that the military was “duped” by the
civilian leadership, the latter of whom had implicitly
promised a higher level of compensation. Indeed, there is
some evidence to suggest that the RMB3 billion of
compensation is based on the conservative profit estimate of
RMB3.5 billion (on total revenue of RMB150 billion) that
the PLA gave to Zhu Rongji before the divestiture
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announcement in July. This low estimate was very much in
line with previous PLA estimates by the General Logistics
Department, which consistently undervalued the profit of
the military enterprise system in order to lessen the central
tax burden of the commercial units. If the above story is
true, then the major source of the PLA’s animus may be that
it was hoisted by its own petard. At the time of writing,
however, it is difficult to judge which of these three
explanations is correct, but the fact remains that vocal
elements within the PLA appear to be significantly
dissatisfied with the compensation package, above and
beyond the usual bureaucratic rapaciousness for ever
greater resources.
Apart from budgets, additional resource allocation
disputes have arisen over distribution of enterprise assets
in the post-divestiture environment. According to one
well-informed observer, there have been some serious
differences over levels of asset compensation because of the
escalating costs of debts and liabilities incurred by
enterprises.65 Many firms were poorly managed with
incomplete accounting records and borrowed from multiple
creditors. The firms’ relationships with banks needed to be
clarified, and licenses needed to be re-registered. Another
problem involved personnel. When military officers and
workers were transferred to the localities, their healthcare
and insurance had to be transferred as well, creating
unwanted social welfare burdens for the new owners.
In other cases, there is intra-military bargaining over
the fate of individual assets. One of the most public
examples of this was the dispute between the Beijing
Military Region and the General Armaments Department
over the fate of the Huabei Hotel in central Beijing.66 Under
the rules of the handover, military units at the bureaucratic
rank of military region, which also covers the new GAD, are
allowed to keep only one three-star hotel. Before
divestiture, the Beijing Military Region controlled two
three-star hotels, including the Huabei, which it agreed to
hand over to the SETC Handover Office. Since the GAD is a
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new organization and therefore had no hotels, it reportedly
coveted the Beijing command’s extra hotel. Thus far,
however, the military region headquarters has declined to
transfer the hotel to the General Armaments Department,
igniting an unresolved bureaucratic struggle within the top
military and civilian leaderships.
The second major set of problems resulting from
divestiture involved discipline issues, mainly corruption
and profiteering. While the data in this area remain
anecdotal, there is some evidence to suggest that the
civilian leadership has aggressively pursued discipline
investigations involving corruption in PLA enterprises,
much to the chagrin of PLA officers who feel that the effort is
gratuitous and harmful to the public reputation of the
military.67 Susan Lawrence of the Far Eastern Economic
Review reports from well-placed Chinese sources that the
SETC Receiving Office has a list of 23 company executives
at the rank of major-general or above who have fled the
country since the divestiture was announced.68 Seven of
these officers are from the Guangzhou Military Region,
which handed over more than 300 enterprises, and another
five are from PLA headquarters. Among the latter is Lu Bin,
former head of the General Political Department’s
Tiancheng Group, who was arrested overseas and
extradited in January 1999. Other arrestees include a
senior colonel who was the head of one of the PLA’s top
hotels, the Huatian, which is located in Changsha. As the
various receiving offices continue to process the assets and
books of some of the shadier PLA enterprises, one can only
expect the numbers of disciplinary investigations to
increase.
Conclusion.
In a sense, divestiture brings the PLA full circle. The
pattern of the campaign, ranging from the transfers of its
high-profile commercial enterprises to the retention of its
lower-level farms and industrial units, suggests that the
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military has essentially returned to the pre-1978
“self-sustaining” economy. Thus, the widespread conclusion
that the PLA has been “banned” from business is far too
simplistic. The military will continue to operate a wide
variety of small-scale enterprises and agricultural units,
with the goal of supplementing the incomes and standards
of living for active-duty personnel and their dependents at
the unit level. Profit and international trade, however, will
no longer be critical features of the system. Moreover, the
military leadership hopes that the divestiture of profitable
companies will greatly reduce the incidence of corruption
and profiteering in the ranks, and thereby refocus the PLA
on its important professionalization tasks.
At this point, of course, it is too soon to judge the
long-term impact of this divestiture on the PLA. While
participation in business had spawned endemic levels of
corruption, an honest assessment would also admit that the
military-business complex made positive contributions by
subsidizing an underfunded military, improving the
material life of the rank-and-file, and creating jobs for cadre
relatives. Despite these benefits, however, the military and
civilian leadership in the end decided that the
disadvantages of commercialism outweighed the
advantages, particularly with the prospect of professional
tasks like the liberation of Taiwan and potential military
conflict with the United States on the horizon.
What will the short- to medium-term future hold for the
divestiture process? Most likely, the next few years will
witness repeated “mop-up” campaigns on the part of the
central leadership and significant resistance and
foot-dragging on the part of local military officials,
repeating the pattern of earlier rectifications. An audit in
early 1999 revealed that the military had kept back some 15
percent of its businesses, necessitating the extension of
some deadlines until August 1999. As late as May 2000, a
top-level meeting on divestiture all but admitted that the
military continues to shield some assets from the process,
stating that the withdrawal of the military from business
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activities had only been “basically completed” (emphasis
added).69 Nonetheless, it is critical not to downplay the
importance of what has already occurred. There is
significant evidence to suggest that the divestiture has
ended the legal participation of the PLA in commercial
activity, perhaps closing one of most unique and interesting
chapters of the post-Mao revolution.
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